Food Security Situation in Syria

Expanded version of the Food Security Sector Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018

Whole of Syria (WoS) FOOD SECURITY SECTOR
Strengthening Humanitarian Response
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Acknowledgements

The 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) of the Food Security Sector – Whole of Syria (WoS) – has been conducted thanks to the untiring participation of food security, livelihood and nutrition partners operating across Syria from various locations. More than 60 experts from 36 partner organizations, along with experts from nutrition, Shelter/NFI and conflict analysts gathered to assess the food security situation, based on evidence from a wide range of assessments. All partners who participated in collecting food security, livelihood and nutrition indicators required as evidence for 2018 HNO analysis, in the fragile context of the Syrian crisis, as well as all partners that have contributed to the analysis should be praised for their efforts and dedication.

The analysis proposed represents a joint effort under the guidance of the Whole of Syria Food Security Technical Working Group (TWG). The Whole of Syria Food Security Sector is highly thankful for their engagement.
Background

The Food Security Sector – Whole of Syria– organized a comprehensive analysis of the food security needs in Syria throughout September 2017 that entailed introducing the acute Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) protocols as a pilot in Syria. The results of the analysis provided the basis for the sector Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) for 2018, establishing the number of people in need (PIN) across the country, both acutely food insecure and those at risk of food insecurity, as well as the severity ranking of areas with such needs.

The HNO captures the needs of the affected population by each cluster/sector on a yearly basis and is the key document for strategic response planning that feeds thereof into the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP). It is an evidence-based analysis of needs by the humanitarian community that reaches a shared understanding of the current situation and its likely further evolution. It guides the implementation of the Food Security Sector response throughout the Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC), which is a shared responsibility of all sector/cluster partners. This analysis was conducted simultaneously by groups of food security, livelihood, nutrition and related sectoral experts in the three WoS formal hubs: Jordan, South Turkey and Syria, with participation of partners from the two other informal hubs.

Building on the success of previous years, whereby joint analysis was conducted with all hubs represented to determine a common understanding of needs and severity, in 2017, Food Security Sector (FSS) tried to further strengthen the process by applying the IPC approach for food security analysis. Partners across hubs were trained in conducting evidence-based analysis using IPC protocols and analyzed 130 sub-districts accordingly. For the rest of the country, the PIN was analyzed by projecting changes to the food security indicators and related contributing factors, and an adjustment was applied to the 2017 HNO food insecurity prevalence. The results of the overall analysis fed into a final harmonization exercise supported by the Technical Working Group (TWG) that consolidated the Food Security Sector needs overview for the whole country in Amman, Jordan, from 25 - 28 of September 2017.

The aim of this report is to complement the Whole of Syria Food Security Sector 2018 HNO section in the Syria HNO document. This report provides an expanded and in-depth overview of the food security situation in Syria’s 14 governorates, including information on the context, main drivers of food insecurity, people in need and severity ranking, in order to support the prioritization of needs and key operational recommendations. The annex is structured by governorate and provides more detailed information for each sub-district. It presents the severity ranking per sub-district, the population data projected for the 2018 HNO, the total PIN, the number of people per HNO severity rank and the percental proportion accordingly. An update to this analysis will be conducted as and when new data is available which will be most likely by mid-2018, when data on national food availability from the summer harvest will be available. Since instability and insecurity are deemed as some of the main contributing factors to food insecurity in Syria, any changes to the security situation will most likely affect access and availability of food at household level, and thus impact the proportion of household with acute or at risk of food insecurity.
SEVERITY MAP

CRITICAL
(28 SUB-DISTRICTS)
Areas where large food consumption gaps were reported along with extreme loss of livelihoods assets. Action is required to save life and livelihoods.

SEVERE
(107 SUB-DISTRICTS)
Areas where food consumption gaps are high or people are able to marginally meet consumption only through severe livelihood assets depletion. Action is required to save life and livelihoods.

MAJOR
(89 SUB-DISTRICTS)
Areas where minimal adequate food consumption was assessed but people are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in negative and/ or irreversible coping strategies. Action is required to protect livelihoods and provide food assistance in certain areas.

MODERATE
(43 SUB-DISTRICTS)
Areas where the populations are able to meet their minimum food needs without engaging in extreme negative coping mechanisms. Action is required to protect livelihoods and provide food assistance in certain areas.
PEOPLE IN NEED MAP
Food Security Situation Overview

As per the 2018 HNO, the Food Security Sector estimates that **6.5 million Syrians are acutely food insecure** and a further **4 million people are at risk of becoming acutely food insecure** due to their fast depleting livelihoods. In total, the groups of acutely food insecure and those at risk of food insecurity represent an estimated 54% of Syria's population.

Compared to last year, the number of Syrians facing acute food insecurity has decreased from 37% to 33% of the population. However, the number of people at risk of food insecurity has doubled, clearly indicating further depletion of livelihoods throughout the country.

People's food insecurity across Syria remains triggered by three main factors: insecurity, lack of financial and physical access to food, and depletion of livelihoods.

In particular, lack of financial and physical access to food is the result of a big drop in food production in Syria, lack of income and low purchasing power, fragmented markets and high prices.

The total wheat production in Syria in 2017 is estimated at 1.8 million tons, still equates to less than half of the pre-crisis average of 4.1 million tons (2002-2011). This big drop in wheat and food production in Syria is due to non-availability of production inputs, their high prices and the big damage in the infrastructure and services.

In August 2017, the national average cost of a standard food basket decreased by 0.3 percent when compared to August 2016. However, food basket prices were still 90 percent above August 2015 national averages and 800 percent higher than pre-crisis level.

Although all Syrians have been affected by the seven-year long crisis, several population groups are considered to be particularly affected by food insecurity. These include people living in besieged and hard-to-reach areas, internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in last resort camps/sites/collective centers, newly displaced populations, spontaneous IDP returnees and over-burdened host communities that include both IDPs and residents.

Syria's dependence on food assistance is expected to continue throughout the coming year, and access to a diversified diet will remain a key need to ensure adequate nutritional status of the acutely food insecure. Agriculture and livelihood interventions are critical to increase self-reliance and strengthen resilience and early recovery for both acute and at risk groups, especially in increasingly stable areas but not only, but also in less stable areas whenever feasible. If appropriate agriculture and livelihood support is not provided alongside food assistance, the caseload on such assistance will likely increase, and the availability of food will remain limited. In addition, livelihood support should take into consideration the high contamination by explosive hazards.

Additionally, where possible, concentrated efforts should be made to improve the linkages between people receiving food, and livelihoods assistance, with the aim of decreasing households’ dependence on assistance and thus ensure that they can become self-reliant over time.

### PEOPLE IN NEED

- **6.5 Million***
  - Acutely food insecure

- **4 Million***
  - At risk of being acutely food insecure

* Includes 490,920 people in 10 besieged locations and 418,000 Palestinian Refugees.

### ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY PIN

People are acutely food insecure because they are experiencing one of the following conditions:

- Large food consumption gaps and extreme loss of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps in the short term. **OR**
- Marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with accelerated depletion of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps.

### AT RISK PIN

People are at risk of becoming food insecure because of assets depletion to maintain food consumption.
The situation in Aleppo is characterized by progressive stabilization following the change of control of Eastern Aleppo City, and Western Aleppo being designated as a de-escalation zone over the next six months. Despite these improvements, and price stabilization in some areas, the food security situation in Aleppo remains volatile mainly due to the high number of IDPs in the area. Most of the IDPs already present in Aleppo are established IDPs (who may not return to their homesteads in the
next quarter). Furthermore, several sub-districts are still considered Hard to Reach (HTR) locations, mostly in the northwestern to the southeastern parts of the governorate. Local production has slightly improved compared to 2016 and markets are recovering. Food is available in local markets, however, it is not available consistently in small localities far from bigger markets. However availability is not at the same level compared to the central/main markets, and in remotely situated location prices have slightly increased. As a whole, humanitarian accessibility is good and is preventing deterioration of the food security situation in a few sub-districts. As of September 2017, the Food Security Sector partners assisted about 28 percent of the population in the governorate through food assistance and 5 percent received assistance through livelihood-based activities. While the less vulnerable population relies on salaries, savings, remittances, selling of productive assets, a large portion is still engaging in high-risk activities.

RISK FACTORS TO MONITOR

- Increase in food prices and restrictions in supply of markets especially in Afrin, Sharan, Raju and Sheik El Hadid.
- Internal conflicts in western Aleppo and risks of tensions in western and southern Aleppo, especially in Jebel Saman.
- Recovery could be hampered by lack of high-quality agricultural inputs due to international sanctions and ongoing impact of the conflict on trade routes.
- The current food security situation in a few sub-districts is prevented from severe deterioration only by the substantial weight of humanitarian assistance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Increase food assistance in the areas ranked 4 and 5 to ensure coverage of food gaps, and maintain food assistance in the areas with inferior ranking to maintain food security at acceptable levels.
- Provision of quick impact and short term agricultural and livelihood support areas ranked 3, 4, and 5 to increase self reliance.
- Rehabilitation of productive infrastructure, including irrigation, is crucial to re-establish livelihood of residents and secure job opportunities for long-term displaced population unwilling/not able to return their original residence area.
- Monitoring the influx of IDPs from Ar Raqqa and Idleb. There is potential displacement from within Aleppo in Q4/2017, and potential small-scale return of some Syrian refugees.
- Monitor if food availability in markets persists through May 2018 and ensure humanitarian assistance is delivered in areas where few alternative livelihoods are currently available until infrastructure rehabilitation.

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1 Average percentage of the population per governorate that has been assisted with food baskets as per Whole of Syria Food Security Sector dashboards, average from January to September.

2 Percentage of the population per governorate assisted through livelihood support (e.g. agricultural inputs, small-scale food production, asset building and protection, veterinary support, income generating activities, rehabilitation of infrastructure and provision of services), accumulative from January to September.
Al Hasakeh governorate used to be the breadbasket of Syria before the crisis. Wheat production levels have decreased by about 40 percent but the governorate remains the major cereal producer of the country, contributing to about 35 percent of the national wheat production in 2017. Since the crisis started, trading with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq has helped to relatively sustain the Al Hasakeh economy.

OVERVIEW

Al Hasakeh governorate used to be the breadbasket of Syria before the crisis. Wheat production levels have decreased by about 40 percent but the governorate remains the major cereal producer of the country, contributing to about 35 percent of the national wheat production in 2017. Since the crisis started, trading with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq has helped to relatively sustain the Al Hasakeh economy.
Al Hasakeh is a relatively stable governorate with two sub-districts (Markada and Shaddadah) under recent active conflict, which have been newly retaken by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Humanitarian access across the governorate has been relatively good since the re-opening of the Aleppo road (for the Syria hub), although can be restrained at times due to administrative impediments (for the Syria hub). Cross-border access has also been consistent but can also be potential impacted by unfolding events in the neighboring Iraq. Overall, access is steady with the exception of the two southern sub-districts of Markada and Shaddadah. Around 21% of the population are IDPs. New IDPs are still arriving from neighboring governorates such as Deir-ez-Zor and Raqqa, moving into Areesheh, Ras Al Ain and Al Hole sub-districts – mostly in camps. The main sources of income are salaries, remittances, sale of livestock, cash crops and unskilled agricultural labor. Although a good proportion of the population is employed by the Kurdish Self Administration (KSA), access to food is threatened by the risk of food price increases. This could result from the possible closure of the border, should political tensions increase between the two authorities present in Hasakeh or with tensions flaring in neighboring Iraq. High prices could also stem from a break in the main supply chain, due to the ongoing conflict across the country. As of September 2017, Food Security Sector partners assisted about 15 percent of the population in the governorate through food assistance and 12 percent received assistance through livelihood based activities.

**RISK FACTORS TO MONITOR**

- Security situation in the sub-districts bordering Deir-Ez-Zor Governorate where offensives were recently ongoing.
- Hyperinflation effects on purchasing power versus eroded incomes and strained employment opportunities.
- Humanitarian assistance access in the southern sub-districts (Shaddadah and Markada).
- Political relationship between KRG authorities and KSA.
- Border operations, which may have impacts on market prices in the North Eastern areas that rely mostly on supplies coming from Iraq.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Monitor and prepare for influx of population from Markada as a result of the latest offensive. In Shaddadah, prepare for humanitarian assistance once it becomes accessible.
- Ensure humanitarian assistance is responsive to market trends and local economies.
- Ensure access to food on the market for most vulnerable population (cash-based interventions where feasible and livelihoods related programming) and through the support to increase food production.
- Scale up emergency livelihood assistance to ensure early recovery of agriculture activities and increase income opportunities.
- Rehabilitate productive infrastructure, including irrigation, and conduct large de-mining operations and/or explosive remnants of war (ERW) mapping to re-establish livelihoods of residents.
Ar-Raqqa governorate’s current context is characterized by the recent offensive against ISIS. Insecurity represents the primary hazard for residents of Raqqa City and surrounding areas and is the main barrier for those seeking to return. Conflict activity has been most intense recently in Raqqa, Maadan and Sabka sub-districts, with consequent population displacements. IDPs represent between around 44% of the population in addition to many new arrivals recorded in Jurneyyeh, Al-Thawrah, Karama and Ein Issa sub-districts – in formal (transit) camps, informal settlements and host communities. The situation is expected to improve in the coming months as the control changes in most of the governorate, including Raqqa City. However, a certain level of instability might remain, due to high
levels of contamination and potential ISIS infiltration. The IDP influx from Deir Ez-Zor and Hama is expected to continue. Food availability is considered a minor limiting factor, except in the areas where conflict activities were ongoing until recently and market functionality has been affected. Conversely, food access is a major limiting factor, due to high food prices, reduced food production and low income. However, humanitarian support is absent in some areas due to recent conflict (Sabka, Maadan) or limited in areas with restricted access (Mansura, Karama). Due to the large amount of humanitarian support, overall the current food security situation has been prevented from deteriorating further in a few sub-districts. As of September 2017, the Food Security Sector partners assisted about 22 percent of the population in the governorate through food assistance and 3 percent received assistance through livelihood-based activities.

**RISK FACTORS TO MONITOR**

- Dynamics of the recent offensive on ISIS, and following this on the establishment of control in parts of the governorate (SDF versus GoS control).
- Interruption or reduction of humanitarian assistance.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Scale-up in-kind food assistance for the most hard-to-reach areas recently impacted by the conflict (Raqqa, Madaan, Sabka, Karama) targeting both IDPs and vulnerable host communities, and maintain Food Assistance in other parts of the governorate through a tight targeting mechanism.
- Implement cash-based interventions where/when markets are functional and the feasibility is sound.
- Prepare for substantial and gradual returns in Raqqa district (sub-districts and City) through adequate humanitarian preparedness and compliance with protection guidelines.
- Provide emergency livelihood recovery assets to the rural areas to ensure the recovery of agriculture and livestock activities and better provision of markets from local production.
- Rehabilitate productive infrastructure (incl. irrigation, markets, bakeries) to re-establish livelihoods of residents and long-term IDPs unwilling/unable to return to areas of origin.
- Undertake wide demining operations and/or ERW mapping (by relevant organizations) and risk education, in urban areas and especially in agricultural lands to allow local farmers and herders to resume their agricultural-based activities.
**MAIN DRIVING FACTORS**

- Unavailability of water (including lower rainfall than other parts of Syria)
- High prices of agriculture inputs
- Non-availability and high prices of labour and machinery

**OVERVIEW**

The main sources of income in As-Sweida are agricultural activities, remittances, skilled and unskilled labour, and civil services. The influx of IDPs increased significantly in 2017 and accounts for about 16% of the population. In As-Sweida, farmers used to depend seasonally on semi-skilled labour from Al-Hasakeh, but with the current limitations on movement they now depend on unskilled labor from amongst the IDPs. The main agriculture activities involve crops (chickpeas, lentils, wheat and barley), fruit trees (olive, apple, grape) and vegetables. Livestock is also an important activity (sheep, cows), the livestock numbers decreased in this governorate similarly to the rest of the country, due to selling
of animals as negative copying strategy to the challenging situation. The main challenges are linked to declining underground water levels and the unavailability of water (mainly rain fed) which requires more attention to integrated water management. Further challenges are the high prices and lack of quality agriculture inputs, high prices of labour and machinery. The difficulty in accessing grazing area was an important factor negatively impacting livestock, but the situation is expected to improve. However, due to the seasonality of these areas, support to the feed sector is highly required. Overall, markets are functioning and accessible. Levels of food security are among the lowest in Syria, but people increasingly make use of coping strategies to maintain consumption levels. Food consumption is particularly poor for IDPs in informal camps where access to food and safe drinking water is a challenge. Prices of the food basket have risen over the past two years. As of September 2017, the Food Security Sector partners assisted about 14 percent of the population in the governorate through food assistance and 11 percent received assistance through livelihood-based activities.

**RISK FACTORS**

- Declining underground water levels requires more attention to integrated water management
- Shortage and high prices of quality agriculture inputs impacting production.
- Further loss and depletion of assets through coping strategies to maintain food consumption levels.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Ensure regular and targeted food assistance in the sub-distincts with highest food insecurity levels and IDPs.
- Raise awareness and provide support to the sustainable management of natural resources (e.g. water, land) by introducing low-cost techniques (e.g. bio-gas, water harvesting).
- Strengthen the value chain of the main agriculture commodities.
- Rehabilitate productive infrastructure, including irrigation, veterinary, storage and re-establish livelihood of residents. Secure rural employment opportunities for resident and displaced population.
- Ensure access to food through supporting the most vulnerable population in increasing their purchasing power (cash-based interventions and livelihoods related programming) and by supporting households with agricultural inputs (feed, fertilizer, pesticides, seeds) enhancing food production and livelihoods and restoring local markets.
- Improve the linkages between food assistance and livelihoods interventions to shift from assistance to self-reliance where feasible.
**OVERVIEW**

Damascus city represents the entire governorate and at an estimated 1.9 million people, Damascus is the largest city in Syria. Throughout the seven years of conflict, the city became home to a large number of people fleeing violence in their governorate. As a result, Damascus has now become home to approximately 650,000 IDPs from around 440,000 in 2015. It is the governorate with the fourth largest IDP population group after Rural Damascus, Aleppo and Idleb. The governorate is mostly urban with a few peri-urban areas. Livelihoods in Damascus are heavily based around business trading jobs, government office job, commercial activities, petty trading and remittances. However there are not enough jobs and hence employment opportunities are limited for a wide group of society especially for the poorer part of society who largely depend on unskilled labour as a means of revenue creation in urban and semi-urban contexts. For example investment in the Syria’s agriculture and construction sectors is limited which are key employment areas for unskilled labourers.
in urban/peri-urban areas. As the security situation starts to stabilize in parts of Syria, it is estimated that around 5,000 IDPs have already returned to Damascus over the past year. It is also anticipated that returnees from abroad and other governorates will increase in the capital in 2018. The food insecure prevalence rate in this governorate is one of the lowest yet the acute PIN in absolute numbers is among the highest with over half a million people in need of food assistance primarily due to the high concentration of IDPs. Food is widely available in Damascus albeit at high prices. Food prices have largely stabilized in Damascus in 2017 after increasing steeply in 2015 and 2016 but still high and thus causing lack of financial access to food. This is especially true for basic food items such as wheat flour, bread, vegetables and pulses. The price of other commodities such as cheese, meat and dates instead has increased in 2017. The price of rice, when imported, also saw a notable increase due to the worsening exchange rate. The price of livestock and fuel (diesel and gas) are also increasing in 2017, as is the daily wage paid non-qualified labour.

NOTE: As per the below graph it is evidenced that non-skilled labour wage has increased across the board over the past year in Syria including Damascus governorate. This is likely a knock-on effect from Syria’s high inflation rate which pushed up prices across the country and wages are slowly catching-up. Yet the increase is not equal to the inflation rate (estimated at 47% in November 2017). Hence, people’s purchasing power remains very weak.

Apart from the high concentration of IDPs, other key issues driving food insecurity in Damascus city are high food prices, limited employment opportunities and households with highly eroded livelihood coping strategies. As of September 2017, the Food Security Sector partners assisted about 26 percent of the population in the governorate through food assistance and 0 percent received assistance through livelihood-based activities.

RISK FACTORS

- Even though stabilizing food prices remain high limiting vulnerable household’s food expenditure.
- With limited employment opportunities, households will continue to engage in negative coping strategies reinforcing vulnerabilities to future shocks.
- Conflict in Joubar and Yaromuk Camp and Tadamoun continues, hereby worsening the city’s insecurity level.
- Eastern Ghouta is close to the city and parts of Damascus such as Yarmouk camp and Tadamoun are under AOG control where the conflict intensification may lead to landing of mortars in the city.
- As ISIS is defeated in many areas of Syria, the number of suicide bombings/attacks have increased in Damascus, a symbolic city for the Syrian Government.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Increase food assistance to reach a greater number of food insecure households.
- Implement cash-based interventions where/when markets are functional and the feasibility is sound.
- Anticipate for an increase in returnees in 2018.
- Prepare a food assistance plan for Joubar, Yaromuk Camp and Tadamoun when humanitarian access is granted and security situation stabilizes.
DAR’A Governorate

**OVERVIEW**

Despite the recent development with the de-escalation agreement in the south, there are still a few contested areas as well as an inaccessible area in Ash-Shajara sub-district. IDPs constitute over one third of the population, mostly from the beginning of the crisis. Given the current stability due to the de-escalation zone there might be possible inflows from neighboring areas and small-scale refugee returnees from Jordan. There might also be displacements within the governorate from the most unstable pockets. IDP livelihood opportunities are still reduced and residents have depleted their productive assets and savings needed to relaunch livestock and agriculture activities in rural areas.

**MAIN DRIVING FACTORS**

- Both IDPs and the resident population have limited livelihood opportunities and depleted productive assets
- Coping strategies are likely to further deteriorate with anticipated seasonal price increases

**POPULATION**

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<tr>
<th>IDPs</th>
<th>People In Need</th>
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<td>898,910</td>
<td>628,861</td>
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<td>37% of the population</td>
<td>70% of the population</td>
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**ACUTE PIN**

<table>
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<th>2016</th>
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<th>2018</th>
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<td>393,487</td>
<td>400,371</td>
<td>628,861</td>
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**EVOUATION OF PEOPLE IN NEED**

- Moderate
- Major
- Severe
- Critical

**EVOLUTION OF PEOPLE IN NEED**

- 341,375 of the population are at risk
- 287,486 of the population are in acute need
areas. In addition, high contamination by explosive hazards in the southern strip of Dar’a governorate will significantly impact the ability of farmers and herders to exploit their livelihoods. Market supply – especially in Dar’a sub-district – is averagely good. Prices recently stabilized if compared to previous years, although at very high levels thus significantly reducing purchasing power, even for those households still counting on regular income or remittances. Coping strategies are likely to further deteriorate with the expected seasonal increase during winter of both food commodity prices, linked to increased cost of fuel and transportation costs, and also non-food expenditure with the upcoming winter season. As of September 2017, Food Security Sector partners assisted about 38 percent of the population in the governorate through food assistance and 10 percent received assistance through livelihood-based activities.

RISK FACTORS TO MONITOR

• Despite current stability or ‘status quo’, the area is under the influence of three different stakeholders that have been engaged in conflicts and might resume bigger levels of conflict.

• The current food security situation is prevented from severe deterioration by the heavy weight of food and livelihood assistance.

• If appropriate agriculture and livelihood support is not provided alongside food assistance, the caseload on such assistance will likely increase, and the availability of food will remain limited. In addition, livelihood support should take into consideration the high contamination by explosive hazards.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Increase food assistance in the areas ranked at 4 and 5 to ensure coverage of food gaps. Maintain food assistance in the areas where food security is at acceptable levels, due to significant food assistance delivered. Nutrition programming is recommended especially in the pockets of Izra, Bushra Sham and Jasim.

• Provide emergency agriculture support in rural areas, to ensure recovery of agriculture/livestock activities so that households can rely on their own production in short-medium term and markets receive better provision through local supply, which may contribute to price decreases. This can help with producing more food (increase availability) not only for those families but also for their local communities.

• Since the main driving factor of food insecurity is access, strictly monitor market prices for both food commodities and energy such as fuel and gas, which significantly contribute to the erosion of the population’s purchasing power, particularly in winter.
The population is two-thirds rural, whose main livelihood sources are agriculture and livestock. Specifically, the main income sources are cash crops sales, livestock sales, remittances, petty trade, and salaries. People primarily rely on purchases and, to a small extent, own production and humanitarian assistance (as this area was under ISIS control during the period of assessment, the reliance on humanitarian assistance was extremely limited). Data collection by Food Security Sector in May, 2017 shows food consumption scores that do not yet reach crisis levels, however in the
following months the situation has significantly deteriorated and is expected to worsen, especially in the southern part of the governorate and alongside the conflict lines. On average, IDPs make up 20% of the population, with the highest percentage in Deir Ez-Zor city (40%) and Al Mayadin (46%). Due to the conflict, which saw active ground operations and air-strikes between October and December in 2018, a high number of displacements are expected in the short term, both within and outside the governorate. Actions should therefore be taken in the direction of preparedness. Livelihood opportunities for the displaced population are very limited or absent and even the few residents counting on stable income such as salaries or remittances have poor financial access to food due to extremely high market prices. Humanitarian access is limited with the exception of Kisreh and the recently retaken besieged neighborhoods in Deir-Ez-Zor city, which was reached through air drops during the siege, thus allowing consistent food assistance to around 73% of the population of Deir-Ez-Zor city which corresponds to 2% of the governorate’s population.\(^1\) No livelihood assistance was provided as of September 2017. The active conflict will significantly affect access to food and livelihood activities in the coming months. Humanitarian Assistance is expected to be irregular and mainly contingent to the security situation and access.

### RISK FACTORS TO MONITOR

- Intensification of conflict and insecurity significantly hampering access to food as well as livelihood activities.
- Major displacements within and outside the governorate, which require adequate preparedness in the more stable neighboring areas.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

- Conduct Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment (EFSNA) and agriculture situation revision to establish targeting criteria for urgent interventions.
- Secure humanitarian access and implement urgent response throughout the governorate as soon as areas become accessible.
- Closely monitor the situation, including risk factors, household groups at risk (e.g. those who have lost breadwinners, female-headed households), livestock losses/recovery, access to agricultural inputs.

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\(^1\) As per OCHA besieged populations estimated number as of August 31, 2017, the number of people living in besieged neighborhoods of Deir-ez-Zor City of Al Jafra, Al Jam’ Al Kabeer wa Al Wasat, Al Bougailia, Al Muhajireen, Al Thawra, Al Jourah, Qosour, Rashdiyeh amounted to a total of 93,500 people.
OVERVIEW

The security, livelihood and the food security situation is diverse among different areas in the governorate (East, South-West, North-West). The situation has currently stabilized with the de-escalation agreement, but tensions could arise in contested areas and in eastern areas. Two-thirds of the rural population engage in crop production, and livestock. However, infrastructure and livelihoods have mostly been destroyed in the eastern part of the governorate (previously under the control of ISIS-affiliated groups) where agricultural lands have been contaminated by explosive hazards. This area represents a strategic location as it links the capital Damascus with Aleppo, Tartous and Lattakia. Almost 20% of the population are IDPs, mostly medium to long-term with a few new arrivals, but
additional displacements are expected from the north-western sub-districts, and recently IDPs left from the eastern part to Aleppo and Idleb. Although Hama’s population has usually relied on their own production (agriculture and livestock) for consumption and income generation, the conflict has had a severely negative impact on livelihoods. Particularly worrying is the widespread sale of productive assets (including livestock and land) especially in Kafr Zeita, Ziyara and As-Saan, as well as high food prices that are negatively impacting food security. Food expenditure is extremely high in the eastern part of the governorate, significantly reducing non-food expenditures. As of September 2017, Food Security Sector partners assisted about 30 percent of the population in the governorate through food assistance and 19 percent received assistance through livelihood-based activities.

**RISK FACTORS TO MONITOR**

- The security situation in Hama is mostly unstable in the North East, and generally unstable in the eastern sub-districts of Oqairbat and As-Saan as well as in the northern sub-districts of Kafr Zeita and Suran. Conflict might intensify and spill into Oqairbat and As-Saan, thus causing further displacements into Idleb, Aleppo and Ar Raqqa. Overall, the situation is diverse across the different areas of the governorate (East, South-West, North-West). As such, response activities need to be tailored to the varying livelihood contexts and needs.

- Food assistance is the main food source for around 40% of the population in Hama. If this is not maintained at current levels, the food security situation in these areas will be negatively impacted, in particular in As-Saan, Madiq Castle and Ziyara where people could face more severe food insecurity levels without food assistance. In parallel, if no agriculture support is provided to increase availability of food, then the population will keep depending on food support and will not shift to self-sufficiency.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Conduct Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment to establish targeting criteria for urgent interventions especially in newly accessible territories.

- Prepare for a further IDP influx in stabilized areas.

- Support vulnerable households with food assistance and agricultural inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, seeds) to improve food production and livelihoods and restore local markets, rehabilitate productive infrastructure as well as conduct de-mining and risk education to re-establish livelihood of residents, especially farmers.

- Monitor food prices, and as availability of food in markets becomes acceptable, support economic access of the most vulnerable through cash and voucher programming to support local markets and value chains.
MAIN DRIVING FACTORS
• Absence of stable livelihood sources
• High prices of commodities

OVERVIEW
Although the security situation has generally stabilized compared to 2016, it remains relatively precarious in most of the governorate. In the hard-to-reach areas of Ar-Rastan and Talbiseh, despite the disruption of supply routes and humanitarian access, the food security situation remains generally stable with a significant part of the population having received humanitarian assistance. In the absence of the assistance provided, the food security situation in the governorate would be negatively impacted. Sokhneh, Tadmor and Jeb El-Jarrah sub-districts were under ISIS control until May 2017 when GoS re-took control. However the food security situation remains fragile as humanitarian access to many
areas still remains limited or absent, although a great part of the population of these sub-districts has fled during the intense conflict in the first part of the year. The majority of the population relies on cash purchases for buying food. Markets are accessible and food prices relatively stable, with the exception of Jeb el-Jarrah where prices have increased due to recent clashes. As of September 2017, Food Security Sector partners assisted about 44 percent of the population in the governorate through food assistance and 10 percent received assistance through livelihood based activities.

RISK FACTORS

- Intensification of conflict and insecurity, especially in in Talbiseh, Ar-Rastan, Jeb El-Jarrah, Sokhneh and Tadmor and impact on livelihoods, which may lead to new IDP influxes, and disruption of the main supply highways.
- Interruption or reduction of food and livelihood assistance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Monitor a possible agreement to permit the return of IDPs in Sokhneh, Tadmor and Jeb El-Jarrah, and prepare plans for the resettlement of IDP returnees.
- Conduct market assessments to better understand the feasibility of expanding cash-based interventions. Based on results, ensure access to food on the market for the most vulnerable.
- Conduct agriculture assessments to guide livelihood recovery activities. Based on results, support emergency agriculture and longer-term infrastructure rehabilitation, including irrigation.
- Support access to job opportunities for the long-term displaced population unwilling/not able to return to their original residence area.
The main sources of income in Idlib are agricultural activities (crop production and sales, livestock breeding), skilled labor, salaries, and some remittances. The overall situation has somewhat stabilized since the de-escalation agreement – although many breaches are still occurring – which has to some extent resulted in IDP inflows from other parts of the country. In the past year the total population of Idlib Governorate doubled, due to the large number of arrivals from various evacuations in other conflict-affected governorates (Rural Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Damascus, Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor). Nearly half of the population are IDPs (44%). Due to the relatively stable situation, which is nonetheless still extremely fragile due to the presence of Ha’iat Tahrir As-Sham (HTS), further inflows from other parts of the country may occur. Additionally, the conflict has substantially impacted
infrastructure in many areas of the governorate since a significant part has been destroyed. Agricultural value chains suffer from low quality inputs, a high cost of agricultural inputs and a lack of agricultural extension support services previously available. Despite active conflict in the southern part of Idleb, humanitarian access has been granted only through two borders crossings from Turkey – Bab Al-Hawa and Bab As-Salam – and cross-line only for the two former besieged areas of Fouah and Kefrayah. Despite these high levels of assistance provided, large food consumption gaps and extreme loss of livelihood assets have been assessed in Khan Shaykhun and Sanjar. Food consumption gaps and the marginal ability to meet food needs are leading to an accelerated depletion of assets in 21 sub-districts. As of September 2017, the Food Security Sector partners assisted about 39 percent of the population in the governorate through food assistance and 25 percent received assistance through livelihood-based activities.

RISK FACTORS

• IDP returns remain minimal (due to fear of detention, arrest and eviction), however they may increase in the future. Meanwhile, conditions for displaced populations may deteriorate as access to employment opportunities and services remain limited and tensions with host communities rise.
• Presence of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.
• Fragile security in some localities. The security situation remains tense in sub-districts in the southern part.
• Interruption or reduction of humanitarian assistance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• There is a need for sustained humanitarian assistance (food and agriculture related-livelihood assistance) to ensure that the conditions faced by the most vulnerable households in the governorate do not deteriorate further.
• Ensure access of most vulnerable population through cash-based interventions and livelihoods related programmes, providing agricultural inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, seeds) in order to enhance their purchasing power, increase food production and livelihoods, and restore local markets.
• Rehabilitate productive infrastructure, including irrigation, and conduct de-mining and or mapping of ERW to re-establish livelihoods of residents. Secure job opportunities for the long-term displaced population unwilling/not able to return to their areas of origin.
• Closely monitor the situation, including household groups at risk (e.g. who lost breadwinners, female-headed households), livestock losses/recovery, access to agricultural inputs.
The main sources of income in Lattakia are agricultural activities (fruit trees, vegetables, crops and livestock) and tourism. The previously tense security situation in the neighboring governorates of Aleppo, Hama and Homs resulted in significant IDP inflows to the relative safety of Lattakia, which have accounted for half of its population. With improved security in Aleppo, Hama and Homs, some IDPs have been returning to their original governorates meaning that by the end of 2017 IDPs accounted for only 36% of the population. This has had an impact on the agriculture sector that
previously benefitted from the influx of IDPs through labour. Although the agriculture production in 2017 has slightly improved compared to 2016 and still much lower than pre-crisis levels, agricultural value chains suffered from a lack of quality inputs, the high cost of inputs and difficulties in irrigation. The production of food is affected by the high prices and non-availability of inputs, in addition to the natural disasters that happen in this area (forest fires, cutting of trees, strong wind and storms). Food is available in the markets, however surplus production cannot been exported through Lattakia Port as was the case pre-crisis. The food security situation in Lattakia is among the best in Syria. However, over a third of the population is currently food insecure and people engage increasingly in negative coping strategies to maintain consumption levels. Food basket prices have risen compared to 2015, but remained stable compared to 2016 with only a minimum increase in the last year. As of September 2017, the Food Security Sector partners assisted about 18 percent of the population in the governorate through food assistance and 7 percent received assistance through livelihood-based activities.

RISK FACTORS

- Potential influx of IDPs from neighbouring Idlib could put an additional strain on the population.
- Risk of further loss and depletion of assets through coping strategies to maintain food consumption levels.
- High prices of agricultural inputs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Ensure regular and targeted food assistance in the sub-districts with critical or severe severity levels.
- Rehabilitate productive infrastructure, including irrigation and re-establish livelihoods of residents. Secure job opportunities for the long-term displaced population unwilling/not able to return to their areas of origin.
- Ensure access to food through supporting most vulnerable population in increasing their purchasing power (cash-based interventions where feasible and livelihoods related programming) and by supporting households with agricultural inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, seeds) enhancing food production and livelihoods and restoring local markets.
- Closely monitor the situation, including household groups at risk (e.g. those who have lost breadwinners, female-headed households), livestock losses/recovery, access to agricultural inputs.
- Improve the linkages between food assistance and livelihoods interventions to shift from assistance to self-reliance where feasible.
Quneitra has faced high levels of conflict and displacement. Despite the de-escalation agreement introducing some improvements in security, the area is still at risk of confrontation and expected to remain tense, potentially impacting the supply of commodities from Nawa and Mzeireb. Almost half of the population are IDPs from surrounding areas many of whom have been displaced for a year or more. About 80% are living in rural areas. Due to the large amount of humanitarian support arriving in Quneitra, the current food security situation has been prevented from deteriorating further. Yet despite the high levels of assistance, the great majority of households still spend more than 75% of their income on food.
income on food purchases, except in AL-Fiq where people rely more on their own production. The main source of income is agricultural activities (crop production and livestock) followed by skilled labor and humanitarian assistance. The main source of food in Quneitra district is through market purchases. Despite the renewal of the de-escalation agreement up to March 2018, there is still the risk of attacks from Jaysh Khalid ibn al-Waleed (JKBW) and sleeping cells of ISIS affiliated groups, in the area adjacent to the sub-district in Ash-Shajara and Tassil, and a GoS offensive which might cause further displacements. As of September 2017, Food Security Sector partners assisted about 54 percent of the population in the governorate through food assistance and 9 percent received assistance through livelihood-based activities.

RISK FACTORS TO MONITOR

- Possible offensive in the area adjacent to Ash-Shajara and Tassil might cause further displacements.
- Livestock prices are likely to increase due to high feed prices and no available pasture until March, which will further affect the population’s purchasing power.
- Coping strategies are likely to further deteriorate with the expected seasonal increase of food commodity prices, linked to an increased cost of fuel and transportation in winter.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Prepare for outflows of the remaining population in Ash-Shajara sub-district towards neighboring areas in Quneitra governorate and maintain food assistance especially in the areas of greater IDP concentration such as Khan Arnaba, Breiqa, Bir Ajam and Rafid.
- Provide emergency agriculture support to the rural areas to ensure recovery of agriculture and livestock activities and better provision of markets from local production, which might contribute to price stabilization/decrease.
- Monitor prices of food commodities to anticipate further depletion of purchasing power.
In Rural Damascus, food insecurity remains highly severe for most of households in besieged areas, including vulnerable displaced and female-headed households with limited or no access to stable income sources. Additionally, around 50,000 IDPs are in Rukban camp, in Sabe Bayr, close to the Jordanian border where both food security and livelihood conditions are extremely dire (including limited access to water, health). Overall, the food security situation is expected to change during the lean season in line with limited own production and higher fuel and food prices. This will add more pressure on many locations especially in Eastern Ghouta where food prices have been very unstable and the highest reported countrywide. Despite access constraints during the past years, Eastern Ghouta still has a partially functioning agriculture system and some food enters through certain checkpoints, although is subject to heavy taxation and recently came to a complete closure which led
to severe food insecurity and malnutrition among children. WFP’s inter agency assessment\(^1\) conducted in Kafr Batana and Duma in October and November, noted that the intensification of the siege since early October has significantly impacted the food security situation of households in Eastern Ghouta, with reports of severe shortages of basic food commodities and soared prices compared to non-besieged areas. The worsening food security situation is attributable to limited sources of food, extremely weak purchasing power while there is an indication that households are not able to withstand any shocks anymore. Households are engaging in emergency livelihood and worst-off food consumption based coping strategies, including consumption of expired food items, spending days without food, and begging. The continued siege has also resulted in the closure of commercial supply routes and contributed to an increase in prices of basic food commodities thereby limiting households’ access to nutritious and diverse food items. Based on WFP market assessment data, the cost of the standard food basket\(^2\) in November 2017 reached SYP 421,200 (~US$817)\(^3\) which is 29 percent higher compared to the previous month, and more than 485 percent higher than in August 2017 (before the al-Wafideen camp crossing was closed). This is almost 15 times higher than the Damascus average food basket price, just 15 kilometers away. The worsening security situation also disrupted humanitarian access to Eastern Ghouta. As such, households’ food access is negatively impacted by blocked supply routes, high food prices, poor crop irrigation and disrupted humanitarian access. The area is heavily dependent on humanitarian assistance as the main source of food in the besieged locations and this dependence will further increase during the lean season with limited access through own production. Due to restrictions on allowing food convoy access into Eastern Ghouta, only eight food convoys entered Eastern Ghouta by December 2017 compared to 14 food convoys in 2016. As of September 2017 Food Security Sector partners assisted about 25 percent of the population in the governorate through food assistance and 7 percent received assistance through livelihood-based activities.

**RISK FACTORS TO MONITOR**

- Intensification of conflict and tensions, security is very fragile in contested areas and in besieged locations, supply routes for commercial commodities and access to humanitarian assistance.

- Interruption or restriction of humanitarian assistance, especially in Rukban camp and Eastern Ghouta enclave.

- Fuel is a huge concern. People have reportedly been burning plastic to generate fuel, which comes in different forms and is sold for cooking and other uses. In addition, access to water is very limited.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Urgently invest in saving lives and livelihoods given that already a significant percentage of the population is adopting crisis/emergency coping strategies that are expected to increase from January to May 2018.

- Ensure humanitarian assistance until livelihoods have been restored and prices have stabilized. In Rukban camp and Eastern Ghouta consistent access for humanitarian assistance is required.

- Conduct agriculture, nutrition and market assessments to guide the food security response and prevent further deterioration of the situation.

- Provide agricultural support to resume agriculture activities and increase own food production through provision of agriculture production inputs (seeds, feed, re-stocking, etc.)

- Rehabilitate productive infrastructure, including irrigation, and conduct civilian de-mining to re-establish the livelihoods of residents.

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2 The cost of a standard basket of dry goods providing 1,930 kcal a day for a family of five during a month. The basket includes 37 kg of bread, 19 kg rice, 19 kg lentils, 5 kg of sugar, and 7 kg of vegetable oil.
3 http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=421200&From=SYP&To=USD
OVERVIEW

Much like Lattakia, the majority of income in Tartous is derived from agricultural activities, and it also saw significant IDP inflows due to the previously tense situation in surrounding areas. The improved security in Aleppo, Hama and Homs, resulted in returns to governorates of origin, meaning that by the end of 2017 IDPs accounted for about a quarter of the population. The benefit of increased numbers of IDPs on agriculture was seen in Tartous, as overall agriculture production has increased in 2017 compared to 2016 but still lower than pre-crisis levels. The focus of production is on greenhouse vegetables, fruit trees and crops. There has been an increase in livestock (sheep and goats) due to the arrival of IDPs. Agricultural value chains have however suffered from a lack of quality inputs, the
high cost of agricultural inputs and difficulties in irrigation. In particular IDPs have been impacted by the high prices. An additional bottleneck is related to the transport of farm products outside the area due to export restrictions and the high cost and transportation, which resulted in oversupply in some markets and a high amount of food waste since the beginning of the crisis. As of September 2017, Food Security Sector partners assisted about 23 percent of the population in the governorate through food assistance and 6 percent received assistance through livelihood-based activities.

RISK FACTORS

• Potential influx of IDPs from neighboring Hama could put an additional strain on the population shortage and high prices of quality agriculture inputs impacting production.
• Trade and export limitations of agriculture products.
• Further loss and depletion of assets through coping strategies to maintain food consumption levels.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Ensure regular and targeted food assistance in the sub-districts with highest food insecurity levels and IDPs.
• Rehabilitate infrastructure, including irrigation and re-establish livelihood of residents. Secure job opportunities for the long-term displaced population unwilling/not able to return to their areas of origin.
• Ensure access to food through supporting the most vulnerable population in increasing their purchasing power (cash-based interventions and livelihoods related programming) and by supporting households with agricultural inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, seeds) enhancing food production and livelihoods and restoring local markets.
• Closely monitor the situation, including household groups at risk (e.g. those who have lost breadwinners, female-headed households), livestock losses/recovery, access to agricultural inputs.
• Improve the linkages between food assistance and livelihoods interventions to shift from assistance to self-reliance where feasible.
METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS

The Whole of Syria (WoS) Food Security Sector (FSS), Technical Working Group (TWG), which is a team of food security and livelihood technical experts from Cluster Lead Agencies and partners, provides support and guidance to the FSS on assessments and analytical methods to determine the humanitarian needs in Syria. The TWG has provided support to the FSS since 2015, in various technical issues such as development of common indicators, tools and analytical processes including food security and livelihood assessments, updating People in Need (PIN) and sub-district severity ranking.

For the 2018 HNO, the PIN figures were calculated through two methodologies – the IPC for 131 sub-districts and the adjustment of the food insecurity prevalence in the remaining 136 sub-districts. The FSS piloted the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) to analyze the food and livelihood needs in Syria wherever data was available for a representative analysis. This involved the training of 61 food security, nutrition and livelihood experts from 36 sector/cluster’s partners, from the three formal hubs and two other informal hubs, followed by three analysis workshops: one in Gaziantep and two in Amman from 10 - 24 September. This was supported by a team of experts from the IPC Global Support Unit, who delivered the training in the three formal hubs and also provided extensive technical support during the analysis workshops. Such analysis was planned only for 131 sub-districts, where food and livelihood indicators (outcome and contributing factors) were available for the IPC analysis. However, one sub-district was noted to have gaps in evidence required for an IPC analysis, resulting in only IPC being applied in 130 sub-districts. The IPC included rigorous analysis of food security and nutrition outcome indicators (food consumption score, food consumption and livelihood based coping, household hunger score, households’ dietary diversity score and Global Acute Malnutrition) and other contributing factors — price trends, sources of income, sources of food, number of meals, utilization indications (sources of drinking water and electricity/energy). Conflict analysis experts from operating partners (NGOs and UN) also supported the workshops by providing an extensive overview of the security situations in the country while projecting detailed trends and scenarios for the forthcoming months and year.

The TWG meeting was held in Amman from 25 – 28 September to finalize the humanitarian needs overview for the Whole of Syria. This entailed the consolidation of the IPC analysis from Amman and Gaziantep and determining the needs overview for the rest of the country, through a technical and contextual analysis of the food security situation at sub-district level.

In order to have a complete analysis of all the sub-districts in Syria, a sub-working group supported in establishing the methodology to determine the PIN in the remaining 136 sub-districts by identifying the indicators, based on available data. The main indicators that were factored in this analysis include the trend analysis of 2017 wheat production, food consumption patterns, coping capacity of households from WFP - mVAM analysis and analysis of food basket prices. A separate calculation process was also considered for the nine sub-districts that contain besieged locations. Such locations are considered to be highly food insecure since the siege limits both food access and food availability through both commercial routes and humanitarian convoys.
The overall combined analysis involved technical reviews and consensus on the severity ranking, PIN calculation from the IPC analysis for 130 sub-districts, updated prevalence of food insecurity for 136 sub-districts and special consideration for the besieged locations.

However, it also needs to be mentioned that there were some limitations in the analysis for the 2018 HNO PIN including the following:

- Unavailability of data for a uniform analysis of food and livelihood needs in Syria. The planned IPC pilot could not be applied in all the sub-districts/districts across Syria, due to administrative impediments delaying the analysis of food security indicators to be received for the 136 sub-districts.

- Not all partners were involved in collection and analysis of food security, nutrition and livelihood indicators that are required as evidence for HNO analysis. The FSS will continue to advocate for partners to conduct surveys that collect standard food and livelihood indicators, and that will inform analysis for the projection of needs in Syria.

- The rapidly changing security situation affects the timeliness and relevance of the food and livelihood analysis presented in the HNO for some areas. In order to ensure relevance of this HNO analysis, the FSS will continue to engage with partners in collecting and analysing data for updating the food security situation in Syria.