2018 HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW

PEOPLE IN NEED
13.1 M

NOV 2017

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

WFP/Hussam Al-Saleh
This document is produced on behalf of the Strategic Steering Group (SSG) and humanitarian partners working under the Whole of Syria (WoS) framework. It provides the humanitarian community's shared understanding of the crisis, including the most pressing humanitarian needs and estimated number of people who need assistance.

While this provides a consolidated evidence base that helps inform joint strategic planning, many of the figures provided throughout the document are estimates based on sometimes incomplete and partial methodologies.

The designations employed and the presentation of material in the report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city, area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

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PART I: SUMMARY

Humanitarian Needs
At a Glance
Impact of the Crisis
Key Figures
Breakdown of People in Need
Severity of Needs
Perceptions of Affected People
Access and Operational Challenges
Operational Capacity
Assessment Methodology and Information Gaps
HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

Entering the seventh year of the crisis, the scale, severity, and complexity of needs across Syria remain overwhelming. Some 13.1 million people in Syria require humanitarian assistance.* Of these, 5.6 million people are in acute need due to a convergence of vulnerabilities resulting from displacement, exposure to hostilities, and limited access to basic goods and services.** Conflict continues to be the principal driver of humanitarian needs, with the civilian population in many parts of the country exposed to significant protection risks which threaten life, dignity and wellbeing on a daily basis.

Despite some reduction in the level of hostilities in certain parts of the country, notably through some of the de-escalation agreements*** (for more information on the specific de-escalation agreements/areas, please refer to p.34), and a reduction in the number of UN-declared besieged locations, sustained or increased violence in many other areas has affected the lives of countless civilians. In 2017, people in Syria continued to bear the brunt of the hostilities in the absence of a political solution, with sustained violence contributing to the world’s largest displacement crisis. Similar to last year, some 1.8 million population movements occurred in the first nine months of the year alone, with many people believed to have been displaced multiple times.\(^1\) Of the 5.5 million Syrian refugees worldwide, most of whom remain in neighboring countries, a very limited number have returned to Syria.\(^7\) In 2017, an estimated 721,647 people returned to their areas of origin.\(^7\) While the number of self-organized spontaneous returns**** has slightly increased from 2016 levels during the first nine months of 2017 (20 per cent),\(^6\) the overall conditions for safe, dignified and sustainable returns are not yet in place in many parts of the country. Against the disruption caused by prolonged hostilities and extensive displacement, access to services as well as livelihood opportunities remain scarce. People’s ability to cope is therefore strained and ultimately inhibits their ability to meet basic needs.

Within the overall 13.1 million people in need, and notwithstanding individual vulnerabilities related to age, gender, disability and socio-economic status, there are 5.6 million facing particularly acute needs. Amongst these, six population groups are deemed most vulnerable due to exposure to risk factors such as besiegement, hostilities, displacement and limited access to basic goods and services.\(^7\) There are some 2.98 million people living in hard-to-reach areas, including 419,000 in UN-declared besieged areas.\(^7\) This entails a reduction of some 1.9 million people living in hard-to-reach areas over the last year. Although there has been increased access to many areas in the northeast of Syria, the needs of people in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas continue to be exceptionally severe due to arbitrary restrictions on the freedom of movement of the civilian population; the inability to access basic commodities, services or humanitarian assistance; physical insecurity; and persistent challenges to deliver humanitarian assistance. At the same time, hostilities continued to fuel large-scale displacement in Syria, at an average rate of 6,550 displaced each day. Those people newly displaced as well as some 750,000 people living in last resort sites face particularly acute needs due to a convergence of humanitarian risk factors.***** Similar levels of exposure to protection risks and challenges in accessing basic services are also faced by overburdened communities, spontaneous returnees and people living in areas with high intensity conflict, with millions across Syria affected.

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* While this document provides a consolidated evidence base emerging from various assessments conducted throughout the country and intended to help inform joint strategic planning, many of the figures provided throughout the document are estimates based on sometimes incomplete and partial methodologies.
** People in acute need are exposed to a convergence of humanitarian risk factors and face either severe, critical or catastrophic problems as per the inter-sector severity categorization tool (please refer to page 74 for more information on the inter-sector severity categorization tool).
*** De-escalation agreements refer to a memorandum signed in Astana on 4 May by the governments of Russia, Turkey and Iran which foresaw the establishment of “de-escalation areas” (DEAs) in Syria. The United Nations is not a party to these agreements.
**** The use of the term ‘spontaneous return’ through the HNO refers to those returns which are ‘self-organized’ and refers to both IDPs and refugees.
***** Last resort camps, collective centres, reception/transit centres and informal settlements refer to those sites used as a measure of last resort, after IDPs have exhausted all other options.
Civilians in Syria continue to face an ongoing protection crisis. Amid active hostilities in many parts of the country, humanitarian actors remain concerned by the high levels of civilian casualties that continue to be reported and point to violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL), including the prohibition on launching indiscriminate attacks and of the principles of proportionality and precaution. Civilians continue to be exposed to the effects of explosive hazards in densely populated urban areas, with the Protection sector estimating that up to 8.2 million people are exposed to explosive hazards. Indiscriminate attacks on densely populated areas, resulting in the destruction of civilian infrastructure, particularly affected health facilities, schools, water networks, markets and places of worship, continue. The Syria Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM4Syria) on grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict verified 26 attacks on schools, children and/or teachers/education, while the Health sector reported up to 107 attacks affecting health workers and facilities in the first half of 2017. Throughout the year, overall vulnerabilities continue to deepen, disproportionately affecting children. Child recruitment is a particular concern, with 18 per cent of 300 verified cases (of which 289 involved boys) involving children under the age of 15 - with some as young as 12 - many of whom are reported to have engaged in active combat roles. In a context where reliance on humanitarian assistance and the adoption of harmful coping mechanisms remains high, people’s needs are exacerbated by risk factors such as the lack/loss of civil documentation, discrimination and attacks affecting humanitarian personnel, which prevent them from accessing humanitarian assistance.

Large-scale population movements; the widespread destruction and contamination of agriculture related infrastructure and value chains such as markets and bakeries; depletion of productive assets and savings, increasing debt; and limited economic opportunities have all contributed to socio-economic hardship and the disruption of livelihoods. This has led to high levels of poverty across Syria, with 69 per cent of the population estimated to be living in extreme poverty. As a result, the coping capacity of many people in the most affected communities in Syria has been nearly exhausted. Households are resorting to harmful coping strategies that disproportionately affect the most vulnerable segments of the population, specifically children, youth and adolescents. These mechanisms include cutting back food consumption, spending savings and accumulating debt. Such coping mechanisms are not only negative and unsustainable but, once exhausted, prompt people to resort to increasingly exploitative and hazardous activities such as child labor and recruitment, early marriage, and engagement with armed groups. Increased efforts to support the ability of households and communities to withstand current and future shocks are therefore essential.

**UN-DECLARED BESIEGED AND HARD-TO-REACH AREAS**

**UN-DECLARED BESIEGED AREAS**
An area surrounded by armed actors with the sustained effect that humanitarian assistance cannot regularly enter, and civilians, the sick and wounded cannot regularly exit.

**HARD-TO-REACH AREAS**
An area not regularly accessible to humanitarian actors for the purpose of sustained humanitarian programming due to the denial of access, the continual need to secure access, or due to restrictions such as active conflict, multiple security checkpoints or failure of the authorities to provide timely approval. Some areas within the hard-to-reach category are subject to specific access constraints because they are militarily encircled. These areas are physically surrounded by single or multiple armed actors, with the effect of constraining access for both supplies and people to and from the area, such that sustained humanitarian programming is not possible.

* These designations are as per the methodology used by the UN to classify access status in Syria.
People in Need at a Glance

13.1 M People in Need*

5.6 M People in Acute Need**

8.2 M People living in areas affected by hostilities and explosive hazards

6.1 M Internally displaced persons

0.72 M Spontaneous returnees

0.75 M IDPs in last resort sites

1.8 M Newly displaced in 2017

5.6 M People living in areas hosting over 30% of IDPs/spontaneous returns

2.9 M People with disabilities

0.6 M Elderly (>59)

3.9 M Children (5-17)

1.4 M Children (0-4)

6.4 M Male

6.7 M Female

5.3 M Children

People in need (PIN) refers to people whose physical security, basic rights, dignity, living conditions or livelihoods are threatened or have been disrupted, and whose current level of access to basic services, goods and protection is inadequate to re-establish normal living conditions within their accustomed means without assistance. People in acute need refers to those facing more severe forms of deprivation in terms of their security, basic rights and living conditions and face life-threatening needs requiring urgent humanitarian assistance.

**PIN and acute PIN have been calculated based on the inter-sector severity categorization tool (see methodology section for more details).
DISTRIBUTION OF PEOPLE IN NEED ACROSS SYRIA (as of August 2017)

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: OCHA – based on inter-sector PIN data

Number of people in need by community (August 2017)
- 0 - 500
- 501 - 1,000
- 1,001 - 5,000
- 5,001 - 10,000
- 10,001 - 50,000
- > 50,000

Hard-to-reach areas
(26 Sep 2017)

Besieged areas

GOVERNORATE | PEOPLE IN NEED | PEOPLE IN ACUTE NEED | % PEOPLE IN ACUTE NEED VS. PEOPLE IN NEED
--- | --- | --- | ---
Rural Damascus | 2.35 M | 1.06 M | 45%
Aleppo | 2.25 M | 0.38 M | 17%
Damascus | 1.45 M | 0.74 M | 51%
Idleb | 1.39 M | 0.35 M | 25%
Homs | 0.95 M | 0.68 M | 72%
Hama | 0.88 M | 0.10 M | 12%
Lattakia | 0.77 M | 0.63 M | 82%
Deir-ez-Zor | 0.72 M | 0.71 M | 98%
Al-Hasakeh | 0.66 M | 0.05 M | 3%
Dar’a | 0.60 M | 0.31 M | 51%
Tartous | 0.55 M | 0.26 M | 48%
Ar-Raqqa | 0.33 M | 0.28 M | 85%
As-Sweida | 0.18 M | 0.00 M | 9%
Quneitra | 0.07 M | 0.02 M | 33%

2.98M PEOPLE IN NEED IN HARD-TO-REACH AREAS

419,000 PEOPLE IN NEED IN UN-DECLARED BESIEGED AREAS
HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

### Evolution of People in Need by Sector (2016-2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
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<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
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<td>Health</td>
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<td>12.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Recovery &amp; Livelihoods</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Management &amp; Camp Coordination</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Food Items</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Sector PIN</td>
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<td>13.5</td>
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The humanitarian impact of the Syria crisis continues to reverberate across the country and the wider region. Most immediately, the crisis has left millions of people facing a daily struggle to survive amidst pervasive threats to their lives, security, well-being, and dignity. These people are caught in a protection crisis, defined by indiscriminate, disproportional and unrestrained attacks that inflicts extensive hardship and destruction upon the civilian population. Various forms of violence permeate daily life, particularly affecting women and children. At the same time, prolonged conflict and widespread displacement continue to tear apart the social and economic fabric of Syria, compounding immediate suffering and compromising Syria’s long-term future.

Factors including exposure to hostilities, widespread displacement, the destruction of livelihoods, as well as the deterioration of basic services and institutions have left an estimated 13.1 million people, or seven out of ten people in Syria, in need of some form of humanitarian assistance. Of these, some 5.6 million people are estimated to be in acute need.

Ongoing hostilities and violations of IHL and IHRL

Hostilities remain the principal driver of human suffering in Syria, presenting a direct threat to human life in many parts of the country and frequently preventing civilians from receiving much needed life-saving humanitarian assistance. At the same time there has been a reduction in violence in some areas, particularly where de-escalation areas (DEAs) have been established or where local agreements* have been reached. The impact of the four DEAs on civilians has been mixed. For instance, in southern Syria, since the ceasefire entered into effect in July, the reported reduction in the level of hostilities has been significant; on the other hand, in the Idleb and northwestern Syria DEA, the reported level of hostilities initially decreased, but increased in September, particularly through airstrikes in which at least 149 civilians lost their lives and medical facilities were hit. Since mid-October, an intensification in shelling and fighting in the East Ghouta DEA has been reported, as well as increased shelling in Damascus city.

In 2017, the scope and intensity of hostilities in densely populated urban areas have been striking, particularly in areas such as Ar-Raqqa city and Deir-ez-Zor city. The high level of civilian casualties remains a strong indication of violations of the prohibition on launching indiscriminate attacks and of the principles of proportionality and precaution.

The destruction of life-sustaining civilian infrastructure and services such as water, sanitation and electricity systems, as well as attacks affecting hospitals, schools, housing land and property have continued to undermine support structures in urban and rural areas, ultimately endangering civilian lives and hampering the return of the displaced populations after the cessation of hostilities. In the first half of 2017, the Health sector reported a 25 per cent increase in attacks against health facilities as compared to the same period in 2016, with attacks on health facilities numbering approximately 20 per month between January and April, or one attack every 36 hours. Although the number of verified attacks on schools in the first half of 2017 is less than fifty per cent of those verified in the first half of 2016, the trend of attacks remains consistent in terms of the type of attacks and their impact on children. Attacks resulting in the deaths of humanitarian aid workers and health workers also continued, with at least 17 health workers and 12 NGO workers killed in the first six months of 2017.

Since the start of the conflict, 65 Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) staff members and 21 UN staff members have been killed, while 26 UN staff members have either been detained or are missing. Such numbers do not capture the full scale and impact of attacks affecting aid workers, which cannot be systematically measured in many parts of the country.

* Local agreements refer to agreements reached between the GoS and some NSAGs, sometimes facilitated by third parties and which concern specific localities, often areas declared by the UN as besieged or hard-to-reach. The UN is not a party to these agreements.
Violations against children have become pervasive across all aspects of daily life in Syria. Children make up over 40 per cent of people in need, and face specific needs defined by their unique experience of the crisis. In the first half of 2017, the MRM4Syria on grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict verified over 1,000 grave violations, including 75 instances of detention of children for alleged association with armed actors, 524 instances of killing and maiming of children and 300 instances of recruitment and use of children in armed conflict. Almost 20 per cent of the verified cases of recruitment and use of children in armed conflict involved children under the age of fifteen. Reports of forcible recruitment of children have been prevalent in ISIL-controlled areas of Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor governorates.

In addition, violence has permeated the community, school and home, exposing children to multiple sources of physical and mental harm. Some two-thirds of children in Syria are said to have lost a loved one, had their house damaged, or suffered conflict-related injuries. Children who have endured these experiences and have been exposed to significant violence are deprived of a sense of security and susceptible to profound mental distress. These psychological consequences of violence are likely to be aggravated by uncertainty about the future following significant disruption to daily life. As a result of this upheaval, many children struggle to access quality education. For those children who are able to attend school, hostilities have triggered a significant reduction in institutional education capacity and subsequent decline in the quality of education, with around 180,000 teachers no longer in service, and damage or destruction estimated to have affected 40 per cent of school infrastructure.

The crisis has also left many adolescents and youth struggling to identify ways to positively engage in their communities and wider surroundings. Unemployment rates among youth are estimated to be close to 75 per cent, and are significantly higher among women. With limited opportunities, and uncertain about what the future has in store, adolescents and youth have grown increasingly frustrated and disempowered.

Real and immediate concerns over the possible loss of a generation due to a combination of child protection risks, lack of access to quality education and limited opportunities for adolescents and youth to meaningfully engage with their communities underlines the importance of the “No Lost Generation” approach in placing these issues at the center of humanitarian needs analysis and the response to the Syria crisis.

“Any kind of problem the family suffers is reflected in violence against their children. Any problem, any financial dilemma, all would turn into anger, from which the children would suffer.”
(a Syrian woman in the south of Syria)

* Human rights law declares 18 as the minimum legal age for recruitment and use of children in hostilities. Recruiting and using children under the age of 15 as soldiers is prohibited under IHL, although the recruitment of children between 16 and 18 for non active duty is permitted, though under stringent conditions.
The world’s largest displacement crisis

Ongoing military operations and hostilities in some parts of the country continued to drive significant levels of displacement, and generate acute humanitarian needs throughout 2017. While the number of long-term IDPs* is estimated to have marginally decreased from 6.3 to 6.1 million over the past year, overall monthly displacement rates remained high and broadly similar to 2016 with some 1.8 million population movements reported between January and September 2017, amounting to approximately 6,550 people displaced each day.23

In addition to those internally displaced, some 5.5 million Syrians are registered as refugees, including 5.3 million refugees in neighboring countries.34 Despite the generosity extended by host countries in welcoming millions of Syrians, asylum space has continued to shrink and increasingly managed admission policies are being adopted by neighboring countries.

*Long-term IDPs/displacement refers to those people who have been displaced for more than three months.
Displacement patterns

Displacement patterns across Syria remained extremely fluid. Many people have been displaced multiple times, moving from one location to another as frontlines shift and hostilities draw closer. Most displacements during the current year occurred within the governorate of origin and for relatively short periods as IDPs sought to swiftly return to their homes as soon as hostilities subsided. Populations on the move continue to be exposed to a number of protection risks including exposure to explosive hazards. Owing to distribution and concentration patterns of explosive hazards in Syria, displaced farmers and herders are likely to be particularly vulnerable, with 33 per cent of communities reporting that agricultural land was contaminated. In addition, there have been reports that a number of IDP camps have been hit by airstrikes.

Although rates of displacement remain broadly similar in 2017 compared to 2016, the geographic focus of new displacements has shifted as the situation on the ground evolves. New displacements have been most frequent in northeast Syria (Ar-Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor governorates) as a result of anti-ISIL military offensives, with an estimated 484,000 displacements reported between November 2016 and the end of September 2017. Many of these have been displaced due to the military operation to gain control of Ar-Raqqa city from ISIL which started in June 2017. Large numbers of people were also displaced from Hama, Aleppo, and Idleb governorates. In the case of Idleb, arrivals include some of the estimated 42,000 IDPs who have arrived in NSAG-controlled areas of northwest Syria in 2017 as part of local agreements, which largely occurred in relation to areas that were previously classified by the UN as either besieged or hard-to-reach, and included provisions for the “relocation” of people to NSAG controlled areas. In northeast Syria, displacement patterns were heavily influenced by restrictions on the freedom of movement of IDPs resulting from security measures implemented by armed actors and local authorities, including screening procedures. This has led to a growing number of IDPs transiting and staying in last-resort sites for prolonged periods of time. Confiscation of identification documents of IDPs upon their arrival at check-points or transit centres by military authorities is widely reported and persisting, despite advocacy conducted by the Protection sector. The disordered storing of documents while security procedures are conducted increases the risk of loss and damage while delayed restitution has sometimes led IDPs to leave sites without their documentation. Confiscation and loss were cited among the main reasons for not having civil documentation in Ar-Raqqa Governorate, while restrictions on freedom of movement were described as the main consequence of not having civil documentation in both Ar-Raqqa and Al-Hasakeh governorates. Request for civil documentation to access assistance was also mentioned among key concerns related to accessing humanitarian assistance in both governorates.
**IDP MOVEMENTS (Jan - Sep 2017)**

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: Information as reported by CCCM, NPM, OCHA Syria, Turkey and Jordan for 2017.

**TOTAL IDP MOVEMENT IN 2017**

(includes displacement from locations within and outside governorate)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Departures from governorate</th>
<th>Arrivals to governorate</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aleppo</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ar-Raqqah</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idleb</td>
<td>308</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deir-ez-Zor</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hama</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural Damascus</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar'a</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Hasakeh</td>
<td>93</td>
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<tr>
<td>Damascus</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Homs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lattakia</td>
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<td>Quneitra</td>
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<td>Tartous</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>As-Sweida</td>
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(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Departures from governorate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aleppo</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ar-Raqqah</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idleb</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deir-ez-Zor</td>
<td>232</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hama</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural Damascus</td>
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<td>Dar'a</td>
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<tr>
<td>As-Sweida</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(in thousands)

**TOTAL LONG-TERM DISPLACED POPULATIONS PER GOVERNORATE**

| Rural Damascus              | 1,300                   |
| Aleppo                      | 962                     |
| Idleb                       | 984                     |
| Damascus                    | 648                     |
| Lattakia                    | 427                     |
| Homs                        | 355                     |
| Dar'a                       | 330                     |
| Hama                        | 287                     |
| Al-Hasakeh                  | 229                     |
| Tartous                     | 202                     |
| Ar-Raqqah                   | 157                     |
| Deir-ez-Zor                 | 152                     |
| As-Sweida                   | 63                      |
| Quneitra                    | 49                      |

(in thousands)
Hostilities in Aleppo and Idleb governorates lead to the displacement of over 75,000 people in the first three weeks of the month alone.

An intensification of hostilities in northern Syria results in some 84,000 displacements, almost 75,000 of which occurred in Aleppo Governorate.

Some 65,000 people displaced from Al-Hasakeh city between 17 August and 22 August, following hostilities between the GoS and NSAGs.

The ongoing anti-ISIS military operation leads to 70,000 displacements, of which almost 60,000 occurred in Deir-ez-Zor.

IDP MOVEMENTS TRENDS 2016

IDP MOVEMENTS TRENDS 2017

IDP MOVEMENTS PER MONTH (2016-2017)

February 2016

March 2017

August 2016

September 2017

2 MILLION
TOTAL NUMBER OF IDP MOVEMENTS IN 2016

1.8 MILLION
TOTAL NUMBER OF IDP MOVEMENTS IN 2017 (As of September)

IDP MOVEMENT TRENDS 2016

IDP MOVEMENT TRENDS 2017
IDPs in last resort sites are deemed to be among the most in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria, and face a daily struggle to address their immediate survival needs as well as those of their family. Of the 6.1 million IDPs across Syria, some 750,000 people live in last resort camps, informal settlements, transit centres and collective centres including schools, residential building, and warehouses. Some 2,900 informal settlements, usually comprising of groups of tents/shelters established by IDPs themselves, constitute the largest proportion of last resort sites. In addition, there are some 2,631 collective centres in Syria, of which one-third are schools; 315 planned camps which are managed by humanitarian organizations; and 285 reception and transit centres intended for very short displacements.

Of these 750,000 people, approximately 112,370 are IDPs in Ar-Raqqa Governorate. As an indication of reduced resources among IDPs and host communities, 20 per cent of the newly displaced in 2017 resorted to IDP sites. People who are displaced face immediate and acute needs during their initial months of displacement in relation to shelter, access to food, access to basic services and access to livelihoods. In the longer-term, IDP households are also reported as receiving lower wages or suffer from a decreased capacity to work. Many IDPs are keeping children out of school in order to work, and many adults are working long hours and/or multiple jobs. Overall, the vulnerability of IDP households is linked to their lack of income opportunities and to the irregularity and low levels of assistance they were able to access. For displaced families, access to income generating opportunities has been further diminished due to the breakup of families, with one third of all families reporting at least one absent member since 2011, often the main breadwinner.

An estimated 50,000 people stranded at the Syria-Jordan border

An estimated 50,000 people, 80 per cent of whom are assessed to be women and children, continue to live in makeshift settlements in Rukban, in the desolate and barren desert on Syria’s southeast border with Jordan. This includes some 4,500 people who were evacuated from the Hadalat settlement in September, following shifts in territorial control and an escalation of hostilities, as well as hundreds of people who have fled southwards from Deir-ez-Zor seeking refuge in Rukban. With limited access to critical food supplies, and only three one-month food distributions in the last year, people stranded at Rukban are living in dire conditions.

While water is being provided and very limited health services are available through a UN facility on the Jordan border, people in Rukban are without sufficient access to life-sustaining basic resources and services. Since an attack on the Jordanian border post at Rukban in June 2016, the Government of Jordan has sealed the Jordanian side of the border preventing further entry of vulnerable people into Jordan, and also severely limiting the delivery of humanitarian assistance from Jordan. Since this time, only three partial one-month distributions of food and essential non-food items have been possible. With recent changes of territorial control in the area, the flow of essential trade bringing in vital supplies has been compromised, and since July 2017 remote assessments within the settlement indicate a rapidly deteriorating situation with increasing rates of basic infections and over 70 per cent of children suffering from diarrhea. The situation for this highly vulnerable population is becoming increasingly precarious.
**Spontaneous returns**

Over 721,000 people, including approximately 66,000 refugees,* have spontaneously returned to their areas of origin so far in 2017, compared to 560,000 total returnees reported over the entirety of 2016.⁴⁶ Existing monitoring and assessment methodologies cannot ascertain the voluntariness and sustainability of these returns, or whether they took place in safety and dignity. While the number of spontaneous return movements may be on the increase in some relatively stable areas, the overall conditions for safe, dignified and sustainable returns are not yet in place in many parts of Syria.* Humanitarian actors continue to support those who choose to return, but do not facilitate or promote returns.

Aleppo Governorate witnessed the highest number of returnees, with an estimated 455,300 individuals returning in the first nine months of 2017, and the city of Aleppo alone receiving a third of all IDP returnees in this period. Hama remains the governorate with the second highest number of returns, with 102,700 individuals returning. With the ongoing military activities in the northeast and a shift in control from ISIL to other forces, Ar-Raqqa is the third-ranking governorate with 47,400 returnees recorded.⁴⁷

Humanitarian actors estimate that, in line with current trends, up to one million displaced people are expected to return during 2018, mostly in Aleppo, Damascus, Rural Damascus, Homs, Ar-Raqqa, as well as an estimated 200,000 refugee returns. Humanitarian partners believe that there will be a lower number of refugee returns compared to IDP returns, though as currently witnessed from Turkey, the level of interest for self-organized “go and see visits” will remain high. Nonetheless despite an increase in self-organized spontaneous returns in many parts of Syria in 2017, these returns need to be framed within the wider context of continued large-scale displacement and ongoing conflict in Syria. The IDP intention survey conducted by IOM in September 2017 reveals that nearly 65 per cent of IDP households (corresponding to nearly 825,000 families) expressed the intention to remain at their current location (17 per cent to integrate in their place of displacement and 47 per cent still undecided on their future plans). Of the over 430,000 families willing to leave their current location, 77 per cent intend to return to their place of origin, 13 per cent intend to move out of Syria and 10 per cent intend to move to another location within Syria. Over 80 per cent of people intend to leave their current location by the end of 2018.⁵⁰

Among factors which contribute to shaping IDP intentions, security either as a push or pull factor, was frequently reported as the main driver of movements. The improvement of the security situation in the location of origin was reported as the main pull factor for 65 per cent of families, while the poor security situation at the current location was reported as the main push factor for 51 per cent of families. The economic situation and future economic prospects as well as the availability of shelter are also important in shaping intentions, with the need to re-possess their properties raised as a determinant for 15 per cent of families intending to return.

Future intentions can also be linked to specific characteristics. For instance, vulnerable families, such as women-headed households, are less willing to return home than non-vulnerable families.⁵¹

* As per the conditions defined in the IASC durable solutions framework, safe conditions include: long-term safety, security and freedom of movement; adequate standard of living; access to employment and livelihoods; restoration of housing, land and property; access to documentation; family reunification; participation in public affairs; access to effective remedies and justice.

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**PERCEPTIONS OF DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN**

**MAIN REASON CITED FOR DISPLACEMENT TO A COMMUNITY**
- Seeking physical safety
- Seeking locations with access to basic services
- Seeking locations close to area of origin and/or assets, or where relatives are living

**MAIN PRE-CONDITIONS CITED FOR RETURN TO AREA OF ORIGIN**
- Reduction in active/intense hostilities
- Reduction in low-intensity violence
- Regular access & availability of basic services

**REPORTED IDP FAMILY RETURN INTENTIONS**

- **47.1%** Have not decided yet
- **27.1%** Return to place of origin
- **17.5%** Integration in the current location
- **4.6%** Leaving Syria
- **3.6%** Moved to third location within Syria


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* UNHCR September 2017
Some 974,080 people are living in UN-declared besieged areas.

In the second half of November, continued fighting in Aleppo and intensification of hostilities in eastern Aleppo, result in the deaths of hundreds and the displacement of tens of thousands of people by the end of the month.

Syrian Democratic Forces begin anti-ISIL campaign in Ar-Raqqa.

On 15 April, simultaneous evacuations from the four towns of Madaya and Zabadani, and Fu’ah and Kafraya (local agreement reached on 27 March) begin.

On 14 January, 1.8 million inhabitants of Aleppo and the surrounding eastern countryside have their water cut.

On 4 May, Iran, the Russian Federation and Turkey sign a memorandum on the creation of four de-escalation areas. The memorandum mentions the need for rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and the creation of conditions for the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

On 7 May, the UN resumes life-saving humanitarian assistance at the “Berm” with a second aid distribution cycle.

In Idleb Governorate, an eruption of fighting between non-state armed opposition groups results in civilian casualties.

The Bab al-Hawa border crossing area is temporarily closed for a week due to the fighting.

In Ar-Raqqa city, an estimated 15,000 civilians remain trapped facing serious protection concerns. Conditions for civilians trapped in the city continue to deteriorate.

As military operations continue towards Deir-ez-Zor city, air strikes and clashes intensify, with hundreds of families displaced.

The situation in East Ghouta deteriorates throughout the month amid reports of shelling, air strikes and ground fighting.

On 23 February, Free Syrian Army fighters, supported by Turkey and fighting as part of Operation Euphrates Shield, capture Al-Bab.

More than 116,000 people displaced from eastern Aleppo.

Fighting in the Wadi Barada area, leads to civilian deaths and the displacement of 7,000 people and also cuts off an estimated 5.5 million people in Damascus and surrounding areas from the main water supply.

On 30 December, a nationwide ceasefire comes into effect.

On 6 June, the offensive in Ar-Raqqa city begins. Heavy clashes, shelling and air strikes result in significant civilian casualties and injuries as tens of thousands of people fled.

On 30 December, a nationwide ceasefire comes into effect.

In Ar-Raqqa, the three year long siege of Deir-ez-Zor city.

Military operations in Deir-ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqa city continue to impact civilians.

Selective key events from SG reports.
Increased pressure on host communities

Across Syria some 12 million people live in areas where more than 30 per cent of the population are IDPs. Of these, 400,000 families are estimated to be hosting displaced people or spontaneous returnees in their homes.\(^{52}\) As with previous years, host families and communities remain the primary providers of shelter assistance and support to these groups. While providing a lifeline to countless people, many of these host communities have themselves been rendered increasingly vulnerable by the crisis.

The influx of IDPs and/or spontaneous returnees in some areas of Syria, has contributed to increased socio-economic pressures and vulnerabilities among many communities, particularly in urban areas, which host 84 per cent of IDPs.\(^{53}\) Facing a large concentration of IDPs and/or spontaneous returnees, these increasingly overburdened communities experience limited availability of essential services, competition over livelihood opportunities and possible tensions over access to services. In northern Syria, host communities struggle to accommodate IDPs and have witnessed the disruption of core services such as schools, as new IDPs increasingly take up shelter in these facilities.

With the influx of IDPs, host communities have seen schools resorting to double or even triple shifts, decreasing the overall quantity and quality of education their children receive.\(^{54}\)

Across Syria, 58 per cent of assessed communities perceive HLP issues as occurring at least sometimes, and in 81 per cent of communities disputes over ownership were reported as the major concern.\(^{55}\) In areas of northwest Syria, disputes over ownership, rental and hosting arrangements were reported as the most common cause of HLP related challenges.\(^{56}\) These issues not only compound existing vulnerabilities and inequalities, but can also preclude the ability of these communities to meet their basic needs and recover.\(^{57}\)

Besiegement and local agreements

As of September 2017, there were 2.98 million people in need in hard-to-reach areas, including 419,920 people in 10 UN-declared besieged areas, the majority of whom are in East Ghouta.\(^*\) Of these, 95 per cent of people are besieged by the GoS, with two per cent of people besieged by non-state armed groups, and three per cent by both non-state armed groups and the GoS. The number of civilians in UN-declared besieged areas decreased by over 500,000 during the past year and may decrease further in 2018 including through further local agreements between parties to the conflict.\(^{58}\)

However, the needs of people in UN-declared besieged areas continue to be extremely severe due to arbitrary restrictions on freedom of movement, imposed constraints on the delivery of basic commodities and humanitarian assistance, the lack of livelihood opportunities, and ongoing hostilities. The systematic removal of medical items from assistance destined for UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas continued, with more than 600,000 medical items removed from or prevented from being loaded on UN inter-agency convoys in the first eight months of 2017.\(^{59}\) These actions disproportionately affect individuals who are chronically ill, injured persons, women with obstetric emergencies and persons with disabilities, denying them access to the trauma care and routine medical treatments fundamental to their wellbeing and survival. In addition, access constraints have a significant impact on the availability of food and other basic items as well as market prices. For instance, the suspension of commercial access to East Ghouta in September resulted in a 50 per cent increase in the standard food basket cost compared to the previous month,\(^{60}\) potentially contributing to undernourishment and increasing the risk of malnutrition among children living in the enclave.\(^{61}\) While conditions and levels of suffering may vary between UN-declared besieged areas, the burden of protracted besiegement among civilians who remain in such areas continues to grow, and the severity of needs in these areas is considered as catastrophic.

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* These designations are as per the methodology used by the UN to classify access status.
During 2017 local agreements continued to alter the access landscape in Syria. While these agreements have contributed to a reduction in the number of people living in UN-declared besieged areas and enabled increased freedom of movement, commercial access, and humanitarian access, they have not always translated into sustained and quality humanitarian access, including to conduct needs assessments and carry out regular programming. For civilians living in these areas this lack of immediate access to assistance can compound the burden of siege and intensive hostilities that often precede local agreements. Furthermore, there are indications that such agreements have resulted in civilians being forced to leave against their will. Similarly, the establishment of de-escalation areas has also not yet translated into sustained increases in humanitarian access to many of these areas.

The 2017 response: mitigating the worst

Response efforts in Syria remain staggering with an average of 7.7 million people in need reached with some form of humanitarian assistance on a monthly basis. Of these, 3.9 million people reached were women and girls and 3.7 million people live in high severity of needs communities. Despite challenges in our collective ability to measure the impact of humanitarian interventions, recent data indicates that key humanitarian indicators related to morbidity, malnutrition and food insecurity remain stable. While food insecurity rates remain high, they are not leading to increased levels of acute or severe malnutrition except in localized (mostly UN-declared besieged areas) contexts. The delivery of multi-antigen and immunization catch-up campaigns also contributed to reducing morbidity and mortality. However, coping mechanisms continue to deteriorate. A further depletion of livelihood assets and opportunities across Syria has resulted in a doubling of the number of people at risk of food insecurity. It is estimated that the combination of humanitarian efforts being deployed – with the funding levels available – constitute a life-line for many and help mitigate the further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Syria. With additional funding towards the HRP and improved access, humanitarian actors could scale-up service delivery and livelihood activities which would contribute to the sustainable reduction in vulnerabilities. Reductions in funding would, in turn, likely interrupt life-saving activities at current scale. This would increase vulnerabilities and potentially lead to a deterioration in the overall humanitarian situation. Such a scenario could have an impact on the long-term stability of the country and wider region.

Increasing socio-economic vulnerabilities

Seven years of hostilities have had a significant impact on the Syrian economy. Between 2011 and 2016, Syria’s cumulative GDP losses amounted to an estimated US$254 billion, more than four times Syria’s 2010 GDP. The economic losses from the disruption to Syria’s education system are estimated to be around US$11 billion—equivalent to about 18 per cent of Syria’s 2010 GDP—while losses to the agricultural sector are estimated at US$16 billion, further undermining Syria’s long-term economic prospects.

For people living in Syria, this has resulted in an economic environment defined by high basic commodity prices, shortages in basic necessities and dysfunctional markets, low wages and high rates of unemployment. As of 2015, the unemployment rate was estimated to be 53 per cent, rising to levels as high as 75 per cent among youth (15-24 years). This has precluded opportunities for safe and sustained access to livelihoods, ultimately contributing to increased levels of poverty in Syria and persistent food insecurity among large segments of the population.

Syria has seen the proportion of the population living in extreme poverty double from almost 25 per cent pre-crisis (less than US$1.90 per day) to approximately 69 per cent today. Combined with an upsurge in the cost of living, this has led to a severe erosion of people’s purchasing power. For instance, up to 1.2 million families cannot afford rent costs, with a recent report on Housing, Land and Property (HLP) issues in northwest Syria reporting ‘unaffordable housing’ as a concern in 100 per cent of sub-districts surveyed. Furthermore, the proportion of income spent on food has soared as incomes and household food production have decreased, while food prices have increased dramatically. Before the crisis, about 25 per cent of households spent over half their annual income on food. About 50 per cent of households have cut back on food consumption of adults to allow children to eat.
Deterioration of basic services

Over the course of the Syria crisis, access to basic public services has significantly declined. For people in Syria, this has contributed to reduced access to healthcare and education as well as limited availability of water and electricity, with two thirds of the population estimated to be affected by disruption to water and electricity systems. Indeed, while before the crisis nearly 100 per cent of the population in Syria was served by centrally managed and ‘free at the point of use’ water systems, families in some areas of the country are now spending up to 15-20 per cent of their income to secure access to an average of 57 litres of water per person per day.\(^2\)^

In addition to other health issues the deterioration of water and sanitation conditions as well as the destruction of infrastructure has contributed to an increased number of Leishmaniasis in recent years in Syria with 32,888 cases reported in the first nine months of 2017 compared to 31,105 during the same period in 2016. The health system in Syria has also been severely disrupted by the conflict, leaving less than half fully operational and resulting in thousands of avoidable deaths.\(^7\) Combined with low immunization coverage, the weakening of the health system led to 39 cases of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type-2 (cVDPV2) confirmed in Syria (37 in Deir-ez-Zor, one in Homs and one in Ar-Raqqa governorate) during the first half of 2017. In addition more than 8,000 children fit the case definition for measles during the first half of the year. Compared to pre-crisis coverage rates for polio, DPT and measles which stood above 90%. WHO and UNICEF estimate that vaccination coverage may have fallen to the 60-70% range. More recent coverage data from the MoH suggests that immunization coverage has risen to 77% (DPT3) and 84% for both Measles and Polio. This improvement may partly be due to the accelerated catch-up campaign to UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas in 2016.\(^7\)^

The impact of the disruption to basic services has been exacerbated by unilateral sanctions and exports controls, limiting the scope and quality of assistance humanitarian actors can provide across multiple sectors, affecting peoples’ everyday access to life-saving and life-sustaining resources. These measures have especially affected the ability of the UN and INGOs to import several ‘dual-use’ items critical to delivering projects related to health, water supply, sanitation, and agriculture. For instance, the WASH sector reports that restrictions on the import of water treatment and disinfectant products constitute a core challenge in delivering safe and effective water supply.

Limited access to livelihood

Insufficient incomes, decreased purchasing power, limited employment opportunities and displacement have also contributed to an erosion of coping strategies, scarce livelihood opportunities and limited agricultural recovery that have continued to impact food security. Indeed, some 6.5 million people in Syria continue to face large food consumption gaps and extreme loss of livelihood assets, contributing to food consumption gaps in the short term. A further 4 million people are at risk of becoming food insecure due to the depletion of assets to maintain food consumption.\(^7\)^ Communities report spending savings, running up debts buying on credit, depleting household assets and reducing food consumption as the most common negative coping strategies to compensate for the lack of basic relief items.\(^8\)^ These coping mechanisms are ultimately unsustainable and, in the absence of humanitarian interventions or an overall improvement in the socio-economic situation, may continue to lead people to resort to increasingly exploitative and hazardous activities when their financial and material resources have been exhausted. Such coping mechanisms disproportionately affect the most vulnerable groups, such as children. Across Syria some 82 per cent of the 4,185 communities surveyed perceived the occurrence of child labor preventing school attendance within their communities, with almost 65 per cent of communities perceiving this as a ‘common’ issue.\(^7\)^ In addition, some 69 per cent of communities perceived the occurrence of early marriage, exposing girls to loss of self-esteem, significant personal protection risks, health issues and depriving them of an education.\(^7\)^ Furthermore, it is estimated that 15 per cent of Syrians in the labour force are engaged in ‘armed struggle’ or ‘illegal’ economic activity (fighting, smuggling, trafficking), in many cases as this is the only livelihood opportunity available to them.\(^7\)

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**PEOPLE IN NEED BY YEAR (2012-2018)**

**SHARP 2012**
- People in need: 1
- People in acute need: 2.5
- 2012

**SHARP 2013**
- People in need: 4
- People in acute need: 6.8
- 2013

**SHARP 2014**
- People in need: 9.3
- People in acute need: 10.8
- 2014

**SRP 2014**
- People in need: 12.2
- People in acute need: 8.7
- 2014

**HNO 2016**
- People in need: 13.5
- People in acute need: 5.7
- 2016

**HNO 2017**
- People in need: 13.5
- People in acute need: 5.6
- 2017

**HNO 2018**
- People in need: 13.1
- People in acute need: 5.6
- 2018
PALESTINE REFUGEES IN SYRIA

418,000 Palestine Refugees (95 per cent of the total Palestine Refugee population in Syria) are affected by the crisis and in need of humanitarian assistance, including 7 per cent living in hard to reach and UN-declared besieged areas. 254,000 people are estimated to be internally displaced in Palestine refugee camps and gatherings on urban peripheries throughout Syria, particularly Damascus, Aleppo, and Dar’a. These areas face massive levels of displacement as residential areas became active frontlines.

Thousands of Palestine refugees continue to live in areas of active conflict, such as in Yarmouk and Dar’a camps as well as the surrounding villages in Dar’a Governorate. In addition, thousands of Palestine refugees bear the consequences of constrained humanitarian access and limited provision of UNRWA services (Khan Elshih camp). These communities live in a state of profound vulnerability, with civilians frequently overwhelmed by hostilities and exposed to life-threatening levels of deprivation.

Prior to the crisis, Palestine refugees experienced significant levels of poverty and unemployment with many living under the poverty line.* Seven years into the conflict, their relatively low resilience, and limited coping mechanisms have been exhausted. Since 2015, Jordan and Lebanon have adopted more stringent entry policies for Palestine refugees from Syria, leaving this vulnerable population with no alternatives outside Syria.

In 2018, partners anticipate increased needs among potential returnees, who may choose to return to their areas of origin as they become accessible. Humanitarian needs are expected to increase as access resumes in specific areas such as Sbeineh camp or Khan Elshih camp in Damascus Governorate. In addition, access could resume to other areas such as Yarmouk where the needs of the population are acute.

* People living below the poverty line do not have enough money to meet their basic needs, with the World Bank defining the global extreme poverty line as US$1.90 per day.

Source: UNRWA, September 2017
**Key Figures**

**13.1 million**
People in need of humanitarian assistance

**5.3 million**
People live in shelters with multiple inadequacy issues including a lack of necessary bathing or cooking facilities, inadequate space, lack of privacy, lack of heating and a lack of insulation.

**1.2 million**
Families are unable to afford rental costs.

**20%**
Of newly displaced in 2017 sought shelter in IDP sites as options of last resort, indicating the reduced resources amongst IDPs and host communities.

**Protection of Civilians**

**83%**
Of assessed communities reported the lack or loss of civil documentation as a concern, and described it as a barrier to accessing humanitarian assistance.

**57%**
Of assessed communities reported the occurrence of early marriage.

**Conflict**

**25%**
Increase in attacks against health facilities as compared to same period in 2016.

**23,000**
Individual explosive conflict incidents reported from January to June 2017.

**Over 3.0 million**
Children under 5 require optimal feeding for adequate nutrition status.

**Nearly 19,000**
Children under 5 with severe acute malnutrition.

**Over 6.5 million**
People are facing acute food insecurity and large food consumption gaps.

**4.0 million**
People are at risk of becoming food insecure - twice as many as last year - due to asset depletion to maintain food consumption.

**800% increase**
Of average food basket prices compared to pre-crisis levels.

**Less than half**
Of Syria’s health facilities are fully operational.

**Economic Collapse**

**US$254 billion**
Cumulative GDP losses resulting from the conflict, more than four times Syria’s GDP in 2010.

**US$16 billion**
In estimated economic losses to the agriculture sector.

**Over 50%**
Of Syrians are currently unemployed.

**Over 5.3 million**
People live in shelters with multiple inadequacy issues including a lack of necessary bathing or cooking facilities, inadequate space, lack of privacy, lack of heating and a lack of insulation.

**Over 1.2 million**
Families are unable to afford rental costs.

**More than 1 in 3 schools**
Are either damaged or destroyed while others are being used as collective shelters or for other purposes.

**8.2 million**
People exposed to explosive hazards in contaminated areas.

**33%**
Of hazards located on agricultural land.

**In some areas of the country, families are spending up to 15-20% of their incomes to secure access to an average of 57 liters of water per person per day.**

**Children**

**High level of civilian casualties** particularly in densely populated areas.

**Over 3.0 million**
Children under 5 require optimal feeding for adequate nutrition status.

**Nearly 19,000**
Children under 5 with severe acute malnutrition.

**Over 6.5 million**
People are facing acute food insecurity and large food consumption gaps.

**4.0 million**
People are at risk of becoming food insecure - twice as many as last year - due to asset depletion to maintain food consumption.

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Cumulative GDP losses resulting from the conflict, more than four times Syria’s GDP in 2010.

**US$16 billion**
In estimated economic losses to the agriculture sector.

**Over 50%**
Of Syrians are currently unemployed.
Over the last year the total number of people in need in Syria has slightly decreased from 13.5 million people to 13.1 million, while the number of people in acute need has remained relatively constant with only a slight reduction of 0.1 million. The slight reduction in people in need is largely due to increased accessibility to some areas of the country. At the same time, needs continue to remain high in these areas, while in parts of northern and eastern Syria needs have increased and deepened following an escalation in hostilities and a significant increase in displacement during 2017.

Within the overall 13.1 million in need there are six population groups who are considered particularly vulnerable and are likely to face a convergence of needs and heightened protection risks. These groups are people living in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas; people exposed to high intensity of hostilities and areas contaminated with explosive hazards; IDPs in last resort camps/sites/collective centers; newly-displaced people; spontaneous returnees; and over-burdened host communities, including long-term IDPs.

**BREAKDOWN OF PEOPLE IN NEED**

The slight reduction in people in need is largely due to increased accessibility to some areas of the country. At the same time, needs continue to remain high in these areas, while in parts of northern and eastern Syria needs have increased and deepened following an escalation in hostilities and a significant increase in displacement during 2017. Within the overall 13.1 million in need there are six population groups who are considered particularly vulnerable and are likely to face a convergence of needs and heightened protection risks. These groups are people living in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas; people exposed to high intensity of hostilities and areas contaminated with explosive hazards; IDPs in last resort camps/sites/collective centers; newly-displaced people; spontaneous returnees; and over-burdened host communities, including long-term IDPs.

**NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN NEED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People in need of assistance</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Children (0-4)</th>
<th>Children (5-17)</th>
<th>Adults (18-59)</th>
<th>Elderly (&gt;59)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFI</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Coordination &amp; Camp Management</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Security &amp; Agriculture</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Recovery &amp; Livelihoods</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The number of people in need in Syria was calculated through the application of the inter-sector severity categorization tool, which calculates the level of severity at community level from 0 (no problem) to six (catastrophic problem) according to six proxy indicators. Please see annex 1 for more details.**

**The number of people in need of assistance refers only to those people in acute need of WASH assistance.**
## PEOPLE IN NEED
(AUG 2017, IN THOUSANDS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>IDPs</th>
<th>Returnees</th>
<th>Host communities</th>
<th>Hard-to-reach and Besieged</th>
<th>% female</th>
<th>% children, adult, elderly*</th>
<th>People in need</th>
<th>People in acute need</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALEPPO</td>
<td>961.8</td>
<td>444.5</td>
<td>2,164.2</td>
<td>324.3</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL-HASAKEH</td>
<td>229.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>865.8</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR-RAQA</td>
<td>157.5</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>235.4</td>
<td>260.8</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS-SWEIDA</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>264.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAMASCUS</td>
<td>647.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1,273.1</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAR'A</td>
<td>330.1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>554.4</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEIR-EZ-ZOR</td>
<td>151.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>743.6</td>
<td>722.2</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6%</td>
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<td>HAMA</td>
<td>287.8</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>1,090.6</td>
<td>119.2</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOMS</td>
<td>355.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1,056.1</td>
<td>209.7</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDLEB</td>
<td>984.5</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>1,069.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATTAKIA</td>
<td>427.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>659.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUNEITRA</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RURAL DAMASCUS</td>
<td>1,303.6</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>1,932.9</td>
<td>1,158.4</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARTOUS</td>
<td>201.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>629.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>6,150</td>
<td>674.4</td>
<td>12,590.4</td>
<td>2,981.2</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Children (<18 years old), adult (18-59 years), elderly (>59 years)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Food Security</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>NFI</th>
<th>Nutrition</th>
<th>Protection</th>
<th>Shelter</th>
<th>WASH</th>
<th>Inter-Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aleppo</td>
<td>1,042,345</td>
<td>2,015,300</td>
<td>2,141,454</td>
<td>1,803,923</td>
<td>1,102,979</td>
<td>831,936</td>
<td>2,395,708</td>
<td>765,972</td>
<td>961,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Hasakeh</td>
<td>345,264</td>
<td>582,859</td>
<td>506,809</td>
<td>591,933</td>
<td>281,178</td>
<td>228,075</td>
<td>713,280</td>
<td>183,017</td>
<td>241,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ar-Raqqa</td>
<td>154,819</td>
<td>313,682</td>
<td>384,178</td>
<td>261,965</td>
<td>213,293</td>
<td>104,342</td>
<td>384,178</td>
<td>185,781</td>
<td>165,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As-Sweida</td>
<td>93,169</td>
<td>132,602</td>
<td>124,727</td>
<td>165,863</td>
<td>40,471</td>
<td>70,617</td>
<td>172,173</td>
<td>38,805</td>
<td>63,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deir-ez-Zor</td>
<td>313,487</td>
<td>600,090</td>
<td>628,861</td>
<td>558,125</td>
<td>262,870</td>
<td>185,175</td>
<td>701,304</td>
<td>246,304</td>
<td>368,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hama</td>
<td>520,177</td>
<td>644,447</td>
<td>715,115</td>
<td>752,518</td>
<td>205,099</td>
<td>381,223</td>
<td>844,273</td>
<td>216,912</td>
<td>306,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homs</td>
<td>377,541</td>
<td>715,502</td>
<td>608,178</td>
<td>779,252</td>
<td>247,461</td>
<td>368,109</td>
<td>887,339</td>
<td>321,444</td>
<td>529,149</td>
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<tr>
<td>Idleb</td>
<td>730,988</td>
<td>913,076</td>
<td>1,357,744</td>
<td>1,424,444</td>
<td>414,651</td>
<td>494,388</td>
<td>1,545,600</td>
<td>637,050</td>
<td>992,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lattakia</td>
<td>177,880</td>
<td>632,143</td>
<td>393,350</td>
<td>688,690</td>
<td>56,175</td>
<td>282,563</td>
<td>743,079</td>
<td>182,826</td>
<td>427,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quneitra</td>
<td>33,494</td>
<td>24,237</td>
<td>79,659</td>
<td>72,339</td>
<td>24,867</td>
<td>23,431</td>
<td>83,321</td>
<td>28,687</td>
<td>48,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Damascus</td>
<td>995,188</td>
<td>1,767,002</td>
<td>1,726,916</td>
<td>2,148,145</td>
<td>622,551</td>
<td>730,519</td>
<td>2,495,218</td>
<td>859,146</td>
<td>1,940,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tartous</td>
<td>216,456</td>
<td>365,221</td>
<td>355,069</td>
<td>481,753</td>
<td>44,643</td>
<td>208,712</td>
<td>500,302</td>
<td>67,514</td>
<td>201,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6.1M</td>
<td>6.1M</td>
<td>9.8M</td>
<td>10.5M</td>
<td>11.3M</td>
<td>4.7M</td>
<td>4.6M</td>
<td>13.3M</td>
<td>4.2M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While the crisis has affected all people living in Syria to varying degrees, some segments of the population and locations have been more acutely affected than others. The most severe needs across multiple sectors are concentrated in areas of ongoing conflict or areas with large numbers of IDPs. Of the estimated 13.1 million people in need an estimated 5.6 million people in Syria are experiencing acute needs. This refers to people in need living in areas where the overall levels of need are considered to have reached catastrophic, critical or severe levels.*

Areas with the highest severity of need require a complementary and multi-sector response to ensure basic life-saving and protection services. These efforts must include concerted advocacy to ensure rapid, unimpeded and sustained access to these areas, particularly UN-declared besieged areas. The remaining 7.5 million people in need in Syria live in areas of the country where the severity of need is considered major, moderate or minor. Most of these people are experiencing relative security, consistency of services, and market functionality/accessibility. This does not preclude sector-specific needs and individual household vulnerabilities due to a variety of factors - in many of these areas.

The inter-sector severity categorization will be regularly updated to highlight shifting contexts and subsequent changes in need, to ensure humanitarian partners are able to identify areas where humanitarian needs are more acute and where, therefore strengthened inter-sector programming is required.

* The inter-sector severity categorization tool seeks to identify the areas across Syria where humanitarian needs are more acute, given a convergence of factors including: besiegement, displacement, exposure to hostilities, and limited access to basic goods and services. These areas call for strengthened inter-sector programming to ensure the needs of those most in need are adequately addressed. For more information, please refer to annex one.
INTER-SECTORAL SEVERITY OF NEEDS AS OF AUGUST 2017

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: OCHA – based on inter-sector severity data
MOST VULNERABLE GROUPS

While the crisis in Syria has left no one untouched, it continues to impact population groups differently. Some segments of the population are likely to be more acutely affected than others due to the specific risk factors they are exposed to. Within the total 13.1 million people in need, and acknowledging that there are people in dire need of humanitarian assistance throughout the country, six broad population groups have been identified as those generally facing the most acute needs across sectors: i) People living in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas; ii) People exposed to a high intensity of hostilities and living in areas contaminated with explosive hazards; iii) IDPs living in last resort camps, sites and collective centres; iv) Newly-displaced populations; v) Spontaneous returnees and vi) Over-burdened communities.

KEY FACTORS RISKS AND GROUPS

The six priority groups outlined above are broad categories of people in need cutting across all sectors. At a more granular level, vulnerability levels within these priority population groups are likely to vary, with the following sub-groups/profiles requiring specific consideration when planning and prioritizing the response:

- **Children** are especially vulnerable, particularly those who are unaccompanied and separated or living with older/disabled caregivers or out of school. Children engaging in child labour or recruited for military purposes will require specific consideration.

- **Women and girls** may face particular risks due to their gender and situation, including harmful survival mechanisms such as early marriage, trafficking and sexual abuse and exploitation. Unaccompanied girls, pregnant and lactating women and female-headed households all have specific needs which require consideration.

- **People with chronic illness, disabilities and injuries** have specific needs which cut across sectors and may face difficulties in accessing needed assistance.

- **Youth** often lack employment and appropriate livelihood opportunities and may therefore be at particular risk of exploitation or engaging in at risk activities. Adolescent girls may face the specific risk of early or forced marriage.

- **The elderly** face specific needs with regards to security, shelter, access to services, health, NFIs and WASH facilities.

- **The elderly** face specific needs with regards to security, shelter, access to services, health, NFIs and WASH facilities.
People living in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach (HTR) areas

For people living in these areas, arbitrary restrictions on freedom of movement, limited access to core services, negligible humanitarian and commercial access, as well as market dysfunctionality, exacerbate vulnerabilities and contribute to a high severity of needs.

People living in these areas continue to face life-threatening conditions due to the lack of core relief items such as food, shelter, fuel and winter supplies, as well as the lack of functional services such as healthcare or clean water supply. Protection needs are also significant, with exposure to hostilities threatening people’s lives, causing distress, trauma and a variety of psychological concerns. In this context, health trauma needs remain significant. While life-threatening needs remain the priority in these areas, livelihood needs are also pronounced with a reduction in livelihood opportunities curtailing a key source of food and income.

People exposed to high intensity of hostilities and living in areas contaminated with explosive hazards

People exposed to high intensity hostilities and living in contaminated areas have specific needs in terms of risk education. These needs are especially acute among children, who are more likely to unknowingly pick up suspect items. Health needs related to trauma care are significant, particularly among people exposed to high intensity hostilities in tightly confined urban environments.

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**IDPs in last resort camps, informal settlements, transit centres and collective centres**

IDPs in last resort sites have been displaced by hostilities, generally exhausted all other options. With few available resources and negligible livelihood opportunities, they have little choice but to seek shelter in these sites.

IDPs living in last resort sites face severe deprivation and have survival needs that cut across all sectors. In addition to needing core relief items and essentials such as food, non-food items (especially winter supplies), shelter, water, nutrition, health, including reproductive healthcare, these IDPs are in particular need of specialized protection services, especially in sites where they are subjected to rigorous security screening procedures and are without civil documentation. Due to the temporary nature of these last resort sites, longer-term livelihood needs are relatively limited. However, in some cases, particularly where the population is more static and where there is a greater concentration of humanitarian partners, livelihood needs, including around access to income-generating opportunities and vocational training, may be more prominent.

**Newly displaced people**

As with IDPs living in last resort sites, newly displaced populations* have generally faced prolonged exposure to hostilities and, were often forced to flee from their homes at short notice, and hence are likely to possess limited resources. Given the prevalence and relative high intensity of hostilities in Idleb, Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor governorates, newly displaced populations are likely to be concentrated in northeast and northwest Syria. In some cases, newly displaced IDPs may overlap with IDPs in last resort sites.

* Populations are considered as newly displaced during their first three months of displacement.
Spontaneous returnees

Reasons for return often cited by IDPs include the need to protect assets/property, perceived improvements in stability and security in the area of origin, better access to humanitarian assistance, the ability to maintain civil-status documentation and an improved economic situation in the area of return. Push factors in areas of displacement have also been noted, including forced return by armed parties or poor living conditions in areas of displacement.

The immediate needs of spontaneous returnees are primarily related to the restoration of basic services and infrastructure, including water, sewage, education, healthcare and electricity in their communities of origin. In addition, individual households may, at least in the short-term, have pressing needs for food, shelter and non-food item assistance given particular vulnerabilities. Protection issues related to Housing, Land and Property (HLP) rights and documentation are likely to be numerous, including among people who have lost documentation, are unable to prove ownership, have experienced damage/destruction of property or are unable to resume agriculture. Areas of return are often contaminated with explosive hazards, with subsequent needs related to risk education and removal. Many spontaneous returnees have considerable livelihood needs, with substantial support required to restore disrupted livelihoods and repair the damaged infrastructure that is critical in maintaining sustainable income-generating activities. Provision of accurate information on conditions and available services in areas of return will be essential to ensure that the needs of the most vulnerable are met based on individual/household level criteria.

Overburdened communities

Overburdened communities where a large concentration (over 30 per cent of the population) of IDPs and/or spontaneous returnees reside, may experience limited availability of essential services, competition over livelihood opportunities and possible tensions over access to services. Overburdened communities face needs stemming from the deterioration of basic services over the course of the crisis, and the strain placed on remaining services due to the influx of IDPs and/or spontaneous returnees in these areas. Specifically, the lack of access to water, health care, shelter and to a variety of social and protection oriented services is a key concern. The restoration of basic services and minimum social infrastructure is a core need of these communities that can contribute to increased livelihood opportunities. Education needs, particularly in terms of vocational training for adolescents and youth, as well as the need for increased market access are also significant and will be critical in restoring livelihoods.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
PERCEPTIONS OF AFFECTED COMMUNITIES ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

The 2017 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (August 2017), as well as other sector-specific assessments simultaneously conducted to inform this HNO, improved the overall understanding of the priority concerns of affected communities’ perceptions of the humanitarian response, as well as their preferred forms of communication across Syria. The assessment was conducted using community-level key informant interviews, with the findings reflecting community perceptions of humanitarian assistance received, and are not representative or statistically significant. In an effort to capture as wide a cross-section of the community as possible, key informants included local authorities, male and female community leaders, older men and women, health staff, teachers, educational personnel, traders and humanitarian agencies. Generally, needs expressed were consistent with needs identified in assessments.

Overall, 71 per cent of the 5,520 communities and neighborhoods assessed reported that some form of humanitarian assistance was delivered in the past three months. Communities under ISIL control in Deir-ez-Zor Governorate reported the largest gap, with only 3 per cent of communities reporting that assistance was delivered. Of the 71 per cent of communities in Syria that reported receiving assistance, 93 per cent reported receiving food assistance, 72 per cent reported receiving NFI assistance, and 41 per cent reported receiving health assistance.

While most communities acknowledged receiving some form of assistance, assessment findings provided insights regarding community satisfaction with the assistance received, specifically related to the quality, quantity, timeliness, and relevance of the assistance. Of the 71 per cent of communities that reported receiving assistance, 8 per cent reported that the majority of the community was very satisfied with the assistance received, 67 per cent were partially satisfied, and 25 per cent were not satisfied. In the communities that were not satisfied or partially satisfied with the assistance received, the majority of communities (53 per cent) reported that the assistance was not of a sufficient quality to meet needs. Overall, of the communities that did report receiving assistance, the majority (79 per cent) of communities indicated that assistance partially met priority needs, 5 per cent indicated that needs were fully met and 16 per cent reported that assistance did not meet the priority needs of the community. These results will inform future planning to ensure a more effective humanitarian response.

Lastly, all 5,520 communities assessed were asked about the preferred ways of communicating with aid providers about community needs or assistance received. Overall, community leaders and community events were expressed as the preferred methods of communication by the majority of communities in Syria. WhatsApp or other mobile phone platforms were the preferred communication method in areas controlled by non-state armed groups. Notably, SMS messages and Twitter were not selected as preferred methods of communication in most communities.
ACCESS AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

Access to many parts of Syria remains extremely limited as a result of active hostilities, and exposure of civilians and humanitarian staff to explosive hazards. In addition, parties to the conflict who have the legal obligation to facilitate humanitarian access, often obstruct and impose unacceptable restrictions and conditions on humanitarian assistance. Out of the 13.5** million in need of humanitarian assistance in 2017, humanitarians were only able to reach a monthly average of 7.7 million people, in large part due to significant access constraints.

Access challenges

The humanitarian response in Syria operates on the principle that assistance is delivered through the most direct and efficient routes from within Syria and from neighboring countries. Under UNSC Resolution 2165 (2014) and subsequent resolutions 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015) and 2332 (2016), the UN and its partners are authorized to deliver humanitarian assistance from Turkey, Jordan and Iraq into Syria through designated border crossings. The full use of these complementary access modalities, including cross border, depends on the renewal of the UN Security Council Resolution, as well as the preservation of operational space for the UN and its partners in neighboring countries, particularly Turkey and Jordan.

Humanitarian actors, including UN agencies, funds and programmes, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and humanitarian international and national NGOs, continue to be prevented in many cases from regularly delivering life-saving assistance and services. Access constraints include sporadic closure of designated border crossings, the removal of critical medical supplies from convoys, denial of authorization to operate, delay in facilitation letters, and the targeting of humanitarian workers and facilities. Furthermore, the difficulties in reaching people in need in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas, or restrictions on the movement of civilian populations to access basic services, further compounds the problem. For instance, in the first 9 months of 2017, less than 770,000 people in need in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas were reached from within Syria through 41 UN inter-agency convoys, 285 airlifts, and 141 airdrops.*** The implementation rate for inter-agency convoys throughout 2017 remains low with a 27 per cent average.97

Access challenges are present across lines of control and affect all modalities. For instance a more restrictive access environment unfolded in 2017 in northwest Syria due to the interference by armed actors and local authorities in aid provision and in exerting further control over governance systems that affect humanitarians. Border closures with Turkey also affected humanitarian access for both shipments and supplies. For humanitarian organisations operating from Turkey, challenges in obtaining registrations or work permits inhibited the response and caused programme suspensions in some cases. Interference in the humanitarian response in former Euphrates Shield areas presented a further obstacle to the delivery of assistance.

MONTHLY AVERAGE OF PEOPLE REACHED AGAINST TOTAL PEOPLE IN NEED DURING 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.6M</th>
<th>7.7M</th>
<th>5.9M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average people reached in acute need</td>
<td>Average people reached</td>
<td>Average people not reached</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These access considerations reflect the operating environments as of September 2017
** People in need as of HNO 2017.
*** In the first half of 2017, the UN conducted a series of high altitude airdrops to Deir-ez-Zor city, and airlifts from Damascus to Qamishli. Both these modalities were halted as land access in these areas resumed.
De-escalation areas

At a meeting on the 4 May in Astana, Iran, the Russian Federation and Turkey signed a memorandum on the creation of four de-escalation areas (DEAs) where hostilities between the conflicting parties are to cease. The Memorandum provisions and a subsequent joint statement by the Astana guarantors include, inter alia, the need to increase humanitarian aid, facilitate rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and create conditions for the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons. The Astana memorandum combined with the “Amman discussions” (involving the United States, Russian Federation and Jordan) have led to the creation of four de-escalation areas: (a) Idleb Governorate and certain parts of neighboring Lattakia, Hama and Aleppo governorates, (b) parts of northern rural Homs Governorate, (c) East Ghouta in Rural Damascus, and (d) certain parts of southern Syria (Dar’a and Quneitra governorates). There are also two so-called de-confliction zones which have been brokered by the Russian Federation in Afreen and Eastern Qalamoun. As of October 2017, some 2.6 million people in need live in the four de-escalation areas of Syria.

While the reduction in violence, most notably in the southern DEA, is a significant and positive development for the civilian population, in other DEAs violence continued after periods of reduced hostilities. In addition, bureaucratic impediments from within Syria continue to delay and hamper the scale up of humanitarian assistance into these areas.
Aid continues to be provided from within Syria, while UN cross-border assistance continues according to UNSC Resolution 2165 (2014) and its subsequent annual renewals, most recently by Resolution 2332 (2017). The UN Monitoring Mechanism (UNMM) continues to monitor the loading of UN cross-border shipments to verify their humanitarian nature, providing notification to the Syrian authorities. Shipments under the UNSCR increased in 2017, with a monthly average of 490 trucks across all hubs. Aid is also provided by NGOs from neighboring countries.

Response efforts are coordinated through formal sector and cluster mechanisms in Syria, Turkey and Jordan, facilitated by OCHA and led by a Humanitarian Coordinator in each country. National staff and volunteers remain the first responders, working in extremely volatile and insecure environments to deliver humanitarian supplies and services.

In Syria, over 220 Syrian NGOs, 23 international NGOs, the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement and 11 United Nations agencies are authorised to provide assistance in areas under the Government of Syria’s control. Compared to 2016, there has been a small increase in partners authorised by the Government of Syria to carry out humanitarian programming in areas under its control, with four INGOs and more than 26 national NGOs now authorised. Additionally, 2017 also saw an increase in organisations operating in northeast Syria from Iraq or based in Syria, with 24 agencies reporting humanitarian programming across seven sectors. In addition, a large number of NGOs continue to operate from Turkey, including over 38 INGOs, over 190 Syrian NGOs and 10 Syrian networks, most of whom coordinate with formal humanitarian systems. However, challenges with regard to the regulatory environment in Turkey caused a number of NGOs to cease or reduce programming in northern Syria. A number of others also reduced programming, moved the management of their programmes to other countries, or both. As many of these were large, well-established international NGOs, this has created gaps in programming in some areas, despite the increase in national partners. The difficulty of Syrian NGOs, who have been affected less severely by these constraints, in accessing direct funding has compounded this problem. A further 23 registered NGOs operate from Jordan. The UN continues to operate from Syria, Turkey, and Jordan.

The WoS approach continues to bring partners together under one coordination framework, with a focus on leveraging the comparative advantage of each hub to provide assistance. Through this, information sharing and operational coordination improved in 2017, especially in areas where multiple hubs are responding, such as northeast Syria. While technical capacity continues to grow, there remains a need for long-term capacity building, particularly in areas such as cash-based programming, resilience and early recovery, shelter rehabilitation, protection, including HLP technical capacity. Combined with the lack of partnership opportunities, the limited capacity in these areas constitutes an obstacle to substantially scaling up and diversifying services across Syria through quality programming. This is especially important in areas where large international NGOs have reduced reach, and local organisations have been newly established, and where local expertise is particularly important.

The humanitarian response in Syria is a complex operation delivered from within Syria, as well as from Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq under the “Whole of Syria approach.”
Absent of a political solution, the humanitarian needs of people living in Syria are expected to remain broadly similar in 2018 compared to 2017.

Millions of Syrians will likely be unable to return home and will remain in need of humanitarian assistance, protection, and improved access to basic services. With more than 6.1 million IDPs as of September 2017, the Syria crisis is expected to continue to be characterised by massive conflict-induced displacement, notably in parts of northwest Syria including Idlib Governorate.

On the basis of current trends, it is estimated that at least 1.5 million Syrians will be newly displaced over the course of 2018, while approximately one million IDPs are forecast to return to their communities of origin. Spontaneous returns may marginally increase over the coming year, particularly for those people displaced close to their communities. At the same time, the scale of refugees returning from neighboring countries is expected to remain relatively low compared to IDP returns, though the interest in temporary visits to Syria will remain high to parts of the country where violence subsides.

Although the conflict is expected to continue, the geographic focus of hostilities will continue to evolve. Hostilities are anticipated to be concentrated in certain areas, notably in parts of northwest Syria that are largely under the control of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) which includes Idlib Governorate and parts of Lattakia, Hama, and Aleppo governorates. The presence of NSAGs in other parts of Syria, including in northern rural Homs, Rural Damascus, Dara’a and Quneitra governorates, likely indicates continued but varying levels of hostilities. Severe violence is also expected to continue in the northeast. The intensification of separate military operations by the GoS and its allied forces as well as the US-led international coalition against ISIL in Deir-ez-Zor have intensified during the second half of 2017, potentially affecting up to 585,000 people and resulting in the displacement of up to 435,000 people.

The de-escalation areas (DEAs) are temporary in nature, and the implementation of a meaningful ceasefire which allows for the provision of assistance and services through the most efficient route possible will shape the modalities, type, and the scale of response from the humanitarian community. However, the degree to which the reduction of hostilities will translate into both meaningful access for humanitarian actors and freedom of movement for the civilian population will likely continue to vary, with the reduction in hostilities in some areas in 2017 not always contributing to increased access and freedom of movement.

Furthermore, not all scenarios envisaged are expected to materialize, notably the extent to which the DEAs facilitate the conditions for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and IDPs. Of particular concern is the Idlib and northwest DEA, where conflict is expected to intensify due to the presence of HTS, potentially having significant humanitarian implications on the roughly 1.7 million people in need, including over one million IDPs, who live in the area.

Civilians in UN-declared besieged areas, particularly in East Ghouta, are likely to remain deprived of sustained humanitarian assistance and have limited access to basic commodities and services, including health, water, food and protection-related services/support. They are likely to continue to be affected by indiscriminate attacks, sometimes involving heavy weaponry and exposed to multiple protection threats. It is expected that the number of people living in UN-declared besieged areas will decrease over the course of 2018, both as a result of conflict dynamics, as well as the continuation of local agreements.

Some of these local agreements have in the past resulted in the “relocation” of people to northwest Syria (Idlib and Aleppo governorates), further deteriorating social cohesion and exacerbating humanitarian needs.

Efforts are ongoing to allow humanitarian assistance through Al Yarubiyah, the designated border crossing between Iraq and Syria (as per UN Security Council Resolution 2165). Nevertheless, humanitarian access to northeast Syria may be unpredictable in 2018 and will be shaped in part by events in neighboring Iraq from where many organisations operate.

Over the course of 2018, work will continue in analyzing and assessing the evolving humanitarian risk outlook for Syria. In turn, this analysis will contribute to overall contingency planning, informing preparedness steps to guide a more effective and principled response.
The analysis informing the 2018 HNO was based on a series of sector-specific assessments complemented by a multi-sector needs assessment (MSNA) reaching all communities in Syria. While sector-specific assessments formed the basis of the needs identification process, the MSNA provided an overall articulation of the situation and identified areas where the severity of needs are higher. Despite enhancements in data collection and analysis techniques, both in terms of quality and reach, many of the figures provided through the document are estimates based on sometimes incomplete and partial methodologies. Some of the limitations of these methodologies are outlined below and include difficulties in accessing some communities as well as continued gender bias, despite recent progress. Notwithstanding these limitations, the scope and depth of data collected at community level provides a solid evidence base for a more effective and accountable response in 2018.

### Multi-sector Needs Assessment

The MSNA is a cross-hub and multi-partner assessment coordinated by OCHA to identify humanitarian needs at the community level. The assessment was conducted by 31 partners in 100 per cent of populated communities between July and August 2017.

Data was collected from as wide a range of key informants as possible, including local authorities, male and female community leaders, older men and women, health staff, teachers and educational personnel, traders and other humanitarian agencies. Efforts were made to interview people less easily accessed but often at additional risk, such as persons with disabilities, women and older people. Overall, over 139,000 key informant interviews were conducted, of which 98 per cent comprised face-to-face interviews while 26 per cent were interviews with female key informants.

This year, humanitarian partners further refined sex-, age-, and disability-disaggregated (SADD) humanitarian planning estimates (population and IDP figures) through the Population and IDP Task Forces. These humanitarian planning estimates represent a snapshot of population trends in Syria as of August 2017. These figures will be updated quarterly to inform the update of the inter-sector severity and PiN estimations.

The 2017 MSNA builds on lessons learned from assessments conducted in previous years. Five years of joint, coordinated assessments have resulted in improved geographical coverage and more granular data, as well as mature data collection initiatives that provide monthly updates on humanitarian needs. This has also lead to technological enhancements in data collection and analysis techniques. Furthermore, capacity building programs have augmented the capabilities of existing data collection partners, particularly Syrian NGOs.

### Sector-specific Assessments

Data collected through the MSNA was combined with sector-specific technical studies, including a SMART survey, two household-level water and sanitation assessments, as well as focus group discussions, which fed into sector needs analysis and for some sectors the development of sector severity scales. While substantial progress has been made, more detailed information is required to understand the specific needs of vulnerable groups.

#### SECTOR ASSESSMENTS INFORMING THE 2018 HNO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCCM</td>
<td>MSNA, ISIM, IDP situation monitoring initiative (ISMI) project (REACH), MDM (NPM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>MSNA, Educational Management Information System (EMIS), Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) Education Assessment, Secondary Data Review (SDR) of other reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERL</td>
<td>MSNA, ERL Severity Scale Measurement Exercise, Livelihoods and Infrastructure Damage Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Security</td>
<td>Food Security and Livelihood Assessment, mVAM Reports, Price Monitoring Reports, Partner assessment reports, CFsAM, MSNA, Conflict Analysis and Contextual Analysis Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>MSNA, HeRAMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFI/Shelter</td>
<td>MSNA, HH-level assessment (REACH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>MSNA, Syria hub Protection Needs Assessment (SHPNA)* for GoS-controlled areas, Focus Group Discussions by sector members, Expert FGDs (GBV), MRM (CP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>HH-level assessments (NPM) (2 Rounds), HH-level assessment South and North hubs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This requires going beyond community-level and key informant interviews to gather household-level information on needs, in turn depending on improved access that enables contact and consultation with affected populations. It is also recognized that, despite recent progress, gender bias continues to impact assessment findings. Gender parity in data collection requires dedicated resources and sustained advocacy, particularly in light of challenges around assessments. Details on the methodology for the analysis included in the HNO are available through this link [www.hno-syria.org](http://www.hno-syria.org).

* The same assessment questionnaire (as agreed by the GoS), aggregation methodology and analysis was used by the MSNA and SHPNA.
PART I I: NEEDS OVERVIEWS
BY SECTOR

INFORMATION BY SECTOR

Protection
Camp Coordination and Camp Management
Early Recovery and Livelihoods
Education
Food Security and Agriculture
Health
Logistics
Nutrition
Shelter and Non Food Items
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
**KEY MESSAGES**

- The high level of civilian casualties and findings from recent assessments continue to provide strong indications that serious violations and abuses of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) continue to be reported, while widespread contamination of explosive hazards endangers the lives of civilians.

- Gender-Based Violence (GBV) continues to negatively affect the lives of women and girls in Syria, inside and outside the home, further eroding women’s rights.

- Violence against children is pervasive, including in areas where hostilities decreased and contribute to the further deterioration of coping mechanisms.

- Concerns related to the delivery of humanitarian assistance are reported, including lack/loss of civil documentation, discrimination and accounts of sexual violence and harassment - requiring a concerted effort by all actors.

- Spontaneous returns increasingly occur, but are often short and not voluntary, dignified, safe or sustainable generating a variety of needs that go beyond the response capacity of duty-bearers.

**OVERVIEW**

Protection issues in Syria continue to be widespread, with 97 per cent of assessed communities reporting the occurrence of at least one protection concern. Despite a steady increase in protection interventions and services throughout the country, the magnitude of needs still outstrips response capacities. People in Syria remain exposed to active hostilities and the Protection Needs Overview (PNO) findings and high level of civilian casualties remain strong indications of violations of the prohibition on launching indiscriminate attacks and of the IHL principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. In areas where a reduction of hostilities has been recorded, civilians are suffering the effects of over six years of conflict including the disintegration of community structures, safety nets and rule of law institutions, the proliferation of weapons, continuous strain on resources and high levels of trauma and psychological distress. Forced and multiple displacements,

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* Protection Sector data is based on the concept of occurrence. Assessed communities were asked about 13 protection issues and whether they occur never, sometimes, commonly, or very commonly for seven different population groups. Occurrence refers to issues that were described as happening sometimes, commonly or very commonly for one or more population groups.
PROTECTION

"Our life is full of explosives"
(adolescent boy in Aleppo Governorate)

Coupled with family separations, have resulted in harmful coping strategies, weakened support structures and resulted in an increasingly complex and high risk protection environment.

In 2017, the Protection sector has been able to increase its coverage and degree of analysis of protection issues, with community-level data collected on several protection issues in 4,185 communities across the country,* with age and sex disaggregation. Findings demonstrate how inter-linkages between protection issues require an integrated response.

ANALYSIS OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

Different population groups inside Syria are still affected by multiple and inter-linked protection issues, with the occurrence of at least five protection concerns reported in 59 per cent of assessed communities. Findings describe a heavy deterioration of the protection situation for communities located in Ar-Raqqa, where between 10 and 13 protection issues were identified in 21 per cent of the 313 communities assessed in the Governorate. In these assessed communities at least one protection issue has been described as “very common” for one or more population groups, highlighting the importance of disaggregating data according to sex, age, and disability to inform the protection response and target the most vulnerable.

• Compounding existing protection risks for communities and individuals

Individuals and communities remain challenged in their efforts to cope with the crisis, often having to resort to harmful coping mechanisms to survive. This has particularly affected children, with the occurrence of early marriage and child labour as coping mechanisms reported in 57 per cent and 82 per cent of assessed communities respectively.** Reliance on humanitarian assistance remains a major recourse for all affected population groups, and is depended upon in more than 50 per cent of assessed communities. Meanwhile, concerns in relation to the way humanitarian assistance was delivered were reported in 64 per cent of assessed communities. Common concerns were the need to present civil documentation to access assistance and assistance not meeting the needs of the population. Less common, but notable reported issues were discrimination, exclusion, and cases of sexual violence and harassment during distributions.

The lack and loss of civil documentation compound protection risks and existing vulnerabilities. Presenting civil documentation to access humanitarian assistance and services was identified as a major concern, which has a direct impact on the capacity of communities to meet their life-saving needs. It also affects broader aspects of life and the future of children, who face challenges accessing education or civil status/nationality. The lack/loss of civil documentation was reported as affecting all population groups in 83 per cent of assessed communities. It was reported as “very common” in Ar-Raqqa Governorate. In assessed communities where it was identified as a concern, the lack and loss of civil documentation exacerbates restrictions of freedom of movement,** prevents people from registering vital

PERCENTAGE OF ASSESSED COMMUNITIES REPORTING OCCURRENCE OF PROTECTION ISSUES

* Child labour, child recruitment, domestic violence, early marriage, economic exploitation, explosive hazards, family separation, harassment, housing, land and property issues, kidnapping/abduction, lack/loss of civil documentation, sexual harassment and sexual violence. The assessment also looked at freedom of movement, concerns related to humanitarian assistance, coping mechanisms and protection services (Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment and Syria Hub protection needs assessments)

**Values quoted here refer to the indicator related to coping mechanisms used for boys and girls. The figure goes up to 71 per cent for child marriage in urban communities (Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment and Syria Hub protection needs assessments).
events and land transactions, with potential repercussions on civilians possessing documentation issued in non-government controlled areas, arrest, detention and housing, land and property (HLP) issues. HLP issues were reported as a concern in 57 per cent of assessed communities, with legal assistance for civil documentation and HLP issues featuring among the variety of protection services required by the population. A dramatic increase in HLP challenges, including issues related to property restitution and compensation is anticipated in a context of increasing IDP returns.

- **Violence against girls and boys, including grave child rights violations**

Children continue to endure multiple protection risks and violations of their rights on a daily basis. Grave child rights violations remain a critical concern with countless children killed and injured through persistent use of explosive weapons in civilian areas, recruitment and use of children, torture, detention, abduction, sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals and denial of humanitarian access, particularly to children living in UN-declared besieged areas. This toxic environment leaves many girls and boys exposed to psychosocial risks (e.g. sense of security, purpose, control and significance, exercising social agency) and experiencing profound distress.

Recruitment and use of children by armed actors continues to be reported. Children, particularly adolescent boys, are used in combat roles as well in support roles. 18 per cent of the 300 verified cases of child recruitment involved children under the age of 15. Payment of salaries, more so than ideology, continues to be a major contributing factor. Family and community influence, indoctrination, abduction, arrest and coercion of children are also factors. In 47 per cent of surveyed communities, child recruitment was perceived as occurring in their community. Child labour is reported as occurring in 82 per cent of surveyed communities, including in its most dangerous and hazardous forms such as recruitment and use by parties to the conflict, begging and scavenging for scrap metal. Out of desperation girls and boys of all ages are reported to be performing work beyond their mental, social or physical capacities which may deny them their basic rights, including to an education. The widespread decimation of livelihoods and the economy have put immense pressure on families pushing large numbers of children onto the labor market with survival options particularly limited for an estimated 1.05 million children living in hard-to-reach areas and 202,300 children living in UN-declared besieged areas.

Separation from caregivers is reported as occurring in 52 per cent of assessed communities. Death of caregivers, divorce, economic reasons, child marriage (mostly adolescent girls) and child recruitment (mostly adolescent boys) were the main reported reasons that children are separated from their caregivers. The majority of separated children are cared for within kinship care, a pre-existing cultural norm, however there is some indication that these arrangements are under-strain. Worryingly, data suggests an increase in unregulated residential care centres such as orphanages and underscores the need to strengthen family tracing and reunification mechanisms.

- **Explosive hazards continue to kill, maim and restrict civilian access to services and impede the safe delivery of humanitarian aid**

Throughout 2017, Syria continued to experience widespread hostilities in many districts. Various weapons types have been used since 2011, leaving behind a range of explosive hazards, including mines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These hazards pose their own risks and require different mitigation strategies to reduce their impact. From January to June 2017 over 23,000 individual explosive events occurred comprising more than 11,500 aerial bombardments and 11,000 incidents of heavy weapons fire. In addition, more than 700 IEDs and explosions were reported. Dangerous explosive remnants will remain in these areas and cause injury and loss of life within nearby communities while also limiting safe access. In 2017, conflict levels have increased in governorates such as Ar-Raqqa and Dar’a and decreased in governorates such as Aleppo and Homs. This geographic shift has added another layer of explosive hazards to previous years, exacerbating danger and increasing the need for organized large-scale interventions.

8.2 million people live in communities reporting explosive hazards as a key protection concern. These communities are spread throughout the country and correlate to areas that have seen the most conflict. The impact of explosive hazards on communities is immediate and devastating, but also prevents the safe delivery of humanitarian aid, affects population movement and limits the scope for recovery and reconstruction efforts. Key services such as schools, hospitals, markets, agricultural land, wells and roads may be blocked by explosive remnants of war (ERW), impeding access to education, health services, marketplaces and safe livelihood opportunities. While the removal of these items is the only way to eliminate the threat, provision of education on these hazards is crucial to provide civilians with basic safety messages to reduce the daily risk.

Death and injury resulting from accidents lead to long term physical and psychological trauma for victims and their families. All population groups are vulnerable to the threat of explosive hazards, but certain groups are at higher risk due to their activity patterns. Of communities reporting known deaths and injuries from explosive hazards, 53 per cent cited farmers and herders – who dig up and walk the land, 37 per cent children - who will pick up interesting items, 32 per cent rubble removers – who come across explosives as they try to rebuild and 31 per cent from people on the move, who...
unwittingly stray into danger areas. In addition to the physical and psychological trauma, these injuries and deaths can have severe long term socio-economic implications on the family structure. The lack of appropriate services, further increases these vulnerabilities and can result in negative coping mechanisms, including taking children out of school and child labour.

The scale of the explosive hazard threat in Syria is not yet fully known and the mitigation measures to reduce their impact on civilians need to be comprehensive and large-scale. Civilians require education on the daily risks they face, areas must be surveyed and better marked to identify where explosive hazards are, while explosive hazards need to be removed and physical, psychosocial and socio-economic assistance provided to victims and their families.

- Disproportionate effect of Gender-Based Violence on women and girls

Assessments have indicated that gender-based violence, particularly verbal harassment, domestic violence (including family violence against women and girls), early marriages and the fear of sexual violence continue to pervade the lives of women and girls in Syria inside and outside the home, resulting in very few spaces where women and girls feel safe. The length of the crisis and the deep-rooted patriarchal structures underpinning Syrian society, in conjunction with the mounting lawlessness in some areas, are normalising this violence, with women's rights continuing to be eroded. The fear of sexual violence, often associated with kidnapping, is a concern raised by women and girls and contributes to psychosocial stress and limits their movements. The restriction on freedom of movement of women and girls also inhibits their access to services, humanitarian aid and ultimately curtails their rights. The shame and stigma surrounding sexual violence means that survivors often do not talk about violence when it happens. Women and girls also fear so-called honour killings as a result of sexual violence. Families arrange marriages for girls, believing it will protect them and ease the financial burden on the family. Girls are reportedly being married younger, with child marriage- sometimes involving girls of 10 or 11 years old-framed as a protective coping strategy in 11 out of 14 governorates. The socio-economic situation, lack of livelihood opportunities, and increased poverty are ultimately leading more women to resort to harmful coping mechanisms such as survival sex.

Household-level gender roles continue to change. Although women have more responsibility, this does not infer authority. Women have taken on additional roles traditionally associated with men, including as heads of household and principal breadwinners for their families. This contributes to increased pressure and stress for women to provide for their families and can lead to increased risks of violence against them within the family and at their workplace. Practices imposed by extremist groups and others in some parts of the country, such as prescribed dress codes and an obligatory chaperone, limit the freedom of women and girls. Where GBV services exist, women and girls have confirmed that they have a positive impact on their lives, which is confirmed by service providers receiving more disclosures than last year. However, 149 sub-districts do not have any GBV programming and northeast Syria remains particularly under-served.

** AFFECTED POPULATION**

The Protection sector dedicated specific attention to how protection concerns and needs affect different population groups. Girls and boys of all ages still face violence in all areas of their lives: at home, at school, at work and in the community. Transition to adolescence, in particular, is a time when children's exposure to new forms of violence increases. Adolescent boys are more likely to be killed and injured, detained and recruited by parties to the conflict, or to be involved in child labour. Adolescent girls are particularly at risk of early marriage and other forms of gender-based violence, including sexual violence. As is the case globally, women and girls are disproportionately affected by all forms of gender-based violence in Syria, in both the public and private spheres. In addition, divorced women and widows continue to be exposed to stigmatization and discrimination, as well as forced marriages. Boys are also understood to be at risk of sexual violence. Men are particularly affected by restrictions of freedom of movement and forms of violence directly associated to the conduct of hostilities (e.g. detention, recruitment). Lack of care-givers and dissolution of community structures significantly affect vulnerable groups such as the elderly, persons with disabilities and those who rely on external support mechanisms for day-to-day survival before the conflict. Those groups are exposed to different forms of violence and face significant challenges in accessing assistance. Exclusion of vulnerable segments of the population from assistance is likely to compound existing risks, such as sexual or economic exploitation. People without civil documentation face specific challenges. Undocumented children are for example, exposed to the risk of statelessness. Palestinian refugees, particularly the 250,000 considered as displaced from destroyed camps and gathering and living in last resort sites or in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas, continue to be exposed to a variety of protection risks and vulnerabilities including psychosocial trauma, various forms of GBV, exclusion, discrimination, abuse and exposure to crime. Concerns for Palestine refugees, including those related to safety and security, as well as access to shelter and HLP-related issues, may further emerge in a context of return movements.

* Child recruitment was reported as occurring for adolescent boys in 47 per cent of the assessed communities.

** Some 43 per cent of assessed communities reported that movement restrictions affected men.
CAMP COORDINATION AND CAMP MANAGEMENT

NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN NEED

6.1 M

KEY MESSAGES

- IDP sites continue to host some of the most vulnerable IDPs who require immediate life-saving assistance.
- The use of IDP sites (camps, informal settlements, transit centres, and collective centres) remains an option of last-resort, however, the lack of other alternatives contributed to 20 per cent of newly displaced IDPs seeking shelter in such sites following significant incidences of displacement during 2017.
- Due to their temporary nature, IDP sites require constant maintenance and support.
- Women and children represent 79 per cent of the total number of the over 750,000 IDPs in IDP sites.

OVERVIEW

For the 6.1 million people who have fled their homes and become internally displaced, many turn to camps, informal settlements, transit centres, and collective centres as a last resort when no other option is available. As an indication of reduced resources amongst IDPs and host communities, 20 per cent of those newly displaced in 2017 resorted to IDP sites, where they received direct lifesaving assistance. Since the end of 2016, the CCCM cluster estimates that some 804,300 people have been displaced across the northern governorates of Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Ar-Raqqa, and Deir-ez-Zor. Over half a million people currently live in IDP sites across Syria.

ANALYSIS OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

The CCCM cluster continues to monitor displacement patterns in northern Syria. Since October 2016, the cluster tracked almost 915,000 displacements (some may be secondary displacements) in northern Syria through the IDP Situation Monitoring Initiative (ISMI) and information provided by humanitarian actors. Average monthly displacements are 148,640, compared to 40,300 recorded in 2016. Peaks in displacement generally occurred due to the start or renewal of military offensives, particularly in Aleppo, Hama, Idlib, Ar-Raqqa and, more recently, Deir-ez-Zor governorates.
The needs of persons displaced by hostilities cut across all sectors, with IDP sites representing a last resort for displaced populations who would otherwise be unable to meet their basic needs. IDPs hosted in these sites tend to be among the most vulnerable.

Collective centres consist of shared accommodation, often based in public buildings which have been repurposed to house large IDP populations. Of the 2,631 collective centres in Syria, schools (33 per cent), residential buildings (15 per cent) and warehouses (8 per cent) are the most common building types. Municipal (8 per cent) and business buildings (3 per cent), as well as mosques (3 per cent) and factories (2 per cent) are also in use. Collective centres have an important role in receiving new arrivals, while also compensating for instances where the capacity of the local community to host new IDPs is limited.

IDPs residing in collective centres face a number of challenges in the delivery of basic services. These challenges particularly relate to issues of water provision (15 per cent), poor sanitation and hygiene (13 per cent) and lack of electricity (12 per cent). Poor conditions of sanitation facilities (11 per cent), lack of heating (9 per cent) and poor shelter conditions (9 per cent) are also common problems for these sites.

Some 2,900 informal settlements constitute the largest share of IDP sites in Syria. These “spontaneous” or “self-established” sites are usually groups of tents/shelters established by IDPs themselves or by non-specialized actors (local charities or individuals). They are not managed by humanitarian organizations with sufficient capacity and often cannot guarantee the delivery of dignified protection and multi-sectoral services. Planned camps, managed by humanitarian organizations, number only 315, with an additional 285 reception and transit centres intended for very short-term displacements.

Challenges faced by IDPs in these sites are often similar to those in collective centres. Lack of water (20 per cent) is the most reported gap, followed by poor sanitation and hygiene (14 per cent) and lack of electricity (12 per cent). While poor conditions of sanitation facilities (11 per cent) and shelters (9 percent) are common, the lack of privacy in sleeping and bathing areas (8 per cent) has been highlighted as a major issue as well.

In northern Syria, the CCCM cluster coordinates the response in 342 sites, including 244 informal settlements, 79 collective centres, 16 planned camps and three reception centres. These sites are regularly monitored through the IDP Sites Integrated Monitoring Matrix (ISIMM) and host 361,077 IDPs (as of September 2017). Humanitarian actors provide regular services to a majority of IDPs living in these sites. However, the increase in site population compared to last year has not been matched by available resources. The provision of services, is therefore often overstretched and cannot cover all needs. Support in shelter and NFI, for example, is unable to cover 35 and 32 per cent of the IDP population, respectively. 30 per cent of the population cannot receive minimum food assistance on a monthly basis. Challenges also persist in sanitation (13 per cent of the population), waste removal (12 per cent) and water (10 per cent). Aleppo and Idlib governorates in particular have received a large influx of displaced persons from other governorates, with more anticipated. With the increase in displacements, existing vulnerabilities among IDPs are exacerbated while coping mechanisms of host and displaced communities are eroded.

In Ar-Raqqa Governorate, hostilities have led to some 436,000 displacements from/within Ar-Raqqa Governorate between the end of November 2016 and the end of September 2017. While a majority of displacements remained within the Governorate and consisted of short-term movements (families returned to their homes after a brief displacement),
more than 90,000 IDPs still remain in IDP sites. Due to limited access of humanitarian actors in Ar-Raqqa, people living in these sites are often not provided with multi-sectoral assistance and face major gaps in the provision of essential food, water and health services.

**AFFECTED POPULATION**

Challenges and gaps differ slightly between collective centres and other IDP sites in Syria. While IDPs in other sites face a lack of water and poor sanitation facilities, families in collective centres are more vulnerable with the lack of heating, overcrowding and unsafe shelters. The lack of space in collective centres, as well as issues related to privacy, comprise key concerns for the population and have important consequences on the protective environment, particularly for women and girls.

The CCCM cluster is collecting detailed information on IDP sites through the IDP Sites Integrated Monitoring Matrix + (ISIMM Plus) on a regular basis. Throughout the 342 IDP sites in northern Syria, children make up 54 per cent of the population, or about 194,940 individuals. In IDP sites in Idleb and Aleppo, the cluster has tracked 576 female-headed and 166 child-headed households.

**STATISTICS ON PEOPLE IN NEED DISAGGREGATED BY SEX AND AGE**

The number of IDPs living in IDP sites in northern Syria has increased from 336,162 individuals to 361,077 individuals (7.4 per cent increase since August 2016). The CCCM cluster has tracked 138,680 new displacements into the camps since August 2016. During this period, 74 new IDP sites have been established, of which three are in Aleppo Governorate and 71 are in Idleb Governorate. Gender breakdown of the IDPs living in IDP sites is 27 per cent girls, 28 per cent boys, 24 per cent women and 21 per cent men.
EARLY RECOVERY AND LIVELIHOODS

NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN NEED

9.8M

KEY MESSAGES

• Some 9.8 million people are estimated to be in acute need of early recovery and livelihood support.

• Over 50 per cent of basic social infrastructure in Syria is now either destroyed or non-operational.

• An estimated three in four people of working age are not involved in any income-generating activities.

• Syria has seen the proportion of the population living in extreme poverty (less than US$2 per day) double from almost 34 per cent pre crisis to approximately 69 per cent today.127

OVERVIEW

Close to seven years of conflict have severely stretched the capacity and resilience of people living in Syria to cope with shocks and stresses brought about by the crisis. The loss of jobs and livelihoods, the depletion of productive assets and savings, increasing debt, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, large-scale displacement and the disruption of social services have all contributed to increased economic hardship that have eroded people’s ability to cope.

The deterioration of basic services continues to undermine the viability of productive sectors, feeding a vicious cycle of unemployment, diminishing resources and resulting in increased levels of poverty. Deprived of the productive tools required to meet their basic needs and in the absence of state-supported basic services, many households are resorting to improvised solutions to address their needs.

On the basis of this analysis, the Early Recovery and Livelihoods (ERL) sector estimates that 13 million people in Syria are in need of humanitarian assistance of whom 9.8 million are in acute need. This compares to a 2017 figure of 13.8 million, of whom 10 million were in acute need.

ANALYSIS OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

The scale and severity of unmet needs (i.e. gaps) suggests that the overall resilience capacity of the population to respond to shocks is increasingly limited. The sector’s analysis of the impact of the crisis focuses on basic and social infrastructure and socioeconomic conditions and challenges.
**Basic and social services infrastructure:** According to the recent sector severity analysis over 50 per cent of social infrastructure in Syria is not operational, often because it has been destroyed as a result of hostilities. Almost 13 million people, roughly 70 per cent of people in Syria, lack sustained access to electricity. Electricity production, transmission and distribution have been heavily affected by ongoing hostilities, leaving much of Syria’s electricity infrastructure non-operational. This lack of electricity has had a negative impact across sectors, including Health and WASH. Indeed, some 13 million people lack sustained access to water, with the population in some areas of the country often depending on water from tanks and other private sources, increasing the overall financial burden on households. Challenges faced in repairing damaged facilities due to a scarcity of spare parts, in part due to sanctions, and difficulties in accessing areas of active hostilities have hampered efforts to resume such services.

**Socio-economic conditions/challenges:** Securing a livelihood is one of the most critical challenges faced by people in Syria, with over half of the 5 million pre-crisis jobs no longer existing. This is reflected in an estimated unemployment rate of 53 per cent, reaching as high as 75 per cent among youth (15-24 years). Against this backdrop, the proportion of the population living in extreme poverty or on less than US$1.90 a day, has soared to 69 per cent, over twice the pre-crisis rate. Compounded by high levels of inflation and the slashing of government subsidies on basic items such as bread, the overall purchasing power of people has been reduced. Lacking the productive means and income-generating opportunities to address their basic daily needs, and given the disruption to basic services, people are resorting to harmful coping mechanisms. Initially such coping mechanisms may include reducing food consumption, running up debts or depleting household assets. Over time, some households resort to increasingly hazardous and exploitative activities as their financial and material resources are exhausted. For instance, it is estimated that 15 per cent of Syrians in the labour force are engaged in ‘armed struggle’ or illegal economic activities such as fighting, smuggling and trafficking, in many cases as this is the only livelihood opportunity available to them. Furthermore, negative coping mechanisms often affect the most vulnerable population groups such as women-headed households, children and people with chronic illnesses. In 2017 some 82 per cent of communities perceived the occurrence of child labour as preventing school attendance within their communities, and some 69 per cent of communities perceived the occurrence of early marriage. If survival and livelihood needs of people are not adequately addressed, the already high degrees of recourse to harmful coping solutions will likely increase, with a growing risk that their effects become irreversible.

At the same time, the strains of almost seven years of conflict and deprivation are ultimately transforming long-held concepts of childhood, family, and community. These pressures are especially apparent in governorates which have witnessed substantial influxes of IDPs. Such dynamics may contribute to a further decline in social capital, defined in terms of the institutions, relationships and norms that inform social interactions in a given society. A recent study suggests that over the course of the crisis, Syria has seen a 30 per cent decline in social capital, rising to up to 80 per cent in governorates such as Ar-Raqqa which have experienced a high intensity of hostilities and widespread displacement. As well as longer-term implications, this social disintegration risks contributing to intra/inter-communal competition over scarce resources and basic services.

**AFFECTED POPULATION**

The consequences of economic decline, deteriorating living conditions and social fragmentation have had a deep and far-reaching impact on people in Syria. Nonetheless, based on the sector severity analysis and taking into account the six broad population groups generally deemed to face the most acute needs across sectors, the Early Recovery sector has a clear evidence-base to inform the overall response and ensure that the needs of the most vulnerable are addressed first.

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**ERL PIN NUMBERS PER INDICATOR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Population</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People with limited/no employment opportunities</td>
<td>10.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with limited/no access to electricity</td>
<td>12.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People living in areas with basic infrastructure damaged</td>
<td>9.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People living in areas with buildings damaged</td>
<td>7.3 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Within these different priority groups there are various profiles of people, including adolescents, youth, elderly, women heads of households, and people with disabilities who require special consideration in the response planning and prioritization.

The needs of adolescents and youth require particular consideration both in the short-term and with a longer term view towards rebuilding the social fabric of Syria. Adolescents and youth (10-24 years) constitute 31 per cent of the population and are often amongst the most economically and socially marginalized groups in Syria. Youth not only have very few opportunities to participate in economic activities but also lack opportunities to participate in decision-making processes that can contribute towards the realization of their rights. They lack formal channels to effectively participate in social, civic and economic life. Ultimately, young people feel disenfranchised and have little faith in the existing participation platforms to have a positive influence on their futures.
EDUCATION

NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN NEED

6.1M

KEY MESSAGES

• Direct attacks on schools and education personnel continue with the trend of the first six months of 2017 remaining consistent in terms of the types of attacks and their impact on children.

• More than one in three schools are either damaged or destroyed while others are being used as collective shelters or for other purposes.

OVERVIEW

As the crisis enters its seventh year, there are now 5.8 million children and youth from pre-school to secondary-age (including more than 100,000 Palestine refugee children) and over 300,000 education personnel in need of education assistance inside Syria. While new EMIS\textsuperscript{132} data for the school year 2016/17 is currently under review, an estimated 1.75 million children, or almost one third of school-age children (aged 5-17 years) from the 2015/16 school-year are out of school and a further 1.35 million are at risk of dropping out. Around 180,000 education personnel, including teachers, left the education system, which has negatively affected the quality of education for all children. Hostilities have seen over one in three schools damaged, destroyed, no longer accessible or occupied for shelter and other purposes. Schools, accounting for an estimated 33 per cent of collective centres, were reported as the most common building type used for IDP sites in Syria.\textsuperscript{133} Increased internal displacement has put the current infrastructure under enormous pressure and highlighted the need for school rehabilitation.

The increasing number of local agreements and expanded access to areas that were UN-declared besieged or hard-to-reach, has opened accredited education opportunities to school-age children who have missed out on years of schooling. However, the number of students who have been out of school for more than five years is also on the rise, with 2,114 communities citing child labour as the primary reason in keeping children out of school.\textsuperscript{*} The education system is overburdened, overstretched and increasingly fragmented with at least six different curricula taught. This has serious repercussions on the certification of learning. Protection risks have been observed during official examination periods for students crossing active frontlines to sit for official exams.

* 2,114 communities represents 40 per cent of the total communities interviewed
Education in camps continues to be underserved. A recent assessment of 171 camps found that 74 per cent of camps and settlements have no education services at all.\(^\text{134}\)

**ANALYSIS OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS**

Since the beginning of 2017, the shifting political landscape including in Rural Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and northeast Syria (including the areas of Al-Hasakeh, Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor recently reclaimed from ISIL) provides a window of opportunity to expand humanitarian access and deliver education interventions to those who have missed out on schooling over the last several years. However, the ongoing hostilities and persistent geographical disparities deny children the right to education.

Access barriers remain significant, especially in areas of active hostilities and in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas, where a large number of schools and teachers are in need of assistance. Lack of safety and security constitutes the greatest barrier to accessing education, with schools and education facilities seemingly under attack and occupied by armed actors. Assessment data indicates that 53 per cent of educational facilities were partially damaged and 10 per cent destroyed.\(^\text{135}\) Some schools operate in double/triple shift (morning, noon and afternoon classes) to accommodate the large influx of displaced children. This reduces the teaching learning hours from six hours to only two to three hours per day, adversely affecting learning outcomes. A review of secondary data regularly undertaken by the WoS Education sector, highlights that almost 40 per cent of non-functional schools are in ISIL-controlled areas. Moreover, some 17 per cent of buildings in these non-functional schools are totally destroyed.\(^\text{136}\) Schools are far from safe and protective spaces. Attacks on schools not only put the safety and wellbeing of students and school staff at risk, but the fear of such attacks also discourages parents from sending their children to school. The MRM4Syria verified 74 attacks on schools and 11 attacks on education personnel in 2016, resulting in the killing of nine education personnel and the injuring of a further 16. In the course of these attacks, 255 children were verified killed or injured while they were at or nearby schools.* Compared to the 2016, the number of verified attacks on schools for the first half of 2017 remains less than 50 per cent of previous year. However, the trend of attacks on schools remains consistent in terms of the type of attacks and their impact on children.\(^\text{137}\)

Teaching capacity remains overstretched. Over 180,000 teachers and education personnel are no longer in their teaching posts. The remaining are overwhelmed, resulting in an overall poor quality of education.\(^\text{138}\) Displaced teachers and students as well as those who have been under ISIL control, have psychosocial support needs that necessitate specialized interventions for effective teaching and learning. Quality of teaching is key to students’ performance, and teachers’ capacity is fundamental to children's experience of a quality education. Reliance on unskilled teachers with limited financial remuneration is impeding learning outcomes of students in public schools, with important disparities amongst regions and between IDPs and host communities.

A learning outcome assessment\(^\text{139}\) undertaken in March 2017 underlines substantial challenges related to learning in assessed schools, pointing out the need for continued support for quality education to ensure that children are not only safe in school but also learning. The assessment showed that 59 per cent of 6th graders, 52 per cent of 7th graders, and 35 per cent of 8th graders could not read a simple, 7-10 sentence story, the equivalent of 2nd grade reading skills. In addition, a recent Early Grade Reading Assessment and Early Grade Mathematics Assessment found that less than 10 per cent of 3rd grade students can read and perform basic mathematical tasks at grade level.\(^\text{140}\)

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*These numbers are not indicative of the overall scale, but represent only those incidents that the MRM4Syria was able to capture and verify.

**FRAGMENTATION OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEMS AND DAMAGE TO EDUCATION INFRASTRUCTURE IN SYRIA**

- Government of Syria (GoS)
- Religious curricula
- ISIL system
- Kurdish curriculum
- Syria Interim Government (SIG)
- Jabhat Tahrir el Sham curriculum

More than 1 in 3 schools are damaged or destroyed while others are being used as collective shelters and for other purposes

1.75 million school-age children and youth are out of school
The psychosocial safety and physical protection of school-age children has been seriously compromised throughout the crisis, with over 80 per cent of students reported feeling anxious, worried, or stressed. Children are facing constant challenges to safely access education and cope with the distressful impact of hostilities, especially for those that have been under ISIL-control.

Lastly, the education system is overburdened and overstretched with pervasive systemic challenges which risk undermining the sustainability of the education response. The nature of education delivery is fragmented, with shifting lines of control and a multiplicity of actors controlling different areas of the country and exerting control over educational policies. Curriculum and certification remains a major issue for the WoS Education sector, with 6 different curricula taught across the country which drastically hinders access to education and has serious implication on accreditation of programmes and certification of learning. For instance, ISIL established its own system and textbooks focusing on spreading their radical islamic ideology, leading to a significant decline in educational services, even bringing these services to a complete halt in many areas.

Legal frameworks regulating school registration and heavy bureaucratic procedures continue to negatively impact programming, timely school-level monitoring, reporting of education interventions and capacity development of partners.

AFFECTED POPULATION

Inside Syria, an estimated 1.75 million children, or almost one third of school-age children (aged 5-17 years) from the school-year 2015/16 are out of school and a further 1.35 million are at risk of dropping out. The dropout rate is higher in displaced communities. There are more than 750,000 children within hard-to-reach areas and about 127,000 within UN-declared besieged areas. Across Syria, nearly 2 million school-age children are displaced as a result of the conflict, many multiple times. ISIL and other parties continue to use education to indoctrinate and recruit children.

The vulnerability of school-age children with no access to learning opportunities has increased over the almost seven years of the crisis, putting children at higher risk of being exposed to exploitation, abuse and rights violations. The intensification of hostilities in some areas of the country has had a negative impact on thousands of children who were not able to access education opportunities, especially in Aleppo, Idleb, Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, and Al-Hasakeh governorates. Too often children are forced to suddenly leave their area of residence as schools have been closed down, have no teaching force available and do not provide certified education.

* In December 2015, ISIL imposed new regulations of compulsory education for all boys from grades 1 to 12, and for girls from grades 1 to 4, which is a factor contributing to child recruitment in ISIL-controlled areas: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/2016/360&referer=/english/&Lang=E
FOOD SECURITY AND AGRICULTURE

NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN NEED

10.5M

KEY MESSAGES

• Across Syria the main triggers of households’ food insecurity remain insecurity, the depletion of livelihood assets and sources which constrain households’ financial and physical access to food.

• As per current estimates, 6.5 million people in Syria are food insecure, while a further 4 million people are at risk of becoming acutely food insecure. In total this constitutes over half of the Syrian population who are in need of urgent life-saving and life sustaining food, agriculture and livelihoods assistance.

• Compared to last year, the number of Syrians facing acute food insecurity has slightly decreased from 37 per cent to 33 per cent of the population. However, the number of people at risk of food insecurity has doubled, clearly indicating further depletion of livelihoods assets and sources throughout the country.

• The total wheat production in Syria in 2016–17 is estimated at 1.8 million tonnes, representing a 12 per cent increase from 2016 but still less than half of the pre-crisis average of 4.1 million tonnes (2002–2011). The national average cost of a standard food basket decreased by 0.3 per cent between August 2017 and August 2016. However, food basket prices were still 90 per cent above August 2015 national averages and 800 per cent higher than pre-crisis levels.

OVERVIEW

The main triggers of food insecurity are insecurity, the depletion of livelihood assets and sources which constrain households’ financial and physical access to food.

Insecurity

Insecurity relates not only to the ongoing hostilities in many parts of Syria but also the accumulated effects of a seven-year long crisis and widespread displacement. Reasons for displacement include increased economic hardship and absence of basic services. The conflict has also resulted in the displacement of technically skilled people as well as semi-skilled labourers in most sectors, including agriculture. Monitoring conducted by the Food Security sector in 2017 noted differences in food consumption patterns between residents and IDPs, with IDPs assessed as having limited access to diversified livelihood assets and sources. Accordingly, areas with higher concentrations of IDPs, such as Idleb and Quneitra, are considered to be more food insecure.
Delivery of humanitarian assistance is affected by insecurity and heavy administrative procedures in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas.

**Lack of financial and physical access to food**

**Reduced food availability**: The agriculture sector is a key contributor to national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and represents the main source of income for the majority of people living in Syria. Since the beginning of the crisis, this sector has been significantly affected by a decline in crop production, reduction in livestock numbers (mostly due to asset depletion), destruction of infrastructure and services (irrigation, storages, veterinary and roads), contamination by unexploded hazards, land degradation, migration and the loss of human resources for production. The financial cost of the damage and loss to the agriculture sector from 2011 to 2016 is estimated to be US$16 billion. The total wheat production in Syria in 2016-17 is estimated at 1.8 million tonnes, an increase of 12 per cent compared to 2016. This increase is mainly attributable to better rainfall and some limited local improvements in civil security allowing farmers to harvest a larger proportion of their crop. However, the level of production remains substantially lower compared to the pre-crisis average of 4.1 million tonnes (2002-2011). While the harvested and irrigated wheat areas have also increased in most governorates (still less than 50 per cent of pre-crisis levels), in the major areas of production in Ar-Raqqa, Al-Hasakeh and Deir-ez-Zor governorates the crop output has not increased. Over the past two years, herd sizes have stabilized, albeit at a very low level, following a reduction in herd size at household level ranging from 47-57 per cent of poultry, goats, sheep and cattle.

Main constraints continue to be high fodder prices, insufficient coverage of veterinary services and access to grazing areas in many parts of the country due to the volatile security situation.

**Major Triggers by Governorate**

- **Al-Hasakeh**: Damage to agriculture infrastructure and limited access to markets due to the closure of trade routes.
- **Ar-Raqqa**: Recent and/or ongoing active conflict, massive displacement inadequate access to markets and humanitarian assistance.
- **Deir-Ez-Zor**: Ongoing active conflict, massive displacement, household reliance on high risk and unsustainable livelihood coping strategies and disruption of livelihood sources.
- **Idleb**: High concentration of IDPs increasing vulnerability.

**Aleppo**: Significant influx of IDP returnees and increase in prices of commodities.

**Homs**: Absence of stable livelihood sources and high prices of commodities.

**Hama**: Various levels of civil insecurity, livelihood and food insecurity.

**Damascus**: High concentration of IDPs increasing vulnerability.

**Rural Damascus**: Limited food availability and financial and physical access to markets for households in UN-declared besieged areas due to blocked supply routes.

**Lattakia**: High concentration of IDPs. Farmers affected by market dysfunctionality, inhibiting delivery of commodities to other urban markets.

**Tartous**: High prices of basic commodities. Agriculture activities are affected by lack of inputs (seeds, tools and fertilizers).

**Dar’a**: Both IDPs and the resident population have limited livelihood opportunities and depleted productive assets. Coping strategies are likely to further deteriorate with anticipated seasonal prices increases.

**Quneitra**: Half of the population is comprised of IDPs. Livestock prices are likely to increase. 90 percent of households already spending over 75 percent of their income on food.

**As Sweida**: Unavailability of water (including lower rainfall than other parts of Syria), high prices of agriculture inputs, non-availability and high prices of labour and machinery.

**Lack of income and low purchasing power**: The population’s main source of income continues to come from agricultural activities such as crop production and sales as well as livestock breeding (although there is a significant change in cropping and breeding patterns that demonstrate negative coping mechanism). Salaries and remittances derived from these activities enable people to purchase food. Despite a slight increase in wheat production, hyperinflation, the lack of other sources of income and employment opportunities continues to heavily affect household purchasing power. The purchasing power of casual labourers is measured by terms of trade. The purchasing power of casual labourers has been assessed as a nominal average daily wage rate in August 2017 of SYP 1,731 (US$ 3.4) and varied in different market locations, from SYP 950 (US$ 1.9) in Al-Hasakeh to SYP 2,070 (US$ 4) in Hama. As of August 2017, casual labourers were able to buy the equivalent of 6.7 kg of wheat flour, an increase of 24 per cent over six months and an increase of 27 per cent from August 2016. However, purchasing power is still estimated to have decreased significantly from pre-crisis levels.
Fragmented markets and high prices: The relative reduction in widespread active hostilities in some parts of the country has led to the reopening of some supply routes linking Damascus markets to other urban markets in the governorates of Aleppo, Al Hasakeh and very recently Deir-ez-Zor. As a result, the price of the standard food basket has decreased by between 15 and 45 per cent in some markets (Aleppo, Al Hasakeh and Rural Damascus governorates) compared to the beginning of the year. Furthermore, economic sanctions have also had a serious impact on the functionality of markets and affects the ability of markets to operate. In August 2017, the national average cost of a standard food basket was SYP 32,225 (approximately US$ 63), and was 0.3 per cent below August 2016 prices. Although this does represent a marginal improvement, food basket prices were still 23 per cent above August 2015 levels and eight times above pre-crisis levels. In general, the situation remains fragile as trade continues to be hampered by insecurity and mine contamination of supply routes, posing considerable security risks and inflating transaction costs for traders. Although there has been a nine and 17 per cent decrease in the price of diesel (per liter) and butane gas (per cylinder) respectively in August 2017 from August 2016, these prices are still more than 100 per cent above August 2015 averages. The removal of subsidies on certain goods as a result of the crisis, as well as hyperinflation across Syria, have contributed to a substantial overall reduction in purchasing power. For example, in Dar’a households no longer benefit from subsidies across various sectors, which 100 per cent of households benefitted from before the crisis. The table below shows prices of food basket, diesel and butane gas in August 2017 compared to the previous three years. In terms of percentage changes, prices are still above August 2014 levels, indicating that the situation is still worse compared to the pre-crisis period but at the same time shows some improvements compared to 2015, implying that some recovery from the initial shocks and stabilization of prices has occurred in some areas.

Depletion of livelihood assets and sources
Prior to 2011, agriculture was the main source of employment for 47 per cent of the population. Continued destruction of infrastructure has led to high levels of unemployment, with the unemployment rate as of 2015 estimated at 53 per cent, with a further increase over the last two years. For instance, in Dar’a, a large portion of the population remains unemployed, with most sub-districts experiencing employment rates of between 25-29 per cent, with the exceptions of Dar’a (46 per cent) and Izra (38 per cent) sub-districts. Repeated shocks, including multiple displacements and reduction in livelihood opportunities have contributed to an uncertain future for the majority of Syria’s population. As a result, people have resorted to multiple harmful food and livelihoods based coping strategies that have often exacerbated the protection risks they are exposed to. Harmful coping mechanisms include spending savings, borrowing money, reducing non-food items, and depelting productive assets. There are reports of a high proportion of households engaging in irreversible coping strategies in order to meet food needs, including selling property or land, and engaging in high risk activities.

ANALYSIS OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS
Those who are acutely food insecure and those at risk of food insecurity represent an estimated 54 per cent of Syria’s population. The severity of humanitarian needs in the sector was established through a rigorous set of protocols, whereby all available household level data on core food security and nutrition indicators was triangulated with contributing factors, conflict and context analysis and scale of humanitarian assistance. The sector will continue to update severity and people in need numbers as and when new data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOOD BASKET COST BY GOVERNORATE (AUG 2017)</th>
<th>% OF SEVERITY RANKING OF SUB DISTRICTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYP 32,225 National average</td>
<td>486% higher compared to 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deir Ezzor</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lattakia</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tartous</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idlib</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raqqa</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Damascus</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damascus</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homs</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasakeh</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quneitra</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleppo</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swieda</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daraa</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hama</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in thousand SYP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 out of 3 people in Syria are food insecure
bears the instruction. For instance, a food security assessment at household level was recently concluded but was not available for the 2018 HNO food security overview. Once available, the food security severity map and the food insecure people in need figure will be updated.

Reliance on food assistance for a significant proportion of Syria’s population is expected to continue throughout the coming year and access to a diversified diet will remain a key need to improve the nutritional status of the acutely food insecure. Furthermore, agriculture and livelihood interventions are critical to increase self-reliance, strengthen resilience and early recovery, especially in increasingly stable areas for both acute and at risk of food insecurity groups. Where possible, concerted efforts should be made to improve the linkages between people receiving food and livelihoods assistance to support households to decrease their reliance on assistance and ensure they can become self-reliant over time.

### PIN Definition

**6.5 Million Acute PIN**

* Includes 419,920 people in 10 besieged locations and 418,000 Palestine Refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PIN</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large food consumption gaps and extreme loss of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps in the short term. <strong>OR</strong> Marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with accelerated depletion of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4 Million At Risk PIN**

At risk of becoming food insecure because of assets depletion to maintain food consumption.

**Critical (28 sub districts)**

Areas where large food consumption gaps were reported alongside with extreme loss of livelihood assets. Action is required to save life through food assistance and livelihoods.

**Severe (107 sub districts)**

Areas where food consumption gaps are high or people are able to marginally meet consumption only through severe livelihood assets depletion. Action is required to save life through food assistance and livelihoods.

**Major (89 sub districts)**

Areas where minimal adequate food consumption was assessed but people are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in negative and/or irreversible coping strategies. Action is required to protect livelihoods and provide food assistance in certain areas.

**Moderate (43 sub districts)**

Areas where the populations are able to meet their minimum food needs without engaging in extreme harmful coping mechanisms. Action is required to protect livelihoods and provide food assistance in certain areas.

### Affected Population

Although all Syrians have been affected by the seven-year long crisis, several population groups are considered to be particularly affected by food insecurity. These include people living in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas, IDPs living in last resort camps/sites/collective centres, newly displaced populations, spontaneous IDP returnees and over-burdened communities comprising both IDPs and resident population. Furthermore, livelihood groups spread across the agro ecological zones of Syria, particularly, small to medium scale farmers, pastoralists/herders, small business holders and casual labourers, face either acute needs or are at-risk of food insecurity. At a household level, those with multiple vulnerability statuses based on gender, disability, high dependency ratio, shelter types, those that were newly displaced or displaced multiple times and returnee households who lost their assets and have to restart their livelihood, are considered more food insecure than others.
KEY MESSAGES

- Six years of conflict have severely disrupted the health system in Syria, leaving less than half of the country’s facilities in full service and resulting in thousands of avoidable deaths from injury or illness.

- Displacement continues to drive health needs, particularly in northeast Syria where the influx of displaced persons has left over 484,000 people requiring urgent assistance and further challenged an already overstretched health infrastructure.

- The lack of sustained and predictable access to UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas continues to exacerbate needs in these areas, depriving people of essential medical services and supplies.

- Syria is the most dangerous country in the world to be a health worker. Health service delivery has been critically undermined by approximately 107 attacks (72 verified and 35 in process of verification) on health workers and facilities during the first half of 2017 and 155 verified attacks (out of the 377 reported) during 2016.

OVERVIEW

An estimated 400,000 people have died as a result of the conflict, with Health sector partners continuing to work to deliver lifesaving primary and secondary care across the country under increasingly difficult conditions, including across active frontlines and in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas. In 2017 the continued damage and destruction of public health infrastructure put existing health facilities under yet additional strain, limiting the ability of vulnerable people to access sufficient medical assistance and critically affecting readiness of remaining facilities and availability of staff to provide services.

The Health Resources Availability Mapping System (HeRAMS) implemented by the Health sector in Syria, indicated that of the public health facilities across all 14 governorates and 105 health districts, (including hard to reach and UN-declared besieged areas) more than half of public hospitals and health centres have either closed or are only partially functional.
Of the 111 public hospitals, 50 per cent (55) were reported as fully functioning; 22 per cent (25) were reported as partially functioning (i.e., facing shortages of staff, equipment, medicines or damage of the building in some cases); and 28 per cent (31) were reported as not functioning. Of 1,802 assessed public health centres, 46 per cent (834) were reported as fully functioning; 22 per cent (396) as partially functioning; 31 per cent (565) as non-functioning (completely out of service) with the level of functionality (7) unknown in one per cent (seven).

It was reported that 46 per cent (51) of public hospitals were damaged, of which 14 per cent were reported as fully damaged and 32 per cent as partially damaged. It was also reported that 25 per cent (462) of public health centres were damaged, of which 7 per cent were reported as fully damaged and 18 per cent as partially damaged; while 66 per cent (1,183) were reported intact with the condition of nine per cent (157) unknown. Health centers and public hospitals in Al-Hasakeh, Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, Rural Damascus, Dar’a, Homs, and Hama governorates are generally located in hard-to-reach areas, with some virtually inaccessible to humanitarian partners. Electricity supply is disrupted and the majority of public health centers as well as 60 per cent of functional public hospitals require generator power.

Intensified fighting in Deir-ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqa governorates during the second half of 2017 has led to a rise in trauma cases. Nearly 99 per cent of all public health facilities in Ar-Raqqa Governorate are either closed or only partially functioning. In ISIL-controlled areas, health care provision is limited to the network of private service providers (18 hospitals; with almost all of them only partially functional and limited information about staffing and capacity available from only two of them).

Low immunization coverage adds to vulnerability, especially for women, children, and displaced populations, 39 cases of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type-2 (cVDPV2) have been confirmed in Syria, some 37 of which have been registered in Deir-ez-Zor, with one each in Homs and Ar Raqqa governorates. In addition, during the first half of 2017, more than 8,000 children fit the case definition for measles.

Seven years into the crisis, additional support is urgently needed to scale up services to address increasing mental health needs, with an estimated 27,635 people in need of mental health services through health centers, 61,788 people needing outpatient psychiatric care and almost 12,000 requiring inpatient psychiatric care. WHO estimates that one in thirty people in people living in Syria suffers from severe mental health conditions (such as severe depression, psychosis, or disabling anxiety) and at least one in five suffers from mild to moderate mental health conditions (such as depression or anxiety disorders).

ANALYSIS OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

Access to health care remains poor, especially in UN-declared besieged and hard to reach areas due to a lack of functioning facilities; shortages of health staff, drugs and medical supplies; and persistent clashes between various armed groups. Referral systems for trauma, emergency obstetric care and surgical services are insufficient, while there remains limited capacity for mobile clinics to reach out to fluid temporary settlements and host communities. The maintenance of medical equipment is also a core challenge, compounded by restrictions related to international sanctions on Syria, which prevent partners from importing critical spare parts.

DATA CORRESPOND TO THE PERIOD FROM JANUARY TO AUGUST 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total medical procedures provided</td>
<td>14 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total outpatient consultations</td>
<td>6 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incidents of violence against</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrupted services per month</td>
<td>&gt;99,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliveries</td>
<td>1,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trauma cases</td>
<td>2,950</td>
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<tr>
<td>Admissions</td>
<td>5,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Surgeries</td>
<td>6,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultations</td>
<td>83,130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TREND OF DAMAGED PUBLIC HOSPITALS BY MONTH (%)**

- APR 2014: 30%
- SEP 2017: 45%

**TREND OF DAMAGED PUBLIC HEALTH CENTERS BY QUARTER (%)**

- Q1 2014: 30%
- Q3 2017: 27%

* fully or partially damaged

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**Note:**
- Deliveries: 1,520
- Consultations: 83,130
- Major Surgeries: 6,310
- Admissions: 5,105
- Casualties (Killed: 50; Injured: 117)
- Disrupted services per month: >99,000
Key health needs and priorities:

1. Access to primary health care through an Essential Package of Primary Health Services—to cover essential health care needs of vulnerable populations.

2. Access to Secondary Health care including trauma care.


4. Maintenance and upgrade of epidemiological surveillance and capacity to detect, investigate, communicate and contain threats to public health security with early warning systems to minimize the impact of epidemics related to unsafe water, poor sanitation and hygiene, overcrowding, low vaccination coverage and other related factors.

5. Access to Reproductive health services and child health care (immunization, integrated management etc.)

6. There is also a dire need to increase availability of mental health services.

Affected population

Although all people have in some way been affected by the crisis in Syria and have a right to receive health care, certain groups are exposed to particular risks which render them especially vulnerable. As such, the Health sector will prioritize the provision of assistance to people living in UN-declared besieged and hard to reach areas; people exposed to high intensity of hostilities and areas contaminated with explosive hazards; IDPs living in last resort sites where freedom of movement and/or access to services remain limited and living conditions below standard; newly-displaced populations, spontaneous IDP returnees particularly in the first months of return; and over-burdened communities hosting a large concentration of IDPs and/or spontaneous returnees.
LOGISTICS

KEY MESSAGES

- Inter-agency humanitarian convoys remain crucial in efforts to expand the delivery of humanitarian assistance to UN-declared besieged and hard to reach areas.

- Coordination and information sharing across the Whole of Syria remains key in overcoming logistics gaps and bottlenecks, and ultimately ensuring a more coordinated and effective response.

- The Logistics sector expects to continue to fully support the cross-border deliveries through UNSC-mandated border crossings from Turkey and Jordan into Syria.

OVERVIEW

The Logistics sector continues to provide common services (transport, storage, transshipment, training, information management and coordination) as per humanitarian partners’ needs in Syria.

The Inter-Agency Humanitarian Convoys to UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas, organized in close collaboration with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), OCHA and humanitarian agencies enables the delivery of much needed humanitarian assistance to populations in need and, at the same time, represents a mechanism to increase trust between humanitarian actors and related authorities, build operational momentum, and ultimately increase access to cut-off locations. The success of these convoys is an important tool in advocating for unimpeded access to all areas currently not accessible to the humanitarian community.

The number of Inter-Agency Humanitarian Convoys has significantly reduced compared to 2016 due to difficulties in obtaining approvals. Furthermore, in light of changes in the situation on the ground, some of the previously UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas can now be supported through regular programmes.

Air operations, through WFP, were facilitated to Deir-ez-Zor City (airdrops) until September 2017 and to Qamishli (airlifts) until June 2017 when land access could be resumed. In light of the newly established land access to these previously cut-off locations, air operations were discontinued and free road transport for humanitarian agencies has been facilitated through WFP to these areas. The Logistics sector has been keeping track of humanitarian road movements to Qamishli and Deir-ez-Zor and has been liaising continuously with humanitarian actors to identify gaps and bottlenecks and find suitable solutions.

With the addition of the Aleppo warehouse in August 2017, the free-to-user storage space available in six locations across the country for the whole humanitarian community increased to a total of 16,429 m$^2$ from 14,000 m$^2$.

Cross-border operations at Ramtha (Jordan-Syria border) as well as Reyhanli and Kilis (Turkey-Syria border) have successfully continued in 2017. Cross-border operations under UNSCR 2165/2191/2258/2332 remain crucial in enabling access to areas of the country otherwise unreachable.

TOTAL CARGO STORED BETWEEN JANUARY AND AUGUST 2017 (m$^3$)

<table>
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<th>MAR</th>
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14,955 Total cargo stored (m$^3$)
ANALYSIS OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

As challenges and delays continue to be experienced, with long supply chains, complex customs procedures, instability in key corridors, and authority approvals, a strong information management and coordination system remains crucial to ensure that logistical constraints and bottlenecks are identified and common solutions sought.

There is a need to maintain common storage space, currently available in six hubs inside Syria (Lattakia, Tartous, Rural Damascus, Qamishli, Homs, Aleppo governorates), and explore the possibility of establishing additional warehouses in newly accessible areas of the country to enable the prepositioning of key supplies and ensure a timely humanitarian response.

Inter-Agency Humanitarian convoys to UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas as well as common transport services, including emergency air operations, cross-border coordination and transshipment services are required.

Seasonal fuel scarcity and an increase in fuel prices are expected during the coming winter. There is a need for increased fuel contingency stocks, storage and provision of winterization fuel for IDP shelters/medical centres for cooking, heating and other essential services.

Capacity-building through trainings and workshops is required so as to mitigate the effects of reduced logistics personnel and to enhance existing capacity.
NUTRITION

NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN NEED

4.6M

KEY MESSAGES

- Over the course of 2017, pockets of acute and chronic malnutrition have emerged in a number of localized areas.
- Women and children living in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas, overburdened communities, areas deprived of basic social services and displaced people are in urgent need of nutrition interventions and should be prioritized, to ensure that their nutritional status remains stable and improves.
- The limited access of boys and girls under five and pregnant and lactating women to lifesaving preventive and curative nutrition services related to Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) in emergencies, micronutrient supplementation, and treatment for acute malnutrition added to their vulnerability, especially those living under harsh conditions, or in areas with inadequate community and institutional capacity.

OVERVIEW

Although the level of Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) among under five boys and girls in the majority of the assessed locations was found to be within acceptable levels, there are still pockets in the Lajat area in Dar’a Governorate where the recently conducted SMART surveys detected poor levels of acute malnutrition. The SMART surveys of 2017 in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas indicate poor to serious levels of chronic malnutrition. IYCF practices in assessed locations remain suboptimal and are all below pre-crisis levels.

The sector severity ranking for 2018 considers seventeen nutrition-specific and sensitive indicators from other sectors such as Food Security, WASH and Health in addition to three cross cutting indicators related to access, intensity of hostilities and population movement to highlight the priority geographic areas to inform the subsequent response. The severity of the situation in the northeast of Syria appears to be greater than in the rest of the country and requires special attention. Across Syria, 66 of 270 sub-districts are found to be facing critical problems and in need of immediate humanitarian assistance (these sub-districts are located in Aleppo, Al Hasakeh, Ar Raqq, Da’r, Deir-ez-Zor, Hama, Homs, Lattakia, and Rural Damascus governorates). In addition, 121 of 270 sub-districts are categorized with severe problems (these sub-districts are located nationwide except...
for As-Sweida and Quneitra) and require urgent humanitarian assistance. The remaining 83 sub-districts were ranked with major problems and likewise require humanitarian assistance.

In light of ongoing displacement, anticipated returns, problematic access to health services and food, high food prices, diminishing employment opportunities and low service coverage, nutrition partners are forecasting more under-nutrition in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas as well as conflict-affected areas. Consequently, the sector ranks all UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas as ‘critical’.

**ANALYSIS OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS**

The 2015/2016 SMART surveys conducted in Syria indicated acceptable levels of chronic malnutrition (12.7 per cent) and acute malnutrition (3 per cent) in 11 out of the 14 governorates. In 2017, the sector focused on generating evidence via SMART surveys and surveillance systems from locations with information gaps such as East Ghouta, Idleb, Lajat (Dar’a) and Ar-Raqqa. The surveys conducted towards the beginning of 2017 indicated that there are acceptable levels of acute malnutrition in East Ghouta and Idleb. However, prolonged besiegement, especially in East Ghouta, has contributed to an increase in food and fuel prices as well as inadequate market access to food that has led to worrying reports about the nutrition situation in the enclave. As such, the Nutrition sector commenced a new SMART survey in East Ghouta on 3 November to better understand the scale and scope of the nutrition needs in the enclave. The results of this survey will be publically made available through the Whole of Syria Nutrition sector by the end of November, with the sector simultaneously moving to implement a scaled-up response plan to address needs.104,105

The 2017 SMART nutrition surveys do indicate pockets of emerging chronic malnutrition in all newly surveyed areas and acute malnutrition in Lajat (Dar’a). Chronic malnutrition is at a poor level in Idleb and Lajat and at a serious level in East Ghouta.106 These elevated levels of chronic malnutrition potentially reflect a long term inadequate dietary intake, including inadequate micronutrient intake as well as repeated infections in younger children, poor feeding practices due to low rates of exclusive breastfeeding in the first 6 months of life and inadequate complementary food in terms of quality and frequency. Although acute malnutrition remains of concern in East Ghouta and Idleb,113 the nutrition situation in Lajat is poor and could be attributed to poor infant and young child feeding practices and the limited availability of food in the area.

The analysis of data from Mid Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) screenings collected via immunization campaigns that reached a total of 525,469 children under 5, identified 5,972 with GAM, of whom 1,952 were diagnosed with SAM and 4,020 with MAM.12 These levels of acute malnutrition remain at acceptable levels, mirroring malnutrition levels registered in 2016. The MUAC screening levels are corroborated by the Ministry of Health (MoH) nutrition surveillance data, which indicates that GAM prevalence rates are close to the national average and other SMART surveys results with an overall GAM prevalence of 2.8 per cent.13

The nutrition situation among women of child bearing age (CBA) is generally poor across the country with GAM rates of 7.8 per cent for women of child bearing age, and at serious levels with a GAM rate of 11.5 per cent among PLWs in the Lajat area of Dar’a.114

Anemia is prevalent among both women (CBA) and children under five, with prevalence rates of 25.9 per cent and 24.5 per cent respectively which represents a moderate public health problem.115 Data from Idleb in 2017 indicates prevalence rates of anemia of 35.3 per cent among children, also representing a moderate public health problem. These results point to the possibility of other serious levels of micronutrient deficiencies among women and children.

The prevalence of infant and young child feeding practices are low and suboptimal. In the 2015/2016 SMART survey, rates of exclusive breast feeding were 30 per cent and early initiation of breast feeding were 35.9 per cent. The results
of a Knowledge, Attitudes and Practice (KAP) survey on IYCF from March 2017 conducted by cross-border Nutrition partners in parts of Aleppo, Idleb and Hama governorates indicated prevalence rates of exclusive breastfeeding were at 30.9 per cent (25.3 per cent - 36.8 per cent, 95 per cent CI), prevalence rates for early initiation of breastfeeding were 37.8 per cent (34.6 per cent - 41.0 percent, 95 per cent CI) and the minimum acceptable diet was achieved for 57.3 per cent (53.4 per cent - 61.1 per cent, 95 per cent CI) of those surveyed.

Livelihoods depletion, limited financial and physical access to food, continued high levels of displacement and unexploded hazard contamination/insecurity relating to the conflict have exacerbated vulnerability. The limited access to quality water as well as significantly reduced purchasing power that inhibits access to hygiene items, may contribute to a high prevalence of childhood diseases. These factors can negatively influence the nutrition situation, especially in the context of worsening health-care and service coverage that characterizes the situation faced by many people living in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas as well as people living in overburdened communities or among populations “on the move”.

Combined, these factors have the potential to further jeopardize the health status of girls and boys under five and pregnant and lactating women (PLW), increasing the overall risk of under-nutrition as well as the short and long term consequences impacting their nutritional and health status such as stunting and growth faltering, morbidity and mortality.

**AFFECTED POPULATION**

4.6 million girls and boys under five years of age and pregnant and lactating women are at risk of under-nutrition and in need of preventive and curative nutrition services in 2018.

84,200 girls and boys aged 6-59 months are acutely under-nourished, of which around 18,700 are in the severe category and are 11 times more likely to die than well-nourished children. 865,295 girls and boys under five years of age suffer from micronutrient deficiencies. 3.05 million girls and boys under 5 years of age require optimal feeding for adequate nutrition status while 1.55 million pregnant and lactating women require preventive nutrition services.

The nutrition sector will continue to monitor return movements to plan and implement the response for nutrition services as needed for returnees.
SHELTER AND NON FOOD ITEMS

NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN NEED OF SHELTER

4.2 M

NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN NEED OF NFIs

4.7 M

SHELTER PIN MAP

PEOPLE IN NEED

1 - 16,000
16,001 - 50,000
50,001 - 100,000
100,001 - 225,000
225,001 - 360,000
360,001 - 3,500,000

NFI PIN MAP

PEOPLE IN NEED

1 - 16,000
16,001 - 50,000
50,001 - 100,000
100,001 - 225,000
225,001 - 360,000
360,001 - 3,500,000

SHELTER SEVERITY MAP

NFI SEVERITY MAP
KEY MESSAGES

- Non-food item assistance continues to be an essential and life-saving need, particularly for those newly displaced or forced to relocate. However, the needs are diverse and location-specific – often going beyond, and at times in lieu of, core items – which require flexible modalities and detailed information of the changing needs at the community and sub-district level.
- Economic pressures are key drivers of need, with large population groups stating that the most widespread challenges are inability to afford rent and to afford needed non-food items.
- Shelter needs remain high and while the emergency response for the recently displaced and durable shelter solutions for returnees often receive most attention, there remains a significant population living in a protracted situation of displacement, whose shelters are often inadequate and below standard.
- Due diligence for Housing, Land and Property rights are incorporated in the shelter response, however, the requirements for demonstrating these rights present challenges to the delivery of the shelter response, particularly for interventions to support women-headed households.

OVERVIEW

As a result of developments and shifts in the crisis, there have been corollary corresponding changes in overall severity of need and People in Need (PiN). At the national level, the overall severity of needs based on aggregated scores has reduced for both Shelter and NFI. For Shelter, however, the PiN figure severity of needs based on aggregated scores has reduced for need and People in Need (PiN). At the national level, the overall severity of needs based on aggregated scores has reduced for both Shelter and NFI. For Shelter, however, the PiN figure

... reflects conflict dynamics, which have been characterized by increased intensity and localized access restrictions in some areas; a reduction in direct violence and relative stability in others, and urban and rural differences. In urban areas there is a high PiN in Ar-Raqqa, Aleppo, Al Bab, Homs, Hama, and Damascus and its environs. In rural areas of northeast Syria, as a result of high displacement from Ar-Raqqa and Deir-Ez-Zor, there has been an increase in the number of persons with poor access to services and markets. The populations in the (albeit reducing) areas controlled by ISIL remain largely inaccessible to shelter partners, limiting the ability of partners to properly understand and capture specific needs.

4.2 million people remain in need of shelter support in Syria. Shelter and infrastructure damage has taken place on a massive scale, especially after the heavy bombardment of densely populated urban environments such as Aleppo, Al Bab, and Ar-Raqqa. The scale of rebuilding and reconstruction is clearly beyond the capacity and responsibility of the sector and the humanitarian response in general. Continued emergency needs exist for populations displaced in/from areas such as northeast Syria and areas where local agreements are reached. On the other hand, a significant number of IDPs were able or would like to return to their communities of origin, increasing the need to repair and rehabilitate damaged shelters to move toward solutions for those able to return.

4.7 million people require NFI assistance, a 20 per cent decline from 2017, mainly due to improvements in market functionality in some areas where conflict levels are reducing and stability is increasing. The accessibility of NFIs is more stable than the previous year, with 24 per cent of communities reporting a deteriorating situation, compared with 72 per cent in 2016. However, needs remain substantial, both in terms of life-saving needs, particularly those among the high numbers of newly displaced IDPs requiring core, supplementary and seasonal assistance; as well as longer-term needs, among those communities requiring resilience-oriented support to help...
reduce dependence on harmful coping strategies. Relatedly, findings show a decreased need for standard/core NFI items and a significant increase in requests for items specific to the situation faced by certain communities or population groups. In 2018 this will put increased pressure on sector partners to design NFI interventions which are tailored and flexible to the particular contexts.

The sector and its partners are also mindful that a possible increase in IDP returns will require scaling up of specific, return-oriented interventions to address the unique needs of IDPs returning home after protracted displacement.

ANALYSIS OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

In terms of shelter, 5.3 million people live in shelters with multiple inadequacy issues, including lack of necessary bathing or cooking facilities, inadequate space, lack of privacy, lack of heating, lack of insulation, the inability to secure lock their home, and others. According to a recent study by the World Bank covering eight governorates, a conservative estimate is that 32 per cent of all housing stock in the governorates has been impacted by the conflict, with nine per cent destroyed and 23 per cent partially damaged. The damage and destruction varies across locations and between rural/urban areas, with some neighborhoods completely destroyed and beyond repair, and others with the potential to be salvaged. 3.7 million people living in Syria cannot carry out necessary repairs to their homes, principally because they cannot afford the materials and/or professional assistance required to carry out the rehabilitation.

As in previous years, the primary providers of shelter assistance and support are host families, with an estimated 400,000 households hosting others. Lack of heating and insulation from cold weather are the most widely reported shelter inadequacy issues, with lack of lighting and protection from rain also commonly cited.

The overall impact of lack of income and high prices is illustrated by the data, which shows that up to 1.2 million families cannot afford rent costs, leading to increased vulnerability and use of harmful coping mechanisms. Housing, Land, and Property (HLP) issues remain a challenge on many fronts. Repair and rehabilitation of housing is only pursued following confirmation of HLP rights; however, many displaced people do not have sufficient documentation (many never had proper or formal documentation or lost them during displacement), and the processes and infrastructure to formalize or recuperate documents is not uniformly functional or accessible. There is increased risk of eviction and/or exploitation with major protection implications (especially for particularly vulnerable groups), while there are also the risks of rights violations (either of owners or occupant) and future disputes due to the difficulties in demonstrating ownership.

Markets are essential in meeting shelter and NFI needs, with 98 per cent of people in Syria using markets to fully or partially meet these needs. However, there are challenges in accessing markets, the most significant being a lack of transportation, physical constraints, and distance. Security concerns also constitute a significant issue. The conflict has cut off a number of communities, increased costs to travel between/to markets, and significantly disrupted normal market functionality.

One thousand communities are almost completely cut off from markets and therefore cannot access any items. These communities are mainly found in northeast Syria, south Syria, Rural Damascus Governorate, and areas in the east of Aleppo Governorate. In those communities that do have access to markets, many items are unaffordable, especially energy-related items such as fuel, batteries and light sources. Unavailability and unaffordability of individual items are linked, indicating that restricted supplies may be driving higher prices, with the result that people in Syria are depleting their assets and increasing debt so as to meet their needs.

AFFECTED POPULATION

Populations in areas with very cold climates during the winter season continue to need seasonal support, with communities surveyed reporting heating-related shelter deficiencies (lack of heating and insulation) as the most widespread issue. The need for clothing and heating fuel were also among the most reported (first and third, respectively) NFI needs across the country.

Women, men, boys, girls and the elderly expressed somewhat specific NFI needs. For instance, large proportions of boys and girls expressed a need for clothing and shoes; large proportions of men sought heating fuel, light sources, and water containers; and women expressed a need for sanitary pads, and women expressed a consistent need for kitchen-related items; the elderly focused on blankets, energy and light sources.

In Syria, families traditionally listed the male spouse (i.e. not female) in HLP documentation. As a result of the conflict, Syria has an increased number of female heads of household and separated families. Given the above-mentioned protection risks related to HLP and the specific need for HLP documentation as a prerequisite to receive certain shelter assistance and rights, women face an additional burden in accessing their rights and this support.

The vulnerability of Palestine refugees remained highly exacerbated by the crisis. The vast majority (95 per cent) continue to rely on humanitarian assistance to meet their vital needs and access basic services. In 2018, it is expected that access of Palestine refugees to basic commodities will remain precarious. Low rates of unemployment, coupled with loss of businesses and price inflation will continue to jeopardize the coping mechanisms of this group, especially those who are internally displaced (more than 250,000) and reside in UN-declared besieged and hard to reach areas (almost 28,900).
WATER, SANITATION AND HYGIENE

NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN NEED

14.6M
7.6M acute humanitarian need

KEY MESSAGES

- Access to safe water remains limited for much of the population, with increased water quality assurances necessary to ensure the population has continuous access to safe water.
- Alternate water supply services and WASH supplies are available but they are relatively expensive, pushing vulnerable families to adopt unsafe coping strategies.
- Water and sewage networks require increased support, including power supply, to continue to provide a minimum level of services.
- People in newly accessible and UN-declared besieged areas lack sufficient access to critical WASH services and critical WASH supplies.

OVERVIEW

Before the start of the conflict, nearly 100 per cent of the population in Syria was served by well-developed, state-owned, centrally-managed water systems. On the other hand, sewage systems including treatment plants served only major cities while other parts of the country relied on simpler technologies.

Four comprehensive WASH assessments were conducted in 2017, involving individual household level surveys and the assessment of existing water systems. Despite some improvements over the last year, the results showed that many systems are only capable of operating at a fraction of their original design capacity, with many others nonoperational.

In many UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas, households have no choice but to turn to costly, alternative water sources to meet their minimum water supply needs.

Piped water systems, though dysfunctional in some areas, continue to operate to varying degrees of efficiency, with urban centers generally better served. Infrastructure efficiency seems to have been negatively affected because of the crisis, with the efficiency of chlorination infrastructure even lower. The non-availability of regular power supply is a critical issue for the majority of water supply systems, to the detriment of overall water provision in some areas. Additionally, while operations and maintenance dependability is generally low, the availability of qualified staff is slightly better.

BY SEX

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BY AGE

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SEVERITY MAP

PEOPLE IN NEED
- 1 - 16,000
- 16,001 - 50,000
- 50,001 - 100,000
- 100,001 - 225,000
- 225,001 - 360,000
- 360,001 - 3,500,000
Due to these limitations in water network supply, up to 35 per cent of the 25,000 households surveyed (70 per cent in NSAG control and 30 per cent in GoS controlled areas) are relying on alternative and often unsafe water sources to meet their water needs. In NSAG-controlled areas, commercial water trucking now accounts for up to 62 per cent of the overall household-level water supply.

While approximately 62 per cent of the surveyed households can still access water supply at a minimum cost from public networks and private wells (although this figure decreases to 18 per cent in NSAG areas), reduced incomes and purchasing power means that families are sometimes spending up to 15 to 20 per cent of their income in some areas, to secure access to an average of 57 liters of water per person per day. This is an indication that the majority of households consider this as the minimum quantity of water required to maintain and to sustain their healthy and personal hygienic.

Despite efforts to restore functionality of the water systems, around 30 per cent of the 988 water systems surveyed are still not operational. Among the 70 per cent of systems which are operational, and despite continuous provision of chlorine in several locations, it was found that efficiency of the water treatment, including disinfection processes, varies significantly between different distribution systems and can prevent disinfection in areas under both GoS and opposition control. This has resulted in increased incidences of water borne diseases in some locations.

Regarding sanitation, more than 98 per cent of the surveyed population has access to a functioning toilet. Sewage networks generally remain intact, although localized repairs and improvements are needed. Wastewater treatment plants in many areas are not in operation due to damage or non-availability of critical supplies and support. Sanitation needs in Syria are considerably higher among IDP populations living in informal settlements, collective temporary shelters or in camps compared to the rest of the population. In addition to general issues of over-crowding and cleanliness of sanitation facilities, assessments confirmed that protection issues, such as the lack of door locks and lights, lack of gender segregated facilities, long distance to the facilities as well as the lack of privacy and harassment on the way to facilities are considerable concerns for women and girls. Facilities adapted for children and for disabled people are also lacking.

Garbage collection services are primarily provided by local authorities in most parts of the country and usually provide a basic level of service. However, due to the lack of comprehensive disposal strategies and operational challenges, efforts are needed in specific rural and urban communities to strengthen and upgrade the quality and regularity of solid waste collection.

**ANALYSIS OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS**

Damage sustained to power networks has negatively impacted the continuity of water supply in many parts of the country. In addition, imposed sanctions have limited the import of critical water supply equipment like water treatment and disinfectant products, further complicating operations and the delivery of effective WASH programming. WASH survey results indicate that water and sewage networks require increased support to continue to provide a minimum level of services. Although water and sanitation services and hygiene supplies are available, they are relatively expensive. Therefore, IDPs and returnees are not able to purchase and sustain basic hygiene practices. Increased quality assurance efforts are required from WASH partners to ensure that populations have access to safe and adequate water and WASH services. IDPs in informal settlements, health facilities and schools are particularly in need of enhanced WASH services.
Overall, the incidence of waterborne diseases is comparable to last year, with general improvements in the situation. However, moderate increases in the incidence of waterborne diseases have been recorded in the governorates of Idleb, Ar-Raqqa, Aleppo, Deir-ez-Zor and Rural Damascus. Regular access, free movement and operational challenges are still seriously impacting the delivery of WASH support to affected populations in many parts of the country.

**AFFECTED POPULATION**

Due to the nature of WASH programming, support to WASH systems benefit the entire catchment population served in the program area, regardless of status or level of need. Information available to the WASH Sector indicates that IDPs are consistently worse off than resident/host communities in terms of access to WASH services and items. Particular groups also face specific needs with, for instance, women of reproductive age (31 per cent of the population) requiring support on menstrual hygiene management and diapers are required for families with children under two years (7 per cent) of age.

Although specific hygiene needs vary according to population group, household-level assessments confirm an overall good level of hygiene practices across Syria despite the protracted crisis. Except for UN-declared besieged areas, markets across the country generally remain functional, and the clear majority of hygiene items are available for purchase. The major barrier to accessing hygiene items is therefore the severely reduced purchasing power of families in Syria, particularly those who are displaced. However, due to the disruption of local markets, critical hygiene items remain mostly unavailable in UN-declared besieged areas.
ENDNOTES

1. Multi-sector assessment, 2017
2. Multi-sector assessment 2017
3. IDP Task Force, September 2017
4. UNHCR http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance , September 2017
5. NPM, September 2017
6. NPM, September 2017
7. The six population groups deemed as particularly vulnerable are: people living in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas; people exposed to high intensity of hostilities and areas contaminated with explosive hazards; IDPs in last resort camps/sites/collective centers; newly-displaced people; spontaneous returnees; and over-burdened communities (where over 30 per cent of the population comprises IDPs and/or spontaneous returnees).
8. CCCM Sector, September 2017
9. ICRC Customary IHL, Rule 14: Proportionality in attack: Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.
10. ICRC Customary IHL, Rule 15: Precautions in attacks: In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.
11. Health Sector, September 2017
13. Health sector, September 2017
14. MRM4Syria, July 2017
15. Shelter-NFI, Food Security, Protection Sectors, September 2017
16. Food Security and Livelihoods Sector, September 2017
18. Whole of Syria Protection Needs Overview, September 2017
19. Food Security/ Shelter-NFI Sector, September 2017
20. OCHA, Inter-sector Needs Analysis, September 2017
21. Statement by the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Syria Crisis on the recent escalation of violence in Syria, October 2017
22. Health Sector, September 2017
24. MRM4Syria, 2017
25. Education Sector, September 2017
26. Health Sector, June 2017
27. MRM4Syria, 2017
29. Multi-sector assessment, 2017
30. Whole of Syria Protection Needs Overview, September 2017
31. Education Sector, September 2017
33. Population and IDP Task Forces, September 2017
35. Whole of Syria Protection Needs Overview, September 2017
36. Displacement to Northwest Syria Preparedness Plan, June 2017
38. Whole of Syria Protection Needs Overview, Ar-Raqqa and Al-Hasakeh governorates profiles, 2017.)
39. CCCM Sector, September 2017
40. CCCM Sector, September 2017
41. CCCM Sector, September 2017
42. Food Security, September 2017
43. Protection Needs Assessment, September 2017
44. Food Security and Livelihoods Sector, September 2017
45. Food Security and Livelihoods Sector, September 2017
46. Protection Needs Assessment, September 2017
47. UN estimate, September 2017
48. IDP Task Force, September 2017
49. IDP Task Force, September 2017
50. IOM IDP Intention Survey, September 2017
51. IOM IDP Intention Survey, September 2017
52. OCHA, September 2017
53. OCHA, September 2017
54. Education Sector, September 2017
55. Protection Needs Assessment, September 2017
56. NRC, Displacement, housing, land and property and access to civil documentation in the north west of the Syrian Arab Republic, July 2017.
57. Whole of Syria Protection Needs Overview, National Overview, September 2017
58. Multi-sector assessment, 2017
59. Health Sector, September 2017
60. WFP Food Price Monitoring Survey, October 2017
61. UNICEF, October 2017
62. OCHA, WoS Response Analysis, September 2017
64. Education Sector, 2016
65. Food Security and Livelihoods Sector, 2017
67. Food Security and Livelihoods Sector, September 2017
69. Shelter/NFI Sector, September 2017
70. NRC Displacement, housing, land and property and access to civil documentation in the north west of the Syrian Arab Republic, July 2017.
101. For the purpose of this protection needs assessment, protection needs are defined (e.g. other sources), findings outlined in this analysis refer to this needs assessment.

102. Whole of Syria Protection Needs Overview pp 21-83, September 2017

103. The protection sector needs assessment analyses the selected protection issues separately for women, men, adolescent girls (aged 12-17), adolescent boys (aged 12-17), boys (0-11), girls (0-11) and persons with disabilities (Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment and Syria Hub protection needs assessments).

104. Among 2,272 communities reporting movement restrictions, 45% mentioned lack of identity documents are a cause of movement restrictions (Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment and Syria Hub protection needs assessments).

105. Among 2,280 communities reporting HLP issues, lack of documents was mentioned as a specific concern by 80% of them (Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment and Syria Hub protection needs assessments).

106. Ibid

107. For explosive hazards indicator: this percentage applies to communities located in sub-districts where 99% of conflict incidents have taken place since January 2015.


110. Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment and Syria Hub protection needs assessments.

111. Ibid

112. Protection Sector Focus Group Discussions

113. Ibid

114. Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment and Syria Hub protection needs assessments.

115. Ibid

116. Protection Sector Focus Group Discussions

117. Figures are from the Clash database. While there is information available on the specific nature and extent of explosive hazard contamination for certain locations in Syria, which will guide the mine action response in those areas, there is a lack of comprehensive information on contamination across the country as a whole. The clash database records incidents across all communities and therefore allows for the potential threat of explosive hazards to be compared across all areas. The underlying assumption is that conflict generates explosive hazards and incidents involving weapons with a failure rate, i.e., air-dropped munitions, heavy weapons fire, and improvised explosive devices, are particularly

118. Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment and Syria Hub protection needs assessments.

119. Based on protection needs assessment – those communities reporting injuries and deaths of explosive hazards were then asked for more information about the activity of those who were injured or killed. Some cited multiple activities, hence the figure above 100%.

120. Structured focus group discussions (FGD) in 172 sub-districts, Community FGDs, GBV expert FGB, MSNA, NPM monitoring project, UN Habitat community profile initiative.

121. Whole of Syria Protection Needs Overview, 2017

122. Whole of Syria Protection Needs Overview, September 2017

123. Whole of Syria Protection Needs Overview, September 2017. According to findings, domestic violence was reported as oc-
eventing in 51% of assessed communities and as experienced at least "sometimes" by boys (<12) and girls (<12) in respectively 45% and 44% of the assessed communities. Domestic violence was understood to refer to violence within the family (not solely intimate partner violence).

124. Whole of Syria Protection Needs Overview, September 2017
125. In communities where exclusion/discrimination was detected in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, older persons were considered amongst the most at risk, alongside different categories of single women with no family/community support.

126. Needs for specialised services (present but insufficient or not present but needed) for people with disabilities have been reported in 72% of assessed communities while needs for care mechanisms for the elderly were identified in 71% of the assessed communities.

131. Multi-sector assessment, 2017
132. Education Management Information System
133. Multi-sector assessment, 2017
134. Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU), 2017, Schools in Northern Syria Camps Thematic Report Issue No: 01.
136. Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU), May 2017, Schools in Syria Thematic Report Issue No: 03.
137. For incidents that occurred in 2017, longer time lapses occur between the actual incidents and their verification, due to increasing access constraints in key areas of conflict, including Idlib, Dara’a, Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor governorates, resulting in more so-called "late verifications". The number of verified attacks on schools for 2017 are expected to rise significantly as more cases are being verified and the final 2017 numbers will be reflected as such in the next Secretary-General's annual report on children and armed conflict in 2018
138. Neuroscience confirms that children who are exposed to violence and distress, including due to displacement, can have a physiological "toxic stress" response that inhibits their brain development, impacting their physical and mental health, behavior, relationships and ability to learn.
139. International Rescue Committee, Impact of War on Syrian Children’s Learning, March 2017
140. Chemonics International, The Status of Early Primary Education in Syria, October 2017
141. Ibid
142. ACU, Dynamo Report, 2017
143. These are derived from the nominal average daily wage and cost of wheat flour and/or sheep
144. Using the exchange rate of 1 USD = 515 SYP as of August, 2017
145. UN special envoy for Syria Report 2016; Confronting Fragmentation Report SCPR 2016;
146. MoH Measles Campaign, April 2017
147. WHO, 2017
149. Physicians Across Continents, Idleb SMART Survey, 2017
150. MoH Nutritional Surveillance, 2017
151. SMART survey, 2017
152. MoH nutrition surveillance, 2017
153. SMART survey 2015/2016
154. SMART survey 2015/2016
AAP – Accountability to affected populations
CBA – Child-bearing age
CCCM – Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CFSAM - Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission
cVDPV2 – circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type-2
DEA – De-escalation Area
EO – Explosive ordinance
ERW – Explosive remnants of war
ESCWA - United Nations Economic and Social Commission for West Asia
FAO – United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
GAM - Global acute malnutrition
GBV – Gender-based violence
GDP - Gross domestic product
GoJ – Government of Jordan
GoS – Government of Syria
HeRAMS – Health Resources Availability Mapping Systems
HLP – Housing, land and property
HNO – Humanitarian Needs Overview
HTR – Hard-to-reach area
HTS – Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham
IDP – Internally displaced person
IED – Improvised explosive device
IEDs – Improvised explosive devices
IHL – International humanitarian law
IHRL - International human rights law
INGO – International non-governmental organization
INSO – The International NGO Safety Organization
ISIL - Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISMI – IDP situation monitoring initiative
IYCF - Infant and young child feeding
MAM – Moderate acute malnutrition
MHM - Menstrual hygiene management
MRM – Monitoring and reporting mechanism
MRM4Syria – Syria Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict
MSNA – Multi-sector needs assessment
MT – Metric tonnes
MUAC – Mid upper arm circumference
NFI – Non-food item
NGO – Non-governmental organisation
NLG – No Lost Generation
NNGO – National non-governmental organisation
NPM – Needs and Population Monitoring
OCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PIN – People in need
PLW - Pregnant and lactating women
PNO – Protection Needs Overview
SADD – Sex-, age-, and disability-disaggregated
SAM – Severe acute malnutrition
SARC – Syrian Arab Red Crescent
SCPR – Syrian Centre for Policy Research
SEA - Sexual exploitation and abuse
SYP – Syrian pound
TAD - Transboundary Animal Disease
UN – United Nations
UNDOF - United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF - United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMM – United Nations Monitoring Mechanism
UNRWA – United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
USD – United States dollar
USG – Under-Secretary General
UXO – Unexploded ordinance
WASH – Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP – United Nations World Food Programme
WHO – United Nations World Health Organization
WoS – Whole of Syria
### Inter-Sector Severity Categorization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO NEED OF EXTERNAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE</th>
<th>NEED OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE</th>
<th>ACUTE AND IMMEDIATE NEED OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No problem</td>
<td>Minor problem</td>
<td>Moderate problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Major problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Severe problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Critical problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Catastrophic problem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACCESS STATUS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newly displaced people and/or returns (&lt; 3 months and incl. IDPs in sites)</th>
<th>No sudden onset IDPs/returns</th>
<th>25-30% Newly displaced of the displacement and its scale</th>
<th>30-40% Newly displaced of the displacement and its scale</th>
<th>40-60% Newly displaced of the displacement and its scale</th>
<th>60-90% Newly displaced of the displacement and its scale</th>
<th>90-100% Newly displaced of the displacement and its scale</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No sudden onset IDPs/returns</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NEWLY DISPLACED people and/or returns (< 3 months and incl. IDPs in sites)**

- No sudden onset IDPs/returns
- 25-30% Newly displaced of the displacement and its scale
- 30-40% Newly displaced of the displacement and its scale
- 40-60% Newly displaced of the displacement and its scale
- 60-90% Newly displaced of the displacement and its scale
- 90-100% Newly displaced of the displacement and its scale

**% of IDPS and returnees vis a vis host population**

- 10% 21 Sever Maof the population in the area is an IDP/returnee
- 11%-20% of the population in the area is an IDP/returnee
- 21-30% of the population in the area is an IDP/returnee
- 31%-40% of the population in the area is an IDP/returnee
- 41%-50% of the population in the area is an IDP/returnee
- > 50% of population in the area is an IDP/returnee

**INTENSITY OF CONFLICT**

- Population not experiencing conflict
- Population is experiencing minimal conflict
- Population is experiencing moderate conflict
- Population is experiencing major conflict
- Population is experiencing severe conflict
- Population is experiencing critical conflict
- Population is experiencing catastrophic conflict

**Compound index (% increase of prices of basic commodities (fuel and flour))**

- <10% range of compound index
- 10%-20% range of compound index
- 20%-40% range of compound index
- 40%-60% range of compound index
- 60%-80% range of compound index
- 80%-100% range of compound index
- > 100% increase in range of compound index

**Access to basic services (access to safe water and use of treatment)**

- Normal situation
- Unsafe source of water and 100-91% usage of water treatment
- Unsafe source of water and 90-61% usage of water treatment
- Unsafe source of water and 60-41% usage of water treatment
- Unsafe source of water and 40-21% usage of water treatment
- Unsafe source of water and 20-11% usage of water treatment
- Unsafe source of water and 0-10% usage of water treatment

**Livelihood coping strategy index**

- No coping strategies used
- Minimal coping strategies
- Moderate coping strategies
- Major negative coping strategies
- Severe negative coping strategies
- Critical negative coping strategies
- N/A
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This document is produced on behalf of the Humanitarian Country Team and partners.

This document provides the Humanitarian Country Team’s shared understanding of the crisis, including the most pressing humanitarian need and the estimated number of people who need assistance. It represents a consolidated evidence base and helps inform joint strategic response planning.

The designations employed and the presentation of material in the report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

http://www.unocha.org/syria

https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/whole-of-syria

http://www.hno-syria.org

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